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 In tracing the history of the TIROS meteorological satellite system, this 
dissertation details the convergence of two communities: the DOD space scientists who 
established US capability to launch and operate these remote sensing systems and the US 
Weather Bureau meteorologists who would be the managers and users of satellite data. 
Between 1946 and 1964, these persons participated in successive coalitions.  These 
coalitions were necessary in part because satellite systems were too big—geographically, 
fiscally, and technically—to be developed and operated within a single institution.  
 Thus, TIROS technologies and people trace their roots to several research 
centers—institutions that the USWB and later NASA attempted to coordinate for US 
R&D. The gradual transfer of persons and hardware from the armed services to the non-
military NASA sheds light on the US’s evolution as a Cold War global power, shaped 
from the “top-down” (by the executive and legislative branches) as well as the “bottom-
up” (by military and non-military scientific communities). 
 Through these successive coalitions, actor terms centered on “basic science” or 
the circulation of atmospheric data were used to help define bureaucratic places (the 
Upper Atmospheric Rocket Research Panel, International Geophysical Year, NASA, and 
the World Weather Watch) in which basic research would be supported by sustained  




CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION:  
From Cornerstones of National Defense to Global Scientific Instrument 
 
 
 In September 1966, the Lyndon B. Johnson White House circulated a press 
release announcing, “plans for US participation in the World Weather Watch—one of the 
boldest and most complex scientific programs ever attempted as an international effort.” 
The brief explained that the President had directed eight federal agencies to engage in an 
international effort to establish a cooperative, worldwide weather service. As such, it 
incorporated scientific and technological advances on a scale “no nation could undertake 
alone.”1 Indeed, the World Weather Watch (WWW) network routed an unprecedented 
volume of environmental observations from meteorological satellites, weather buoys, 
automated weather stations, and hundreds of observer posts from across the globe in the 
interest of routine weather forecasting as well as amassing data for basic scientific 
research. Upper atmospheric research had unquestionably achieved the status of “Big 
Science.”  
 To many, “talking about the weather” seemed perhaps the most benign if not 
banal exchange possible. Since 1873 the International Meteorological Organization and 
its successor, the World Meteorological Organization had coordinated national weather 
service observations, helped standardize meteorological practice, and conducted special 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Draft Press Release, 19 September, 1966, file: Meteorological Weather Link, box: 15 
National Security File of Charles E. Johnson, Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library 
(hereafter, Johnson Papers). 
 2 
research projects.2 By the mid-twentieth century, their efforts had brought forth growing 
participation of national weather services, including in Europe, the postcolonial world, 
parts of eastern and western Asia, and the Soviet Union.  
 But talking about the weather could be problematic. The WMO’s gradual 
expansion was punctuated by world wars, regional conflicts, and other geopolitical strife 
when adversaries (US policy included) denied the international organization their local 
weather observations.3 The international network was composed of, unforgivingly, 
national units of participation. Due to the fact that this observation network relied on 
state participation for human resources, funding, and international legitimacy as a UN 
operating agency, it remained at least marginally at the mercy of political considerations. 
 Weather observations are “dual use” in nature— a valuable service to the public, 
but also the military. Observations from a satellite might be used to advance scientific 
knowledge of the atmosphere or be applied to forecasting, both of which are useful to 
both military and non-military communities. Satellites, themselves dual use products of 
national defense complexes, revealed new complexities to international exchanges of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Frederik Nebeker. Calculating the Weather: Meteorology in the 20th Century (New 
York: Academic Press, 1995), 87-88, Paul Edwards, “Meteorology as Infrastructural 
Globalism,” in Global Power Knowledge: Science and Technology in International 
Affairs (Osiris: 21). Paul Edwards, “Representing the Global Atmosphere: Computer 
Models, Data, and Knowledge about Climate Change,” in Clark Millar and Paul Edwards 
(eds), Changing the Atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance 
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2010.) 
3 Edwards, “Meteorology as Infrastructural Globalism.” To learn more about 
Reichelderfer’s war years, coordinating data and coping with wartime interruptions to 
international exchange, see Kathleen Broome Williams, Improbable Warriors: Women 
Scientists and the US Navy in World War II (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press, 
2001), 72-76.  
 3 
atmospheric data.4 Not only did these emerging technologies promise to become the most 
complicated and the most expensive instruments used for studying the earth’s 
atmosphere, they were the most politically charged. The capacity to launch them evoked 
the fear of nuclear holocaust; they challenged long-standing conceptions of national 
sovereignty and airspace; and they were so expensive, they could only be justified in 
terms of national security or prestige (itself a function of Cold War national security.)5 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For histories regarding the “dual use” nature of remote sensing equipment in military 
and/or civilian meteorology see: John Cloud “Imaging the world in a Barrel,” “Cold War 
Science in Black and White,” Pam Mack, Viewing the Earth: The Social Construction of 
the Landsat Satellite System (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1990), David DeVorkin 
“Who Speaks for Astronomy? How Astronomers responded to government funding after 
World War Two,” Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 31, no. Part 
I (2000): 55-92. “Cold War Science in Black and White: US Intelligence Gathering and 
its Scientific Cover at the Naval Research Laboratory, 1948-62,” Social Studies of 
Science 31 (2001) pp. 207-229. James Rodger Fleming, Fixing the Sky: the Checkered 
History of Weather and Climate Control (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 
165-188. Erik Conway, “The World According to GARP: Scientific Internationalism and 
the Construction of Global Meteorology, 1961-1980,” in Margaret Vining and Barton 
Hacker (eds), Science in Uniform, Uniforms in Science (Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow 
Press, 2007), Ronald Doel and Kristine Harper, “Prometheus Unleashed: Science as a 
Diplomatic Weapon in the Lyndon Johnson Administration,” Osiris 21, Kristine C. 
Harper, “Boundaries of Research: Civilian Leadership, Military funding, and the 
International Network Surrounding the Development of Numerical Weather Prediction in 
the US,” (PhD diss., Oregon State University, 2003), Kristine Harper, Weather by the 
Numbers: the Genesis of Modern Meteorology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008). 
5 There were many linkages in press and politics regarding the inaccurate presumption 
that if the Soviet Union was capable of launching a satellite in orbit, it could be equated 
with the ability to accurately launch an ICBM at the United States. In fact, Asif Siddiqi 
notes that the first successful launch of an R-7 ICBM occurred on Aug 21, 1957, roughly 
six weeks before Sputnik. In an unusual act of publicizing a military achievement, Soviet 
authorities communicated the successful launch of a “super-long-range, intercontinental 
ballistic missile” at a “hitherto unattained altitude.” However the US press demonstrated 
little, if any interest. See Asif Siddiqi, Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge 
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2000),161-162.  
 
 4 
 Reconsidering classic narratives of superpower rivalry, this study maps how 
contrary to experience in past geopolitical conflicts, US and Soviet Cold War statesmen 
aligned state policy with the desires of scientific practitioners to greatly enhance, and in 
time, stabilize the international circulation of upper atmospheric observations in the 
International Geophysical Year (IGY) and later World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO). Shortly after construction of the Berlin wall and just a few months before the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, representatives of the US and Soviet scientific communities met to 
discuss trading meteorological satellite data. In many regards, President John F. Kennedy 
and Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s agreement to trade weather satellite data was intended 
as a diplomatic gesture to garner international goodwill and relieve global tension. This 
dissertation details the many years of policymaking and scientific precedent that rendered 
their highly politicized offer technically and practically viable. The blessing of heads of 
state was necessary for the US scientific community to share weather satellite images 
with Soviet partners. Once the Kennedy administration had secured Khrushchev’s 
commitment to the project, the US Weather Bureau (USWB) and National Aeronatics 
and Space Administration (NASA) could begin expanding upon a bilateral mandate and 
establish a world order for trading satellite data as well as more traditional atmospheric 
observations already being circulated in the World Meteorological Organization. 
 As Chapter One’s title indicates, this dissertation is about getting to the global. At 
a series of junctures in this dissertation, the delineation of activities or institutions as 
being involved in or performing basic research or other activities specifically not directed 
toward developing military applications instituted bureaucratic “places” as more neutral 
 5 
“trading zones.”6 Through these research activities, sounding rocket and satellite 
technologies (read: missile and reconnaissance technologies) were transferred first out of 
the field of missile science. Meteorological instruments were transferred to use in a 
scientific earth satellite system supporting earth science research in the International 
Geophysical Year (IGY), then transferred to NASA, and finally used for cooperation in 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Peter Galison, “Trading Zone: Coordinating Action and Belief,” in Mario Biagioli, ed, 
The Science Studies Reader (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 137-160. Galison 
characterizes interactions among three subcultures of physics including instrumentation, 
experimentation, and theory. While these subcultures of the physics community attach 
different meaning to trading zone objects, they can collaborate and come to consensus on 




Table 1.1 Chapters and R&D Coalitions 
 
 Basic Research 
Coordinated 
Yielded International Inputs 
Chapter Two 
UARRP 1945-1958 
DOD labs’, universities’ 
sounding rocket 
payloads and launch  




active in International 
Scientific Unions, 
competition with Soviet 
Union a driver in R&D 
Chapter Three 
IGY 1957-19587 
Mix of 67 countries’ 





UARRP and NAS 
coordinated for 
Vanguard satellite 
New technologies, new 
(but temporary) 
geopolitical accesses to 
data, access to satellite 
orbit 
 
Skills for satellite design 
and launch; no follow-
on program 
67 nations coordinated 
observations and shared 
data; Sputnik shock led 






Basic research supports 






Sustained support for 
basic research and 
civilian R&D, this 
sustained US research 
and researchers from 
IGY 
 
But DOD has TIROS 
meteorological satellite 
program 












TIROS technology and 
DOD funds to NASA  
Tracking stations across 
globe, cloud imagery 
shared with international 
partners, training in 




WMO member nations’ 






access, orders of 
magnitude more data 





 Tracing the evolution of a remote sensing system through five phases, this 
dissertation documents the means by which a succession of coalition interest groups 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Extended so that it lasted from the summer of 1958 through the end of 1959. 
8 Planning began in 1958, transferred to NASA 1959, launched 1960. 
9 Planning began 1962, operational 1964. 
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negotiated with executive and legislative authorities to reshape US science and 
technology policy. 10 This, in turn, shaped US international relations. Intervening at 
critical junctures, the researchers and middle management featured here established that 
select UARRP environmental observations produced by military sounding rockets would 
be treated as basic research, and therefore limited as little as possible by classification 
restrictions (Chapter Two). Whereas the Eisenhower Administration intended for the 
US’s first satellite to be an inexpensive and simple “stalking horse”11 to assure the US’s 
right to satellite overflight of foreign territory, sounding rocket and satellite researchers 
worked to ensure that the US’s first satellite establish scientifically relevant precedents of 
data circulation and develop a satellite system with more experiments and more 
capabilities. All of these resulted in a higher cost than desired by the Eisenhower 
Administration, but sustainable infrastructure (Chapter Three). Post-Sputnik, a couple 
dozen IGY rocket and satellite researchers consulted with Congress and the White House 
over the formation of a National Space Establishment, pointing out how basic research 
performed in a non-military establishment would support US defense activities in space 
but also US and international civil society.12 Many of these persons then transferred to 
the newly formed non-military research centers of NASA (Chapter Four). Long alarmed 
by the perceived encroachment of defense research and development (R&D) funding into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Remote sensing is broadly defined today as a method of obtaining information about 
the properties of an object without coming into physical contact with that object. AMS 
Glossary of Meteorology http://glossary.ametsoc.org/wiki/Remote_sensing 
11 Allan Needell, Science, Cold War, and the American State: Lloyd V. Berkner and the 
Balance of Professional Ideals (Australia: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000), 325. 
See also Cargill Hall in NASA Exploring the Unknown Vol. I: Organizing for 
Exploration (Washington, D.C.; NASA SP 4407), 222. 
12 These key representatives of the budding space science community wrote two well-
circulated proposals for a National Space Establishment. See Appendix B for one 
proposal and list of signers.  
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civilian spheres of influence (in particular the universities and basic research) Weather 
Bureau administrators labored to assert their own percieved federal mandate to perform 
basic research. USWB officials began taking aggressive strides in 1957 and 1958 to 
establish the US Weather Bureau as the central power acquiring and routing 
meteorological satellite data. At this time, NASA officials actively sought transfer of the 
department of defense’s experimental meteorological satellite system to NASA (Chapter 
Five). Between 1962 and 1964, NASA and USWB officials expanded upon a presidential 
bilateral mandate to trade weather satellite observations with the Soviet Union, 
committing the US to a position of leadership in the formation of a multilateral WWW 
(Chapter Six). Through these successive steps, cornerstones of US national defense—
including reconnaissance satellite cameras, missile tracking technologies, ICBM launch 
vehicles, and hundreds of scientists and engineers were re-mobilized under wholly new 
organizational logics.  
 From the perspective of the meteorological community and the rocket and 
satellite R&D communities, these steps were not viewed as a means of regulating military 
power, nor taken at the expense of tactical capabilities. Indeed, data from research 
conducted in the International Geophysical Year and World Weather Watch supported 
“hard power” activities inherent to Strategic Air Command, reconnaissance satellite 
operations, tactical operations in the field, and for working up weather forecasts 
concerning forward operating bases and enemy territory abroad.13 The resulting network 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Hard power is most broadly characterized as military or economic might, as either 
carrot-inducements or stick-threats. Joseph Nye, former Assistant Secretary of Defense 
contrasts hard power with soft power. Nye describes soft power as being co-optive 
power, the ability to shape what others want. Joseph Nye, Soft Power: the Means to 
Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 5-7. 
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increased the circulation of atmospheric observations. It secured more resources for non-
military institutions such as the USWB, the University Center for Atmospheric Research, 
and the National Center for Atmospheric Research; it sustained input from the US armed 
services; and it greatly increased data circulation among the US and World 
Meteorological Organization partners. 
The Meteorologists and the Space Science Community 1946-1958 
 
 This study tracks a decade-long interplay between the meteorological community 
and the space science community before their interests converged in a national 
meteorological satellite system in 1958. From 1946 through 1958, the US space science 
community developed a variety of launch systems and scientific instruments, used for 
observing the upper atmosphere.14 During this time the meteorological community 
recognized the promise of very high altitude observations, but did not pursue the 
resources for their own rocket and satellite systems, distinct of military labs. The space 
science community for their part remained open to observers of panel proceedings and 
readily shared observations in the scientific press as well as personal correspondence.  
 By the phrase “space science community,” I refer to a series of coordinating 
panels that designed, constructed, experimented with, and operated sounding rockets and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Homer Newell, who would serve as NASA’s assistant director for space sciences, 
deputy director for spaceflight programs, director for space sciences, associate 
administrator for space science and applications, and finally associate administrator of 
NASA defines space science as “scientific investigations made possible or significantly 
aided by rockets, satellites, and space probes.“ Historian David DeVorkin has explained 
how over these years the rocket research communities transitioned from being more 
developmentally-oriented, honing the engineering skills to launch instruments into the 
upper atmosphere and how later, their scientific findings came to be accepted by more 
established scientific communities. David DeVorkin, Science with a Vengeance: How the 
Military Created the US Space Sciences After WWII (New York: Springer Verlag), 1992.  
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later satellites. One panel (see Appendix A for details on member institutions and Panel 
interests over time) changed names three times without drastically changing composition 
or mission. In 1946 it began as the V-2 Rocket Research Panel, so named because the US 
Army had invited university, federal, and industry researchers to place scientific 
instruments in the nose cones of captured German V-2s. The Panel flourished and, due to 
the dwindling number of V-2s and proliferation of alternative sounding rockets, changed 
its name to the Upper Atmospheric Rocket Research Panel in 1948. In 1955, the Panel 
changed its name again when its members began coordinating contributions for the IGY 
Vanguard satellite.15 The Rocket and Satellite Research Panel (RSRP) lasted until 1960 
when its members had completed their International Geophysical Year work and NASA 
had superseded its function coordinating launch services with the scientific communities 
interested in sending research equipment into the upper atmosphere and earth orbit.16  
 Throughout scientific explorations and observations in the International 
Geophysical Year, the RSRP functioned as node around which various research 
communities coordinated resources and operations. Central to the RSRP activities were 
sounding rocket flights and later, the design and operation of the Vanguard and Explorer 
satellite systems. In 1958 the entire Vanguard team, their satellite support systems, and 
the remaining satellite manifest was transferred by executive order to NASA, composing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Vanguard was by definition an interservice project with Army and Navy contributions, 
but managed by the Naval Research Laboratory’s Vanguard Division. 
16 The IGY began in 1957 and was extended to last through 1959. During this time sixty-
seven nations coordinated geophysical observation of the earth, sharing data and 
circulating their findings in national and international publications and meetings. The 
Sputnik, Vanguard, and Explorer satellites were all Soviet and US contributions to the 
IGY. Numerous sounding rocket experiments were also conducted during this time. 
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the nucleus of what would become NASA’s Goddard Spaceflight Center.17 In 1959, 
NASA’s Vanguard Division began to advise NASA Administrator Keith Glennan on the 
transfer of the military meteorological satellite system TIROS, to NASA for launch and 
operation.18 
 Cooperation between the space science communities and the meteorological 
community came slow and uncertainly. Between 1946 and 1958, the space science 
research community (from the V-2 Panel to the RSRP) had performed R&D and sought 
to keep it not only unclassified but also circulating in the scientific literature and at 
professional conferences. A variety of professionals participated in Panel research 
including rocket engineers, radio physicists, mathematicians, upper atmospheric 
physicists, electrical engineers, chemists, and a limited number of meteorologists. In 
some regards the space science community overlapped with the “meteorological 
community.” Bridging these two—one primarily military and the other primarily 
civilian—were two now largely obsolete classifications of research, aerology and 
aeronomy. Aerology was defined as the meteorology of the free atmosphere above 
approximately 20 meters and extending throughout its vertical extent. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 John E. Naugle, First Among Equals: The Selection of NASA Space Science 
Experiments (Washington, D.C.: NASA SP 4215, 1991), Homer Newell, Beyond the 
Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Science (Washington, D.C.: NASA SP-4211, 1980), 
Dreams, Hopes, Realities: NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center First Forty Years 
(Washington, D.C.: NASA SP-4312), Alfred Rosenthal, Venture into Space: Early Years 
of Goddard Space Flight Center (Washington, D.C.: NASA SP-4301), Linda Newman 
Ezell, NASA Historical Data Book II Programs and Projects 1958-1968 (Washington, 
D.C.: NASA SP-4012), Lane Wallace, Dreams, Hopes, Realities: NASA’s Goddard 
Space Flight Center the first forty years (Washington D.C.: NASA History Office, 1999). 
NASA SP-4312. The October 1 formation of NASA transferred 157 Vanguard personnel 
from NRL to NASA. Later 47 scientists from NRL’s sounding rocket branch transferred 
and 15 from NRL’s Theoretical Division came. The April 1959 transfer of Army Signal 
Corps TIROS team is listed as the last of the initial cadre at GSFC, p18-19. 
18 See Chapter Five. 
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 Aeronomy was a second important classification of research at that time 
overlapping with meteorology. Aeronomy refers to the physics and chemistry of the 
upper regions of the atmosphere where ionization, dissociation, and a number of chemical 
reactions take place.19 This “atmospheric shell” undulates according to variances in day 
and night, solar activity, and geomagnetism. Well into the 1960s, researchers could not 
determine the highest point of the ionosphere, but they had identified its lowest dip as 
low as 40 to 49 miles (70 to 80 kilometers). Whereas lower frequency radio waves are 
unaffected by the ionosphere, higher frequency waves can be reflected back to earth by 
this “shell.” This “skip-distance effect” identified at the turn of the twentieth century can 
propagate radio waves to receivers hundreds and thousands of miles away. Thus the 
chemical and electromagnetic properties and patterns of undulation of the ionosphere 
were of great interest to the armed services for communications, missile tracking, missile 
guidance, reconnaissance, and countermeasures. 
 Meteorologists such as Army Signal Corps’ William Stroud and RAND 
Corporation’s William Kellogg were keenly interested in this region of high ion density 
and attempted to incite the interest of fellow meteorological researchers. Perhaps the 
most vivid (and witty) description of ionospheric studies came from Kellogg speaking to 
a joint meeting of American Meteorological Society and American Geophysical Union: 
The same atmosphere which, by absorption, protects us from the powerful 
radiation coming from outside [solar and cosmic radiation], is also the obstacle 
which hinders us from looking into outer space. In particular, the very important 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 An alternative definition: “As officially used in the US Navy until early 1957, same as 
meteorology; this usage was more administrative than scientific.” Dictionary of 
Technical Terms for Aerospace Use, First Edition, (Washington, D.C.: NASA SP-7, 
1965). 
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region of the ionosphere which is formed by the ultraviolet and x-ray radiation 
coming from the sun, acts as an “ion-curtain” beyond which we cannot see.20 
 
Individuals from the Rocket and Satellite Research Panel attended American 
Meteorological Society (AMS) meetings and published in the AMS-affiliated journals. 
William Stroud designed meteorological instruments that flew on RSRP rockets, orbited 
on IGY satellites, and functioned as key instruments of NASA’s TIROS weather satellite 
system. Kellogg wrote several influential reports and proposals regarding applications of 
meteorological instruments to spaceflight in the 1950s and took a keen interest in better 
coordinating research activities between the USWB and RSRP. Yet, until roughly 1954, 
the USWB remained willfully in the margins of space science research, doubtful of the 
operational utility of either satellites or sounding rockets in the immediate future, but also 
lacking the resources to take an active role in the field.21 For instance, USWB researcher 
Harry Wexler attended Rocket Panel meetings regularly, not representing the Bureau, but 
as a representative of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, for which he 
chaired National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA) special subcommittee on 
the upper atmosphere.22 Neither the USWB nor the NACA were formally identified as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 “Use of an Artificial Satellite in Upper Air Research” H. K. Kallmann and W. W. 
Kellogg RAND Report P-760 February 15, 1956 as presented at National Meeting of the 
American Meteorological Society held in New York, January 23, 1956. Available at 
www.DTIC.mil. 
21 Chapters Two and Three illustrate that USWB researchers and administration were 
interested in both satellites and sounding rockets as early as the 1940s, but considered 
them impractical from a budgetary standpoint. 
22 On Wexler see J. Fleming, “Beyond Prediction to Climate Modeling and Climate 
Control: New perspectives from the papers of Harry Wexler, 1945-1962.” The 
Development of Atmospheric General Circulation Models, Leo Donner, Wayne Schubert, 
Richard Somerville, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 51-75; “Planetary-scale 
Field Work: Harry Wexler on the possibilities of ozone depletion and climate control.” 
Knowing Global Environments: New historical perspectives on the field sciences and the 
multiple scales of nature, Jeremy Vetter, ed., (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
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“military” institutions, though they did in varying capacities support the US military, the 
USWB providing weather data and services and the NACA providing R&D support. 
 In the eyes of key Weather Bureau officials, the US meteorological community 
was in practice divided (and more importantly, uncoordinated) among Navy, Air Force, 
and Army Signal Corps research laboratories, their university contractors, and the US 
Weather Bureau proper. As these emerging technologies reached initial proof of concept 
phases, the Weather Bureau gradually accepted their eventual utility, but faced daunting 
barriers to entry. In the mid-1950s, the meteorological community weighed in on 
determinations over what observation equipment would be included on IGY satellites, but 
had marginal participation in development, operations, or data acquisition from the 
equipment. (See table 1.2 for a list of the relevant satellites). 
 From the perspective of the history of technology, this dissertation traces a 
seemingly linear path from 1940s sounding rocket programs to the mobilization of 
WWW resources in the mid-1960s. Table 1.2 posits a narrowing of vision necessary to 
“see” the gradual convergence of support systems, payloads, and expert knowledge into 
what would become NASA and the USWB’s TIROS satellite system. As such, this table 
emphasizes the continuities among seemingly distinct technical systems, filtering out 
most elements that were not adapted to TIROS.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2010), 190-211; “Earth Observations from Space: Accomplishments, challenges, and 
realities.” NASA's First 50 Years: An Historical Perspective, Steven J. Dick, ed., 
(Washington, DC: NASA, 2010), 543-562; “Polar and Global Meteorology in the Career 
of Harry Wexler, 1933-1962.” Globalizing Polar Science: Reconsidering the 
International Polar and Geophysical Years, Roger D. Launius, James Rodger Fleming, 
and David H. DeVorkin, eds( New York: Palgrave, 2010), 225-241.; and “Earth 
Observations from Space: The first two decades.” Earth Observations from Space: The 




Table 1.2 TIROS Genealogy 
(Instruments in boldface carried through to TIROS meteorological satellite system) 
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23 TIROS I and II were operated in collaboration with the DOD. See table 6.1 for details 
concerning TIROS satellites. 
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 In many regards, the rocket and satellite R&D community had benefitted from a 
series of “surpluses” and windfalls. First Army Ordnance offered defense scientists and 
engineers a “free ride” of payload space on V-2 rockets. In years that followed, sounding 
rocket R&D so closely aligned with missile R&D, it created economies of scale and 
larger R&D projects in which scientific studies could be funded “in the margins” of more 
formal defense research contracts. Finally, the defense community of space science 
researchers enjoyed the windfall of both military and National Science Foundation (NSF) 
funding to support sounding rockets and scientific satellites in the International 
Geophysical Year. 
 The embedded-ness of these tools and researchers within defense centers in some 
regards constituted barriers to entry for the USWB. In time, this inaccessibility prompted 
a quickening in the civil sector. Weather Bureau officials soon became eager to not only 
keep abreast of DOD developments, but began pressing to exercise a coordinating power 
over activities they perceived as falling under the USWB’s mandate to perform basic 
research in the upper atmospheric sciences.24 Key USWB leadership expressed an 
abiding concern over the lack of coordination between military labs and the WB, 
indicating that because of the USWB mandate to perform basic research they ought to 
exercise some degree of jurisdiction over the performance of all US upper atmospheric 
research.  
 Between 1950 and 1960, the USWB officials struggled to operationalize this 
mandate. Housed within the Department of Commerce, the USWB had a reputation 
among the armed services and federal government for being grossly underfunded and its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See Chapters 3-5. 
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administrators (Reichelderfer and Wexler in particular) looked on with apprehension as 
they saw the armed service’s influence on upper atmospheric research grow with 
increasing university funding, the (at least seeming) duplication of effort among the 
services, and the activities of projects and entire departments obscured by classification 
restrictions.25 Beginning in 1956, the USWB would use connections at the National 
Academies of Sciences to begin circumventing the defense department’s influence over 
basic R&D. Calling for an increase in “basic meteorological research” they began calling 
for a national institute for atmospheric research; 1958 brought the formation of the 
University Center for Atmospheric Research (UCAR) and 1960, the formation of the 
National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR).26 While these were not the product 
of USWB or NAS politicking alone, they certainly helped reorganize non-military 
research along lines conducive to Reichelderfer’s interest. 
 With July 1958 plans for the formation of a non-military space administration 
(NASA), USWB officials presumed that they would have full access to US 
meteorological satellite data, but 1958 brought more frustrations. Having failed to gain 
coordinating power over defense R&D in the basic atmospheric sciences or 
meteorological satellites, USWB officials pushed to fund a USWB weather satellite 
program independent of the DOD and failed.27 In the days between the signing of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 The USWB was transferred from the Department of Agriculture to the Department of 
Commerce in 1940. 
26 See Chapters Four and Five of this dissertation. Joseph Peter Bassi’s dissertation does 
not address USWB interest but does document the formation and early years of the 
NCAR in Creating a Scientific Peak: How Boulder, Colorado Became a World Center 
for Space and Atmospheric Science, 1945-1965. See also the UCAR “Blue Book” 
available at http://www.ncar.ucar.edu/documents/bluebook1959.pdf. 
27 This deal was struck down by the Bureau of Budget due to the expectation that NASA 
would manage the US meteorological satellite system. See Chapter Five. 
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NASA Space Act and the actual operational opening of NASA, NASA officials to-be 
began negotiations with the DOD determining their division of labor. Initially they 
concluded that weather satellites would remain in in the Defense Department and 
undertook plans to have the Air Force Cambridge Research Center manage data from the 
US’s first generation of meteorological satellites.28  
 Ultimately, the space science R&D community (embodied in part the newly 
acquired the Naval Research Lab-NASA Vanguard Division) converged with the US 
meteorological community, cooperating on the operation and data-handling of the 
Television Infrared Observation Satellite (TIROS). In 1962, this NASA-USWB 
partnership would begin coordinating for operational satellite capabilities central to the 
World Meteorological Organization World Weather Watch. 
Historiography: (Re)Organizing for Space R&D, 1955-1959 
 
 This dissertation catalogs the emergence of meteorological satellite technologies 
from cornerstones of US national defense to tools of scientific development and cultural 
modernization. Under whose initiative were the first R&D satellites produced and with 
what aims in mind? Historians have detailed the manner in which the IGY Vanguard and 
Explorer R&D satellite programs came to be at once products and symbols of a cutthroat 
missile and space race.29 Armed with the leftover hardware and know-how of German V-
1 and V-2 rocket scientists, Soviets and Americans competed to be the first to launch a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See Chapter Five. 
29 Roger Launius, John Logsdon, Robert Smith, Reconsidering Sputnik: Forty Years 
Since the Soviet Satellite, (New York: Routledge, 2000), see in particular Michael 
Neufeld, “Orbiter, Overflight, and the First Satellite: New Light on the Vanguard 
Decision”, Walter McDougall, …The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the 
Space Age (New York: Basic Books, 1985), Constance McGlaughlin Green and Milton 
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satellite in orbit.30 On August 2, 1955, President Eisenhower announced the US intention 
to launch at least one satellite for the International Geophysical Year. Later that same 
day, Leonid Sedov, of the Soviet Academy of Sciences announced the USSR’s intent to 
orbit a satellite as well.31 Two years later, on 4 October 1957, the Soviets succeeded in 
orbiting the first artificial earth satellite, Sputnik. Sputnik II followed just one month 
later. The successes of the Sputniks and the December setback of the US Vanguard test 
vehicle set forth a flood of Congressional and media inquiry. Investigations focused not 
simply on the ability of the US to launch a satellite, but the overall preparedness of 
satellite and missile programs. These investigations resulted ultimately in the backup 
Explorer program satellite launched 31 January 1958. 
 Rather than focus attention on orbiting hardware and rare launch dates, historian 
Walter McDougall has famously challenged this narrative, demonstrating that the US’s 
painful opening of space race might be reinterpreted with an eye on the Eisenhower 
Administration’s reconnaissance activities.32 By publicly engaging the Soviets in a space 
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race and doing so under the aegis of the UN’s International Geophysical Year, 
Eisenhower and his intelligence apparatus side-stepped uncertainties regarding satellite 
overflight; namely, the question of whether or not sovereign airspace extended infinitely 
above each nation.33 Through intensive analysis of the IGY, historian Rip Bulkely has 
written an institutional history illustrating in finer detail how the scientific programs of 
the IGY were often influenced by the US and Soviet national security states. Bulkely 
argues that US officials constructed a “superficially egalitarian programme of 
international scientific cooperation for the disproportionate benefit, much of it military, 
of their own country.”34 These and other analyses take as a given that the federal 
government was the foremost driver of scientific activities, directing research and 
distributing money as a near-monolithic entity.  
 Alan Needell’s biography of Lloyd Berkner, Science, Cold War, and The 
American State, provides a more nuanced interpretation of the earliest days of spaceflight 
research from the perspective of one of the most influential scientific elites. Still focusing 
attention on the highest echelons of governance, Needell illustrates the rigorous debate, 
painful compromise, and at times tenuous coalition-building necessary to coordinate the 
resources of oftentimes unaligned government interests. Here, one individual’s skills and 
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does not explicitly accuse Eisenhower of slowing the pace of Vanguard development, nor 
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values as “the public administrator, the manager, the technocrat, and the ‘statesman of 
science,’” played out, challenging the apparent dichotomy between “pure” knowledge-
driven research and the necessity to secure patronage.35 Rather than being disingenuous 
rhetoric and empty diplomatic posturing, the desires of these scientific communities for a 
well-managed international circulation of scientific knowledge were at once compatible 
with and necessary for Cold War national security.36 Berkner carried significant influence 
in the IGY, both among the space scientists and the meteorological community. 
 Other high-ranking scientists’ and engineers’ careers illustrate the complex 
intersections of space policy, federal R&D policy, and statecraft. Influential policymakers 
and science advisers (including Vannevar Bush and James Killian) fostered abiding 
reservations about the practicability of guided missiles and satellites being as near to 
fruition as many DOD proponents would have them believe. G. Pascal Zachary’s 
biography of Vannevar Bush briefly addresses the “engineer of the American century’s” 
views on missile R&D, Sputnik, and the military potential of satellites, quoting Bush.37  
 Valerie Adams suggests that in the face of the increasing complexity of Cold War 
science and technology, President Eisenhower exhibited a unique tendency among US 
presidents in that he preferred to consult with civilians and “his scientists” on matters of 
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national defense.38 Following the advice of the Technical Capabilities Panel and the 
PSAC, the Eisenhower White House was concerned only with the principle that the US 
launch a “scientific satellite.” They left the scientific details to NAS committees and 
Department of Defense lab representatives. 
 To reiterate: neither meteorological satellites nor routine upper atmospheric 
research factored explicitly in executive policy at this time. Eisenhower overlooked them 
in part because satellites were unproven and emerging technologies. The US launch of 
scientific IGY satellites would permit initial testing and evaluation of such equipment, 
but he expressed no desire to provided for follow-on scientific satellite systems. Instead, 
plans for post-IGY meteorological satellites began to unfold at the armed services’ level: 
in the Air Force, Army, and Navy, each to fill their own tactical needs. Having been 
granted the mandate to pursue reconnaissance satellites, the Air Force and later Army 
acquired the resources to coordinate experimental meteorological satellite systems as 
well.  
 Spaceborne cameras, telemetering equipment to radio information back to ground 
stations, as well as skills at photographic interpretation and rectification each overlapped 
considerably between reconnaissance satellites and meteorological satellites (commonly 
referred to as “weather reconnaissance” satellites). Economies of scale and even 
surpluses furthered the almost incidental development of meteorological satellites. When 
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RCA representatives lost the bid for the Air Force reconnaissance satellite program, they 
submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Army, which Wernher von Braun accepted. In 
1958, the Defense Department determined that the US had no need for two photographic 
reconnaissance satellite programs and dubbed the Army’s a weather reconnaissance 
satellite. Several histories have identified the defense origins of the TIROS weather 
satellite, but they all neglect explaining who—and appealing to what logic—actually 
drew the US’s TIROS satellite plans from the Army to NASA.39 
 Told from the perspective of the space science communities and the 
meteorological community, this dissertation explores what organizational and 
technological progressions necessitated this transfer. Why were weather satellites a 
seemingly incidental outgrowth of DOD activities? Why, by 1958, were they utterly 
beyond the grasp of the Weather Bureau?  
 
 Between the launch of Sputnik and the October 1958 opening of NASA, 
bureaucratic groundwork was laid for the transfer of the Vanguard satellite team to 
NASA. This cross-section of space science talent included practitioners who developed 
scientific instruments, refined their use, sought research support, and kept abreast of 
International Scientific Union activity. Three authors of NASA history were themselves 
participants in the US’s reorganization for space exploration between 1957 and 1960.40 
John Naugle, who used balloons and later sounding rockets to study photons and the 
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magnetosphere, transferred from private industry to take a research position at NASA in 
1959. In his history of NASA’s selection of space science experiments, Naugle is one of 
several authors who credit the Naval Research Laboratory Vanguard satellite team as 
being one of the two “heritages” of research culture transferred to NASA’s Goddard 
Spaceflight Center.41 Naugle’s second “heritage” shaping Goddard—one-day home of the 
TIROS meteorological satellites—was the National Advisory Committee on 
Astronautics.42  
  Until the mid-1960s Goddard was the only NASA center conducting earth 
science.43 While in Goddard’s Office of Space Science, Naugle worked under Homer 
Newell. Newell (who transferred to NASA with the Naval Research Lab’s Vanguard 
Project) was widely recognized by his peers as the “spark-plug” behind the formation of 
NASA in the guise it took (see appendices C and D for the COS proposal for a National 
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Space Establishment).44 Though their memoirs are extremely useful (and candid) insider 
reflections on the reorganization of space R&D and the operations of NASA, neither 
Naugle nor Newell offers perspective on the origins and transfer of the TIROS and few 
reflections on NASA’s relations with the Weather Bureau. T. Keith Glennan, NASA’s 
first Administrator kept a diary of his first year at NASA, but there, too, references to the 
transfer of TIROS are vague, likely due in part to the classified origins of the program 
and efforts of the Army to retain their weather satellite research team and infrared 
instruments.45 Thus, space histories have only captured segments of an arc, from the 
sounding rocket origins to the IGY, or from IGY preparation to post-Sputnik damage 
control, or from the launch of TIROS to service in the UN’s World Meteorological 
Organization World Weather Watch.  
  
 For a narrative to carry the histories of these research communities and Cold War 
technologies, it must span a number of coalitions (Table 1.1). Addressing the degrees of 
(un)coordination among this constellation of military and civilian institutions begs a new 
methodological approach. In his history of the Department of Energy Labs, Peter 
Westwick puts forth the vivid notion of “systemicity” to describe the competition, 
collaboration, specialization, decentralization, as well as inter- and intra-organizational 
dynamics. Westwick describes the national labs’ systemicity, in language parallel to 
diverse and decentralized DOD labs, but also evoking their disconnect from the US 
Weather Bureau. Westwick observes: 
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the national labs duplicated disciplines, machines, and missions and distributed 
them geographically. There had been several earlier proposals for a central 
research lab in the United States, most notably one spurred by the application of 
science to national priorities in WWI.46  
 
While the centralized lab described by Westwick never came to fruition, the Army and 
the Navy did set up their own laboratories: the Army at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey 
(from which TIROS was transferred in 1959) and the Naval Research Lab in Washington, 
D.C. (from which the Vanguard space science team was transferred in 1958).47 From its 
inception in 1947, the Air Force, too, began funding research in radio, sound, and optic 
wave propagation. Each armed service sought advancements in military communications, 
missile development, advanced warning systems, aircraft performance, electro-optical 
capabilities and the like. Each lab by policy or “in the margins” of applied research was 
also contributing to basic upper atmospheric research.  
 While the armed services funded several defense labs and university research 
contracts, they neither exercised nor sought an explicit systemic policy among the labs. 
Instead, collaborations such as those outlined in Table 1.1 came about for the most part 
organically from the labs’ networked researchers. These successive coalitions and 
reorganizations (including the UARRP, the IGY, NASA, and the WWW) function as 
trading zones among developers of atmospheric instruments, users of these tools, 
managers of data, and users of data. Within the boundaries of basic or fundamental 
research, scientific researchers cleaved successive intellectual and bureaucratic “places” 
in which they might share observations and ultimately, collaborate with international 
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partners. Thus, this dissertation traces the movement of resources from one extremely 
local field of knowledge production (national defense labs) to sustained use in NASA, the 
USWB, and ultimately, World Meteorological Organization partnerships. We will return 
to the notion of systemicity in Theme III, below.  
Theme I: The Satellite System as Big Science 
 
 Rocket and satellite research exhibited many properties of a “Big Science,” 
perhaps foremost among these was intra- and inter-national collaboration.48 The German 
V-2 Project Paperclip team contributed mightily to the early days of US space science, 
providing insight about their past research and helping transform the V-2 missile system 
into a useful sounding rocket system.49 Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, UARRP 
members remained active in International Scientific Unions and readily attended 
international symposia on upper atmospheric research. Sounding rocket researchers 
sought new geographic latitudes from which to launch their experiments, prompting 
international partnerships.  
 Between 1957 and 1958, the IGY initiated a trial period in which international 
partners could compare methods, share facilities, aid in satellite tracking, and share their 
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interpretations of atmospheric observations. International collaborators tracked IGY 
satellites with Baker Nunn cameras, with ham radios, and agreed to the US Army Corps 
of Engineers constructing Minitrack stations in their countries. The international 
Minitrack network used to track and predict the orbit of IGY satellites was itself a 
collection of enormous scientific instruments with antenna systems stretching 500- and 
700-feet. Fourteen Minitrack stations together composed a north-south “fence” across 
North, Central and South America.  
 Another attribute of big science was that satellites and sounding rockets were 
extremely expensive. Each pass of a satellite over the Minitrack network was estimated to 
cost $10,000 to $20,000 (not adjusted dollars).50 When, in 1960, the Weather Bureau at 
last began tooling up to fund an operational meteorological satellite system, the $500M 
appropriated for the cheaper model meteorological satellites dwarfed the $50M laid aside 
for traditional USWB functions. Yesterday and today launch services typically dominate 
the cost of developing and building remote sensing systems.  
 Inherent to the expense of these sounding rocket and satellite systems were high 
rates of failure, particularly in the early years. Managers soon learned to order multiple 
spare parts for quality control purposes and build multiple spare satellites in anticipation 
of design flaws, launch failures, and improper orbital insertion. Redundancy increased the 
effectiveness of these systems, but also the price. See Table 2.1 for an illustration of the 
many shades of failure encountered in Viking sounding rocket launch. When, in 1958-9 
NASA negotiated the transfer of the ailing meteorological satellite program out of the 
DOD, its funding included five complete models of the TIROS satellite: two engineering 
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prototypes and three flight models (with two as backups in case of launch or orbital 
insertion failures).51 For further illustration of the high launch vehicle failure rate in the 
early years of the US space program, see Table 6.2 for details concerning the Defense 
Meteorological Satellite Program 1962-1965.  
 
Table 1.3 US Launch Record: Successes and Failures52 
 
Year Successes Failures Percent Success 
1957 0 1 0 
1958 7 10 41 
1959 11 8 58 
1960 16 13 55 
1961 29 12 71 
1962 52 7 88 
1963 38 8 83 
1964 57 7 89 
1965 63 7 90 
 
 
 Rocket and satellite research were also expansive in nature. Its practitioners 
pressed rocket engineering to higher and higher altitudes. Dissatisfied with the sounding 
rocket’s brief glimpses of the upper atmosphere, they conducted studies determining the 
fiscal and technical demands of launching instruments high enough to attain earth orbit. 
International Geophysical Year scientists put forth the notion that a scientific satellite was 
but a “Long Play Rocket” and commonly used the abbreviation “LPR” to identify the 
NAS committee responsible for satellite development and coordination. This play on 
words was intended to illustrate the continuities between sounding rocket research and 
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satellite-based research. Often a satellite is described as a platform launched with enough 
velocity that it is constantly “falling” around the Earth.53 Having had a sample of the 
observations satellites could perform in the IGY, the space and meteorological science 
communities sought the experimental TIROS meteorological satellite systems. Following 
that, the military and civilian meteorological communities’ expectations rose again, 
desiring 12-month a year operational coverage in an operational satellite system.54 
 Teamwork was another important facet of satellite research as Big Science. Even 
the legendary Wernher von Braun, the talented rocket engineer who became a leading 
figure in human spaceflight exploration is remembered, not simply for his profound 
individual technical capabilities, but as an astute manager and a gifted proselytizer to 
superiors and staff alike. Chapters Two through Five detail the maturation of a team of 
space scientists and engineers who together transitioned from early V-2 sounding rocket 
research to the Viking sounding rocket, Vanguard launch vehicle and Vanguard satellite, 
and finally, adoption of the TIROS meteorological satellite. Managers and engineers 
Milton Rosen, John Hagen, Homer Newell, and John Townsend were all key figures of 
this team, collaborating with researchers who had developed instruments for flight on 
their rockets and then satellites.  
 This work was also interdisciplinary in nature. David DeVorkin has illustrated the 
diversity of sciences and engineering contributing to the formation of the US space 
sciences between 1945 and 1955. This dissertation sheds light on the careers of others 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 This is how satellite orbits are explained in the National Air and Space Museum gallery 
“How Things Fly.” The earth’s gravitational pull keeps “pulling” the satellite. This is true 
only of low earth orbit. Geostationary satellites (not covered in this dissertation) are at a 
point of equilibrium between the earth’s gravity and the satellite’s velocity. 
54 Constant satellite coverage was achieved beginning with TIROS IX, the experimental 
model for the TOS, (TIROS Operational System.) 
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including Milton Rosen, the radio engineer turned rocket engineer, John Mengel, who 
worked on infrared detection and later designed the Minitrack (radio) tracking stations, 
and Herbert Friedman, the x-ray physicist who retooled himself from refining quartz 
crystal quality control to becoming a world leader in solar research using sounding 
rockets, balloons, and satellites. 
Theme II: Basic Research and the Space Sciences 
 
 Historians of science and technology have illustrated that it is nearly impossible to 
draw clear and universal distinctions between the activities of fundamental knowledge-
driven research and the development of applications. In doing so, some authors direct our 
attention to “in service engineering” and concurrence, demonstrating that often 
developing an application necessitates backtracking into scientific study or that major 
developments can take place without understanding the scientific principles on which 
they operate.55 Other critics commonly identify these presumed ideal types as the basis of 
the much-maligned “linear model.” In the linear model of research, policy is made based 
on the presumption that innovation begins with basic research, then progresses to applied 
research, development, and ends with production and diffusion to users.56 Historian 
David Edgerton has asserted that criticisms of the linear model are themselves 
oversimplifications. The linear model was never intended to be an analytically useful 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 See in particular Phil Scranton, “Urgency, Uncertainty, and Innovation: Building jet 
engines in postwar America,” Management and Organizational History 1 (May 2006), 
pp. 127-157. 
56 Quote from Godin “The Linear Model of Innovation: The Historical Construction of an 
Analytical Framework” see also Bruno LaTour on diffusion in Science in Action: How to 
Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1987). 
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concept, rather exists solely as a “foil for the more elaborated academic account,” little 
more than “a classic straw man.”57  
 In tracing the institutions and individuals facilitating the convergence of missile 
and reconnaissance technologies into a meteorological satellite system, I opt not to 
problematize the scattered conceptions of what constitute 
basic/fundamental/scientific/research or application/engineering/development. Instead, 
this dissertation sheds light on the utility of the notion of basic research as an instrument 
of organizational reform and institutional autonomy. At the individual level, the act of 
classifying research as lacking or conversely being free from immediate application 
indicated the logic by which patronage may be supplied or denied. Thus, to sponsor 
research explicitly ordained as “basic” was to sanction intellectual latitude, but also 
express a degree of faith, either in the promise of the researcher or the field of study, or 
both.  
 At an institutional level, the notion of basic or fundamental research functions as 
an instrument of (re)organization. It helps practitioners and administrators distinguish 
knowledge production from scientific operations/applications such as weather 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 David Edgerton, “’The Linear Model’ did not exist: Reflections on the history and 
historiography of science and research in industry in the twentieth century” in Science-
Industry Nexus (New York: Watson, 2004) Significantly, Edgerton indicates that one of 
the first uses of the term “linear model” was to describe the dauntingly complex 
couplings between basic scientific research and “technological solution.” As early as a 
1969 Science article, the linear model was identified by that name and defined as a model 
in which “innovation seems to be a rational process, essentially similar to the other, more 
systematic functions of an organization.” The article’s authors, executive director of the 
US Air Force Office of Scientific Research and a vice president in industry, stated that 
innovation is very much “irrational” and impossible to “be programmed in advance,” but 
suggest institutional mechanisms for exposing technologists to new scientific knowledge. 
William J. Price and Lawrence W. Bass, “Scientific research and the innovative process: 
The dialogue between science and technology plays an important, but usually nonlinear 
role in innovation,” Science 164 (1969), pp. 802–6.  
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forecasting. In the case of NASA’s formation, it was an important but unclear boundary 
between the military (tactical and strategic applications) jurisdiction and NASA (basic 
research and civilian applications). At first, these boundaries justified leaving R&D 
meteorological reconnaissance satellites in the Department of Defense. Later, when 
NASA and USWB officials negotiated their division of labor on satellites, it was agreed 
that NASA would function as the R&D institution developing successful weather satellite 
instruments and systems, but that the USWB as user would fund operational weather 
satellites. More than once the plasticity of such inter-related and overlapping binaries 
(such as basic/applied, military/non-military, R&D/operational, etc.) provided ground for 
conflict and renegotiation among the armed services labs, US Weather Bureau 
Representatives, and NASA representatives.  
 Of the three armed services functioning as the origins of the space sciences, the 
US Navy held a long-standing reputation for funding a greater proportion of exploratory 
basic research than the others.58 However as defense and R&D budgets at the close of the 
Korean War, it became harder to justify new research projects to sponsors outside the 
Naval Research Lab.59 Classification of work as being “basic research” could be 
problematic when dealing with sponsors other than the Office of Naval Research, such as 
the Bureau of Aeronautics or the Bureau of Ordnance. Milton Rosen, chief designer of 
the Viking sounding rocket recalled that finding support for basic research beyond the 
NRL was “unfruitful” specifically because “Viking [sounding rocket] was viewed as an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 DeVorkin underscores the move that NRL made 1945+ to build more basic research 
divisions and sections. See also Harvey Sapolsky’s Science and the Navy: the History of 
the Office of Naval Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
59 Detailed in Chapter Four. 
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upper air research vehicle and not as a weapon.”60 In the words of William Kellogg, head 
of RAND’s Geophysics Engineering Division, the formation of a National Space 
Establishment would “Allow a long term program of space research to be carried out 
without interference with or by the military requirements for missiles, etc.”61  
 Throughout this narrative, researchers, engineers, meteorologists, and a host of 
science policymakers invoke the notion of basic research to classify relationships of 
patronage, to describe research objectives, to define institutional mission, and to justify 
international collaboration. They gesture toward a spectrum spanning idealized poles 
with knowledge-driven research on one end and applications-oriented development on 
the other. They use a range of actor terms to communicate this notion. Following the 
Second World War, researchers commented that they had not had time while pursuing 
wartime crash engineering projects for the scientific “systematic study” of newly 
recognized radio phenomena. When Army Ordnance invited defense and university labs 
to launch scientific instruments on V-2 rocket firings, Col. James B. Bain distinguished 
between Ordnance’s interest in applications and the researcher’s field of studies, stating 
that Ordnance was primarily interested in “the rocket itself” but was glad to contribute to 
the scientists’ “research program” by providing payload space for the instruments. The 
IGY Technical Panel on Earth Satellites and Panel on Instrumentation referred to “the 
quest for knowledge about our solar system” and a “scientific program” when advising 
on the “basic research objectives of a continuing program in satellite research.” Such a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 “Inquiry Into Satellite and Missile Programs Hearings Before the Preparedness 
Investigating Subcommittee of the Armed Services 85th Congress November 25, 1957 -
January 23, 1958 (Washington, D.C. US Government Printing Office, 1958), 2095. 
Hereafter “Satellite and Missile Programs Hearings.” 
61 Ibid, emphasis added, 2118. 
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program would demand innovative techniques and hardware: “techniques for the 
recovery of packages from a satellite,” satellite instruments to measure photons, 
ionospheric activity, micrometeorites, and geomagnetic fields.62 President Eisenhower 
referred to the “the expansion of human knowledge” when recommending the 
organization for a NASA and indicating that its basic research would make available 
“discoveries of military value” which would be applied to “activities peculiar to or 
primarily associated with military weapons systems or military operations.”63  
   
 While the NRL may or may not have been the most amenable home for basic 
research in the armed services, the mid-1950s brought brutal cuts to funding: 10% across 
the board for the armed services, all forced to reduce R&D expenditures. As will become 
evident in Chapters Three and Four, upper atmospheric rocket and satellite research, 
widely recognized as one of the most expensive fields of R&D, had reached an existential 
crisis by the opening of the International Geophysical Year. The precarious state of the 
nascent space sciences in the mid-1950s casts new light on the formation of NASA. 
NASA was widely recognized as a centralization and reorganization of resources 
intended to match and ultimately beat the Soviet lead in the space race. From the 
perspective of a handful of scientific researchers, NASA was also an institutional 
“homeland” providing a mandate for sustained basic research and international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 The IGY Technical Panel on Earth Satellite Program (NAS), the Working Group on 
Internal Instrumentation, the Working Group on Tracking and Computation, and the 
Working Group on Satellite Ionospheric Measurements published their proposal (based 
on William Kellogg’s proposal prepared for the WG on Internal Instrumentation) was 
published in Science 127 (11 April 1958), pp. 793-802. 
63 President’s message dates to 3 April 1958. Quoted in Science 127 (18 April 1958), pp. 
864-865. 
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collaboration following several years of incremental funding from the Defense 
Department and the temporary support for IGY scientific satellites.  
 Though the instruments and systems were coming together at this time, 
meteorological satellites did not factor prominently in national policy. Chapters Three 
through Six shift focus from the UARRP to inter-organizational relations among the 
Weather Bureau, the UARRP, NASA, and individual defense labs. At the institutional 
level, characterization of research activities as being basic science defined institutional 
missions and more than once leveraged calls for the formation or re-organization 
institutions. Theme three, below, elaborates on how more than once the USWB 
referenced their mandate to perform basic atmospheric research for the US government as 
justification for their coordinating military, university, and USWB research.  
Theme III: Military and Civil | National and International 
 
…space exploration has not only been a project of national consideration but also 
the result of communities (or individuals) who identify with a whole host of other 
markers that are not connected to national claims… [highlighting communities] is 
a way to problematize the notion that space exploration represents national 
aspirations.64 
 
 Before TIROS could “get to the global” its predecessor systems (Vanguard, 
Explorer, and sundry sounding rocket exercises) had to be ushered through critical and 
uncertain moments in R&D policymaking. At each of these moments state and/or 
military mandate were tweaked. Perhaps at times outright undermined. What ideolog(ies) 
ushered TIROS from the national to the global? The seemingly parochial world of 
scientific practice reified its norms in these six institutional steps. In the interest of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Asif A. Siddiqi, “Competing Technologies, National(ist) Narratives, and Universal 
Claims. Toward a Global History of Space Exploration,” Technology and Culture 51:2 
(April 2010), 425–443, at 425, 439. 
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pursuing fundamental knowledge, basic research, environmental data and other avatars of 
“openness” and communality Lloyd Berkner, Homer Newell, Francis Reichelderfer, 
Harry Wexler, and their colleagues wielded these very principals of openness and basic 
research as instruments of federal reorganization (illustrated in Table 1.1).  
 As noted above, historians of science and technology have thoroughly 
deconstructed the linear model as well as the murky distinctions between what constitutes 
basic and applied research. This dissertation uses the notions of fundamental and applied 
as less a definition between epistemic activities and more an instrument of organizational 
power. In the chapters that follow, we will see how Reichelderfer, Newell, et al. cast 
broad organizational nets of “basic research” to help build the largest possible Cold War 
era coalitions (the UARRP, IGY, NASA, NCAR, WWW). Often, they were motivated by 
a desire to keep funding for civilian research on par with the armed services. In rare 
events, they actually coordinated military and civil activities as one. 
 
 It is important to note that for decades, USWB’s Francis Reichelderfer had 
facilitated coordination and even coalitions among the armed services and USWB. As a 
navy aerologist, aviator, and balloonist, Reichelderfer had traveled to Europe where he 
learned the Norwegian frontal forecasting method. The Bjerknes School of meteorology 
had been developed during World War I restrictions on the broadcast of weather forecasts 
and synoptic observations.65 While many other national weather services adopted his 
methods, the USWB did not. Following his studies in Europe, Reichelderfer wrote a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 See Williams 72-75, Nebeker, and Robert Marc Friedman, Appropriating the Weather; 
Vilhelm Bjerknes and the Construction of a Modern Meteorology (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1989). 
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report and later technical manual guiding application of the Norwegian method to 
forecasting. This manual facilitated the adoption of these methods by the USWB, armed 
services, commercial airlines, and other industries. Reichelderfer also took an active 
interest in the training of a knowledgeable base of aerologists and aerographers for 
wartime service. Throughout the Second World War, Reichelderfer created committees to 
coordinate the activities of USWB, Civilian Aeronautics Authority, War, and Navy 
Departments.  
 Internationally, Reichelderfer was widely accepted as one of the leading 
powerhouses behind IMO-WMO reorganization and wholly supportive of Harry 
Wexler’s machinations for the formation of a WWW. Thus, his record in coordinating the 
US armed services, universities, USWB, National Academies of Sciences, and ultimately 
contributing to the formation of the US NCAR, speak to aims of national and 
international organization. 
 Reichelderfer took great pride in his wartime service and accepted the wartime 
restrictions to the sharing of weather data as a reasonable matter of course. And yet one 
decade before Eisenhower named the military-industrial-complex, he cautioned of the 
undue influence of military research and development funds upon the atmospheric 
sciences. In private correspondence Reichelderfer observed that, “With the prolonged 
period of military expansion and military funds available for all manner of research and 
development, there have been evidences of more or less permanent plans by the military 
to invade the civil meteorological field.” This, he believed, resulted in “a growing 
tendency for other agencies to assume leadership in meteorological service developments 
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and in meteorological research.”66 Reading between the lines, Reichelderfer and his staff 
were as vexed by what the armed services had as the limited resources the Weather 
Bureau could secure. Being tucked away under the Department of Commerce, the 
Weather Bureau remained notoriously underfunded.  
 Reichelderfer did not seek compartmentalization between military and civilian (an 
impossibility) nor reductions in military research per se. Reichelderfer sought to re-
establish the Weather Bureau’s statutory role with a “new and comprehensive program in 
meteorology.”67 Thus, he hearkened to principals of efficiency that would in turn improve 
productivity. In 1946, Vannevar Bush had adopted a similar stance. Bush, as former head 
of the Office of Scientific Research and Development in WWII, had been asked to report 
to President Roosevelt on the best possible governance of science in the postwar years. 
Regarding the necessity to declassify wartime scientific discoveries, Bush suggested that 
this would result in a more effective management of R&D resources and would function 
to “relieve the military services of unnecessary civil duties and to eliminate wasteful 
duplication.”68 On one hand Science, the Endless Frontier was a daring call for sustained 
federal support of the basic sciences; on the other hand, it was a nuanced study 
articulating methods for the reasonable demobilization of WWII R&D.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Reichelderfer to Wexler, August 13, 1951, “New Approach to General Coordination of 
Meteorological Research Sponsored by the Government” Box 5, General Correspondence 
Folder 1951, Harry Wexler Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, DC (Hereafter Wexler Papers). 
67 Emphasis added. 
68 Bush addressed the need to declassify war research under the headings “Security 
Restrictions Should be Lifted Promptly” and “Need for Coordination” in Chapter 5, The 
Problem of Scientific Reconversion. Vannevar Bush, Science: The Endless Frontier, 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office (GPO), 1945), 23. 
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 Years later, Reichelderfer expressed precisely the same sentiment in nearly the 
exact same words—that the movement of basic research from the military would 
“relieve” the armed services of unnecessary civilian duties. Reichelderfer was not so 
much perturbed by defense labs performing basic research in “his field” as the fact that 
he could not match, much less manage it. Invoking the Weather Bureau’s mandate to 
perform “basic research” (his own words repeatedly), Reichelderfer sought to increase 
access to data and fundamental data produced beyond USWB. Without suggesting 
explicitly that persons or research programs be removed from or denied the DOD, he and 
colleagues in the National Academies of Sciences cast a broad net of “basic upper 
atmospheric research” and called for its coordination (read: centralization) in a National 
Center for Atmospheric Research. Unable and perhaps unwilling to breech the military 
labs, he sought to (re)appropriate the mandate of basic research. The principal of a 
centralized national organization resonated with the Eisenhower Administration’s desires 
to maintain an economical government, innovative defense base, and civilian regulation 
of the armed services. It did so with the formation of NCAR and it did so with the 
formation of NASA. 
 Reichelderfer’s efforts paralleled those of the RSRP community. As they cleaved 
manpower, facilities, and intellectual property from the armed services, encouraging their 
transfer to NASA, they did so hearkening to openness as a means to more effective 
national governance and international governance. Getting to the global, when we 
expand our focus to the international coordination of meteorological resources, the 
communality of basic science and data (as its raw material) was again routinely invoked 
as an organizing principal to secure domestic and international buy-in. There can be no 
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doubt that when Reichelderfer, the first World Meteorological Organization president, 
pressed for the USWB’s role of TIROS data agent that he did so with the aim of 
contributing to the WMO.  
Theme IV: Units of Analysis 
 In tracing the genealogy of a technical system (Table 1.2) through and among 
multiple institutions, I have benefitted from the guidance of historians suggesting 
possible methods for thinking about the Cold War, US R&D, and space history.  
 David Hounshell has suggested that in rethinking science and technology in the 
Cold War, historians be “much more rigorous” in selecting units of analysis. Allowing 
that no unit would be universally optimal, he suggested that ample studies have been 
performed of individual scientists as a way to analyze motivations, allegiances, and 
compromise. Instead, he coaxes his readers to explore the utility of scientific institutions, 
scientific disciplines, scientific organizations (military and non-military), and even 
artifacts themselves in better explaining the relationship of the Cold War state to 
science.69 To varying degrees, this dissertation makes use of these units. It is an extension 
of David DeVorkin’s history of space science into the age of satellites and NASA’s 
formation. It discusses the careers of individuals who labored to contribute to national 
R&D institutions while improving their professional standing in international scientific 
unions and contributing other professional societies. And, while there is limited analysis 
of the technology proper, it traces the movement of a technical system among a number 
of R&D to operational scientific institutions (ultimately the USWB and WMO).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 David Hounshell, “Rethinking the Cold War; Rethinking Science and Technology in 
the Cold War; Rethinking the Social Study of Science and Technology” Social Studies of 
Science 31 (2001), 291-292. 
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 The resulting division of labor among these disbursed developers of TIROS 
instruments demands a trans-organizational scope. Westwick’s notion of systemicity 
mentioned above is tremendously useful in analyzing this constellation of institutions, not 
operating in isolation, but not thoroughly coordinated in policy. They were at times 
collaborating, at times competing. Returning to the notion of using basic research as an 
instrument for defining organizational mission or bringing about a reorganization of 
resources, this sense of systemicity may be used to explain the aspirations of several 
individuals. Some sought to impose a more effective order upon basic research in the 
upper atmospheric sciences (Reichelderfer, Wexler). Others may have desired a 
sustainable order for the conduct of space sciences (Newell, Kellogg) or an order for the 
most efficient development of missile and satellite technologies in the face of Soviet 
belligerence (Lyndon Johnson, Wernher von Braun). Some even used NASA’s unique 
mission as an expression of US commitment to space for “peaceful uses” (as expressed 
later in the career of Eilene Galloway). This study looks to the logic behind these 
organizational divisions of labor and how those logics facilitated (or forestalled) the 
resulting World Weather Watch.  
 Is it possible to sift through these fragmented aims and identify a larger trend at 
work? More than a decade ago, historian of the Global Cold War, Odd Arne Westad 
prompted us to think more critically about the different cultural settings and political 
purposes for which technology was developed in the US and Soviet Union. To say that 
linkages between strategic priorities and socio-economic development were 
fundamentally tied was, for both Superpowers, nearly self-evident given the longevity, 
the breadth, and the sheer power commanded by the two Cold War cultural complexes.  
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Driving these military-industrial-complexes were, at least at times, harmonious 
ideologies among science practitioners and statecraft.  
 Westad defined ideologies as “a set of fundamental concepts systematically 
expressed by a large group of individuals.70 The 1958 Space Act, with all its problematic 
and strategic ambiguities, was just such an expression. Faced with the finite nature of the 
IGY, contradictory calls for a space spectaculars, an accelerated military space program, 
a peaceful national space program, and even UN-regulated transnational space program, 
the Eisenhower administration and Congress opted for the formation of National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, transferring the IGY satellite systems and 
operators to NACA.71  
 This transfer represented a dramatic disjuncture in policy history, paralleling the 
Atomic Energy Commission’s founding.72 The transfer of the Army Corps of Engineers’ 
Manhattan Project to the AEC was an important expression of postwar US ideologies. 
This transfer of resources balanced a distinct postwar faith in science advancing social 
and military development with the presumption that these research activities were best 
managed under civilian auspices.73 The transfer of the Manhattan Project and formation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Emphasis added, Odd Arne Westad, “Bernath Lecture: The New International History 
of the Cold War: Three (Possible) Paradigms,” Diplomatic History 24:4 (2000), 551-565. 
71 The fact that it was an administration and not an agency speaks to the power that it was 
expected to wield, likely vis a vis the Army Ballistic Missile Agency and the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency. See Chapter Four and Logsdon, Legislative Origins. It was not 
until 1960 that the ABMA was transferred to NASA. 
72 So far as missile capabilities were pursued largely as vehicles for nuclear weapons, this 
history is a continuation of the US’s development of atomic weapons systems.  
73 See Rodney Carlisle, Management of the US Navy Research and Development Centers 
During the Cold War (Navy Laboratory/Center Coordinating Group Naval Historical 
Center: Washington, D.C., 1996), Richard Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., The New 
World (1936-1946), Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield, 1947-1952 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1969), George T. Mazuzan and J. 
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of the AEC are important formative policy experiences in the decades leading up to 
NASA, making NASA’s formation a point divergence itself. Unlike atomic energy, space 
was not centralized into one organization, but NASA was formed to coordinate 
overlapping interests among multiple military, civilian, academic, and private sector 
R&D centers.  
 With NASA as well as the AEC, there were palpable tensions between national 
priorities and national security. These themes are evident in the much-contested New 
Look strategy, the carefully staged post-Sputnik missile and satellite preparedness 
hearings, and in Eisenhower’s farewell address.74 Throughout, Eisenhower sought to 
temper the growth of a national security state, protect long-term economic stability, and 
offer neither too generous nor too parsimonious expressions of support to Western bloc 
allies. In light of these conflicting interests, the formation of NASA was in some regards 
a compromise (“for my scientists”)75 going against his administration’s concerns over 
duplicative R&D efforts and the push for the privatization of American R&D.76  
 Ultimately, the NASA reorganization amounted to a re-crafted projection of 
power—domestically and abroad. On one hand is the well-documented and far better 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Samuel Walker, Controlling the Atom: The Beginnings of Nuclear Regulation, 1946-1962 
(1985).  
74 On New Look (representative of his early policy) see Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. 
Immerman Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), Iwan Morgan, Eisenhower Versus the Spenders 
(London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), Ira Chernus Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace (College 
Station: Texas A&M, 2002). 
75 Regarding Eisenhower’s change of heart regarding duplicative military and civilian 
space centers of research see Z. Wang, 93-97 , Killian, “my scientists” 239, regarding 
space agency proposals from the ARS, TPES, etc, see 124-5. 
76 Eisenhower had to be talked into centering space R&D in a civilian institution, detailed 
by Walter McDougall and in my Chapter Four. Hoover panel cited in Management of US 
Navy R&D Centers. 
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publicized projection of American dynamism in the 1957-1969 space race and 1961-1969 
moon race. On the other hand is a more subtle expression of international leadership, 
mandated explicitly in the 1958 Space Act and with collaborative autonomy exceeding 
the AEC. With logic paralleling the Atoms for Peace program, carefully measured 
intercourses of technological know-how and scientific resources were used to advance 
scientific knowledge, but at the same time to grasp a position of leadership in 
international policymaking. Here, scientific practice mated neatly with statecraft that was 
evolving away from the intractability of Eisenhower’s New Look.  
 To borrow from John Krige, in getting to the global this dissertation “interrogates 
the sources of technological change, the social conditions that produced it, the factors that 
induce technological dynamism.” As such, it explores a set of fundamental concepts 
expressed by a series of US scientific communities (see the coalitions and their 
hearkening to basic research Table 1.1). 77 Without a substantive national policy, could 
there be a viable international policy?  
Chapter Summaries 
 This dissertation is arranged chronologically with each chapter detailing one 
phase or shift in US R&D organization. These include the Upper Atmospheric Rocket 
Research Panel, the International Geophysical Year, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, the transfer of the TIROS Satellite to NASA and the formation of the 
National Center for Atmospheric Research, and last, the World Weather Watch. 
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23-25, 2011. 
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 Chapter Two “Going the Sounding Rocket Route: Foreshadowings of Satellite 
R&D 1946-1951” illustrates how far removed the Weather Bureau was from rocket and 
satellite R&D. Researchers funded by the armed services (in DOD labs, universities, and 
private firms) were able to pair missile R&D with upper atmospheric research, often 
conducting basic research in the margins of missile development projects. They 
coordinated resources in the Upper Atmospheric Rocket Research Panel and speculated 
on satellite flight, finding it far too expensive to warrant investment by the armed 
services. 
 In Chapter Three, “The Promise and the Threats of Emerging Satellite 
Technologies: UARRP and NAS Coordination for IGY Satellites 1950-1957,” the 
Eisenhower Administration offered a subsidy to UARRP research communities that they 
might launch a scientific satellite in the 1957-1958 International Geophysical Year. In 
coordinating for the Vanguard IGY satellites, researchers working through the National 
Academies of Sciences set policy precedents for incremental, scientific satellite 
programs. Working with international partners, they established an order for launch 
notification, aid in tracking satellites, and for sharing data. The Soviet Sputnik preceded 
the Vanguard satellite into space. Following a Vanguard test vehicle failure in December 
1957, Congress, the White House, and the US public engaged in an eight-month debate 
over how to reorganize space R&D. During this time, a number of “space stunts and 
spectaculars” were offered as balm to the US’s prestige, but threatening the US’s 
legitimacy as a scientific and “peaceful purposes” space power. 
 Chapter Four, “Seeking Sustainable Resources and US Leadership in Space: 
NASA’s Formation November 1957-April 1958” illustrates that due to cutbacks in 
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defense research and development, UARRP members faced an uncertain future in 
sounding rocketry. This was a critical moment shaping the Janus-like facade of US Cold 
War power. After much negotiation among the White House and Congress (both 
consulting often with the scientific communities) the 1958 Space Act charged NASA 
with planning and conducting aeronautical and space activities, providing the widest 
practical dissemination (meaning for military, civilian, and international users) of 
information of its activities and results, and charged with international cooperation.78 
However throughout this time the proposed TIROS meteorological satellite remained 
under the aegis of the DOD’s Advanced Research Project Agency and not the USWB or 
NASA. 
 Chapter Five is “Coordination for Meteorological Satellite R&D: ‘The USWB is 
About to Enter the Space Age.’” As of the summer and fall of 1958, ambiguities 
surrounding NASA’s formation and its role coordinating military and non-military 
resources led to a plan with ARPA for the DOD to launch the US’s first generation of 
R&D weather satellites. More disconcerting to the USWB, all satellite images and data 
would be routed through the Air Force Geophysics Research Division, with the Weather 
Bureau receiving limited data second-hand from the DOD. USWB perceived this as an 
incursion of DOD research institutions into the WB’s basic research mandate. After a 
brief period uncertainty and intervention by the Executive branch, the Weather Bureau 
was established as NASA’s “meteorological agent” thereby securing responsibility for 
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data-handling. TIROS was transferred to NASA in the spring of 1959 and launched a 
year later. 
 Chapter Six “Going Operational: Bilateral Cold Line; Multilateral World Weather 
Watch,” illustrates how USWB researchers took a bilateral mandate for sharing satellite 
data and laid foundation for a global weather observation system of unprecedented scope. 
As with the IGY and formation of NASA, USWB officials invoked, constructed, and 
reified norms of scientific internationalism even as they mobilized new and otherwise 
inaccessible resources to support US hard power. 
 Given my institutional affiliation, it is useful to consider one last methodological 
note: Why NRL? For one, this lab’s research divisions provide a useful case study of the 
nature of policies and day-to-day practice of defense labs in the mid-twentieth century. 
Among the many actors participating in the V-2 Panel, UARRP, IGY, NASA formation, 
and WWW, it is useful to trace the careers of a handful of people through formative 
moments in the history of US R&D. Actors from the NRL-Vanguard team who carry this 
story from beginning to end include Homer Newell, John Hagen, and Milton Rosen. 
Second, NRL provides a broad sampling of the sciences and engineering necessary for 
space exploration, a budding vertical monopoly from launch design through to data 
reduction and the publication of scientific papers, which leads to the third and perhaps 
most important factor. NRL UARRP researchers who peopled the Vanguard Division and 
then transferred to NASA provide a direct lineage from the V-2 Panel to TIROS 
operation. 
 In sum, this is as much about the military communities of researchers as it is the 
USWB community. The military researchers spent years investing in subsystems and 
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techniques they knew would yield operational weather satellite systems for tactical use. 
Due to a confluence of congressional, White House, space science community (UARRP 
then NASA), and USWB interests, these subsystems were gradually ushered from 























Foreshadowings of Satellite R&D: 






In the space imagination, nations typically represent airtight constituencies despite 
evidence to the contrary that communities cutting across borders and 
cultures…represent important actors and actions…In the rush to draw up airtight 
national narratives, we inevitably tend to gloss over the ambiguities and flows 
among each of these communities.  
Asif Siddiqi79 
 
 During the Second World War, US defense labs began work on a wide variety of 
missile systems, developing knowledge bases in propulsion, missile tracking, and missile 
guidance that would one-day support satellite launch and operation. Thus, more than a 
decade before space exploration became a national priority (with the launch of Sputnik in 
1957), a variety of scientific communities struggled to master the scientific sounding 
rocket system, intending to one day design satellite systems. Beginning in 1945, these 
research communities adaptively reused missile hardware, collaborating on a number of 
upper atmospheric research projects. Using rocketsonde—at times missiles without 
explosive warheads, at times rockets specially designed for scientific research—they 
captured elusive snapshots of the upper atmosphere and the ionosphere. Having 
established that their basic scientific research could remain unclassified, they shared their 
findings at national and international conferences, published in scientific journals, and 
circulated in unclassified research reports.  
 In defense labs, postwar “surpluses” of equipment, German V-2 prisoners of war, 
and US missile experts willing to practice science “in the margins” of more formal R&D 
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projects fostered a de facto monopoly over US sounding rocket as scientific instrument. 
Gradually, other scientific communities came to accept the validity of the V-2 Panel 
researchers rocket observations.80 The late 1940s and first couple years of the 1950s 
featured three concurrent developments important for understanding the technical and 
policy history of weather satellites. (1) Leading US Weather Bureau researchers and 
administrators became intrigued by the use of upper air photographs to map cloud 
formations for synoptic weather prediction and studying interactions between land and air 
masses. (2) V-2 Upper Atmospheric Research Panel members devised a variety of 
techniques to sound the upper atmosphere for temperature, pressure, and density, slowly 
reaching a consensus on the calibration and refinement of their instruments as well as 
drawing up tables for pressure, densities, and temperature of the upper atmosphere. (3) 
Geophysical research communities in other countries ( and the UK in particular) 
expressed an interest in coordinating observations of upper atmospheric phenomena in 
the earliest years of International Geophysical Year coordination and planning. 
 During this time, US Weather Bureau Chief Francis Reichelderfer voiced 
reservations about the tendency of other institutions to assume leadership in 
meteorological research and began positioning his bureau to “take a much broader role in 
planning and coordinating research.”81  
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Operation Paperclip 
 Throughout the course of the Second World War, US Army and Navy research 
labs labored to keep abreast of German guided missile developments. From captured 
hardware, they developed radio-jamming countermeasures as battlefield stopgaps and 
compared US and German methods of design and operation. At the close of the War, 
Army and Navy commissions traveled to Germany to study missile guidance 
technologies, attempting to glean information regarding engineering and operations. 
Ernst Krause, from the Naval Research Laboratory’s Communications Security Section 
expressed particular interest in inertial systems, gyro drift rates, and the general accuracy 
of German missiles. The V-2, Vergeltungswaffe “Vengeance Weapon” was just one 
object of interest. 
 In the chaos of postwar Germany, the V-2’s primary designer, Wernher von 
Braun approached Major General Walter Dornberger about the possibility of surrendering 
to the US. The two agreed that it was indeed time “to put our baby [the V-2] in the right 
hands.” Von Braun had been planning the defection for some time, telling an old friend 
and radio operator that he would need his assistance when, fairly soon, he hoped to fly to 
the moon, presumably for the US.82 Missile designers and hardware brought from 
Germany in this, Operation Paperclip, were key drivers igniting US interest in sounding 
rockets and possible satellite programs. Exposure to German rocket scientists and von 
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Braun’s enthusiastic prognostications in particular legitimated the notion that satellites 
might soon become viable instrument—and weapons—platforms.83  
 To von Braun, the so-called “dreamer of space,” applications such as sounding 
rockets and scientific satellites were nearly mundane distractions from his grander aims 
of human spaceflight and interplanetary exploration. However in the US, the charismatic 
rocket designer came in contact with a number of research communities with very 
different objectives and philosophies for space exploration. For these US researchers, the 
Earth’s upper atmosphere might also have been characterized as a “frontier”—less 
because space was uninhabited by humans and more because it was very much uncharted 
from an electromagnetic perspective.  
 Since the early 1900s, US radio researchers had studied the properties of the 
upper atmosphere and beyond that, the ionosphere, attempting to render communications 
technologies and radio reconnaissance techniques more reliable, but at the same time 
remain a step ahead of potential adversaries in radio countermeasures. Some studied 
aerology, generally accepted as a synonym for meteorology, but with emphasis on 
meteorological research and not forecasting. Aerologists studied the free atmosphere 
above 20 meters using aircraft, balloons, and rockets. At heights these platforms could 
not reach, radio propagation or fading was used to analyze the physical and 
electromagnetic changes of the earth’s atmosphere. Aeronomists, studied the upper 
regions of the earth’s atmosphere where ionization, dissociation, and sundry chemical 
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reactions that among other things, produced a “skip distance” effect on high frequency 
radio waves. 
 The scientific communities von Braun’s team came in contact with were laboring 
to secure sponsorship for research beyond the atmosphere. They tended to focus their 
studies on radio propagation, optical sciences, guided missile research, radio astronomy, 
remote sensing, reconnaissance, astrophysics, and spacecraft engineering. For them, 
human spaceflight was but a distant possibility.  
 
 In the winter of 1945-46, the US Army Ordnance (which had taken possession of 
the Operation Paperclip team and hardware) offered scientific researchers at select 
institutions access to the V-2s. Originally, the Army intended for approximately five of 
twenty-five V-2s to be offered for scientific payloads. Proposals were due to the Army in 
a mere eleven days. On 16 January, twelve institutions offered proposals for upper 
atmospheric research and applications development projects. Army Ordnance quickly 
reached the decision that all V-2s would be used for research and that an organizing 
panel of scientists was necessary to keep launches and their payloads in order.  
 At the first V-2 Panel meeting, Col. James B. Bain, the Army’s coordinator of 
interservice activities explained that there were three major “Categories of Interest” 
surrounding the V-2. These included “Military interest in the rocket itself” (trajectory, 
handling, firing, detection), Countermeasures, and last, “Meteorology Physics of the 
Upper Atmosphere.”84 Army Ordnance was interested in upper atmospheric research only 
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“to the extent of the effect of the upper atmosphere on the flight of missiles.” Thus, while 
Ordnance was “glad to contribute to the research program” by flying instrumented 
payloads provided by the research institutions, they had limited interest in the 
coordination of scientific research. 
 From the opening days of the Panel, Army representatives took a relatively hands 
off approach in directing scientific use of the V-2s. Col. James Bain had initially hoped 
for General Electric to lead the researchers, however the firm proved unable. In January 
of 1946, Naval Research Lab’s Ernst Krause moved to establish some degree of latitude 
over the program. Already at odds with Johns Hopkins’ Applied Physics Laboratory over 
the question of which lab would coordinate Navy’s program in physics and the upper 
atmosphere, (APL had been designated as such by the Navy Bureau of Ordnance and 
NRL the lead by the Navy’s Office of Research and Inventions—the predecessor to the 
Office of Naval Research), Krause sought to establish NRL’s position as lead. Warheads, 
minus their explosive payloads, became platforms for affixing instruments such as 
cameras, spectrometers, and photographic plates attempting to capture the sun’s x-ray 
emissions. 85  
 Throughout January, Krause quickly assumed a leadership role on the Panel, 
stepping in to offer 10-channel telemetry equipment when GE could not provide the 30-
channel telemetry systems they had originally offered and arguing that the Panel ought to 
have a strong centralized coordinating responsibility for determining what equipment 
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would be flown for experiments.86 By February, Krause and his Lab were perceived to be 
appropriate leaders for the V-2 Panel, given the NRL’s growing stake in the upper 
atmospheric sciences. Meeting notes indicated that Krause was all but a shoe-in as 
chairperson, “inasumuch as Dr. Krause is devoting 100% of his time to the physics of the 
upper atmosphere, he was the logical candidate.” There were no dissenting votes.87 
 
 In addition to the NRL, over time as many as twenty-five institutions contributed 
resources, expertise, facilities, and manpower to the Panel. In some cases, areas of 
specialization led to divisions of labor: General Electric provided ground crew support 
for launches; Harold Zahl of the Army Signal Corps Research Laboratory offered to 
make available to all partners all his information on batteries intended to operate in zero 
atmosphere. 88 In other cases, the research centers devised “competing” means to tackle 
the same problem and compared notes. Tracking methods ranged from Doppler, to 
Theodolite, and Beacon. Instruments that weathered V-2 flight awaited utterly 
catastrophic “landings.” Intact, the missile achieved terminal velocity of 2000 miles per 
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88 Radio propagation research was an important driver behind upper atmospheric studies. 
This lab operated under several name changes while performing research for the Army 
Signal Corps in radio communications and upper atmospheric research (among other 
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an hour, meaning, “most of the vehicle was pulverized beyond recognition.” 89 Later, 
rocket teams affixed explosives to the rocket body with the knowledge that two or three 
less aerodynamic segments would return to earth more gently, a mere “several hundred 
feet per second.” 
 This coordinating panel formed a loose confederation of research institutions—
each was allocated its own V-2 warheads for instrumenting as it saw fit, though they 
routinely used the Panel as a forum to avoid unnecessarily duplicative experiments or to 
compare notes on instrument design and results. From the outset, the Naval Research 
Laboratory and the APL procured the bulk of services and hardware. The University of 
Michigan (funded by the Air Force after its 1947 establishment), the Ballistic Research 
Laboratory, the Army Signal Corps Research Laboratory (ASRL), Princeton, and the Air 
Force’s Cambridge Field Station (later AFCRC/AFCRL), were also members (see 
Appendices A and B for membership over time). The US Weather Bureau’s Harry 
Wexler attended meetings as an observer, but not actually representing the USWB. 
Instead, Wexler attended as the chair of the NACA’s Special Subcommittee on the Upper 
Atmosphere. 
 Given the fact that “basic research” was the primary aim of the Panel, from its 
beginning, Col. H. Toftoy had established that V-2 firing schedules, basic elements of 
rocket design, and flight information would be unclassified. This was significant because 
these engineering details were necessary for interpreting measurements taken by 
scientific instruments. Rocket design and details of its flight offered clues into the 
interpretation of atmospheric observations. One example was that aerodynamic pressure 
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curves were necessary to calculate atmospheric density from pressure measurements 
along the surface of the rocket. Thus, critics might argue that when researchers published 
observations in journals or shared them at conferences, they were offering glimpses into 
the operations and capabilities of US rockets and missiles.  
 This policy remained in place in spite of occasional efforts by the armed services 
to classify data. NRL mathematician Homer Newell explained: “The panel unanimously 
agreed to fight classification, citing the importance of the scientific process, in particular 
open publication and free exchange of information, to a basic research activity.” He 
continued, stating that, “while there was something to be gained by classifying certain 
specific uses of scientific information, there was much to be lost by classifying the purely 
scientific data.”90 
Vanguard’s Birthplace 1945-1946: “The Things that Were Available” 
 
 Why were NRL and Krause in a position to take a leading role in the Panel? 
Months before the Army Ordnance’s invitation to collaborate on the V-2 Rocket 
Research Panel, NRL managers had been reorganizing their institution to function as a 
leader in upper atmospheric rocket research. In his reflections on postwar planning at the 
Homer Newell illustrated the uncertainties and the excitement of that time.  
All of us were talking about the future….One day the subject of using the 
experience that we had gained in designing television-guided missiles be used to 
investigate the upper atmosphere was proposed by Milt Rosen. That was thought 
to be a great idea. We immediately began to think of many ways in which it 
would be important to the Navy and to the military in general, and so we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Homer Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Science 
(Washington, D.C.: NASA SP-4211, 1980), 42-43. Newell cites Col. H. N. Toftoy 
to Commanding General, White Sands Proving Ground, in Megerian, minutes of 
panel, rpt. 13, 29 Dec. 1947. Homer Newell was a leading figure in UARRP and 
IGY, before finishing his career as NASA Associate Administrator. 
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concluded that the military ought to support work of that sort…Most of us found 
the idea of rocket upper air research so attractive that we stayed.91 
 
Through 1945 and the opening of 1946, proponents of sounding rocket research worked 
to establish the immediate utility and long-term value of upper atmospheric—and even 
orbital—observations. In October and November of 1945, the Navy Bureau of 
Aeronautics’ Committee for Evaluating the Feasibility of Space Rocketry submitted 
recommendations for an Earth-orbiting “space ship” designed for research and weighing 
approximately one ton.92 Exploratory contracts soon estimated that such a venture could 
cost far more than feasible. Newell recalled, that he and his colleagues were “seriously 
considering the possibility of using satellites.” However, “we hoped that we would be 
able to take things that were available and just use them. We couldn’t do that, and we 
couldn’t get money to build things on our own, so we went the sounding rocket route.”93 
Thus, as of 1946, the “things that were available” at NRL were insufficient to justify a 
satellite program. Sponsors were unwilling to fund anything beyond studies of satellites, 
certainly not the hardware.94  
 Rocket soundings of the upper atmosphere did prove feasible. Explicitly 
contrasting their policy with WWII “crash programs,” NRLers decided to adopt an 
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History of Quantum Physics Collection, Niels Bohr Library and Archives, American 
Institute of Physics, College Park, MD USA (hereafter AIP Collection), 
http://www.aip.org/history/ohilist/4795_1.html. 
 
92 Constance McLaughlin Green and Milton Lomask, Vanguard: A History (Washington, 
D.C.: NASA SP-4202), 6-7. 
93 Interview of Dr. Homer Newell by Dr. Richard Hirsh on 17 July 1980, AIP Collection, 
http://www.aip.org/history/ohilist/4795_1.html 
94 NRL’s primary sponsors included the Bureau of Aeronautics, Bureau of Ships, Bureau 
of Ordnance, which had been contracting with the lab for R&D since immediately after 
its earliest years of formation. Later came the Office of Research and Inventions was 
reorganized into the Office of Naval Research.  
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incremental approach to R&D: they would begin with rocket soundings of the upper 
atmosphere and in time, pursue orbital capabilities. The technical complexity and 
financial risks of “going the sounding rocket route” were mitigated by investment in 
guided missile research. By the end of the Second World War the Lab had an established 
reputation in the field of rocket research and had built a number of partnerships with 
private firms producing rocket bodies and a host of radioelectronics. The testing and 
development of guided missiles demanded that they be able to telemeter data, but also be 
tracked by interferometry on the ground.95  
 To develop this hardware indigenously, the lab reorganized. At that time, the lab 
acquired a new Captain, H. A. Schade, who had been Head of the US Technical Mission 
to Europe. Hoyt Taylor, a radio physicist at NRL recalled that Schade intended to reorder 
all Lab research into:  
. . . a complete and integrated program for the Laboratory as a whole, a program 
which would lay more emphasis on basic research and less emphasis on problems 
of a transitory interest. Also, he stated that research must return to the hands of 
the civilian scientists and that the military dominance of the divisions, which had 
become progressively noticeable during the war, must be removed.96 
 
 Krause and Schade were eager to retool the NRL for more intensive guided 
missile research, expanding on expertise in both engineering and science, in part to retain 
scientific talent that may otherwise leave at the end of the war. Throughout the course of 
the war effort, lab workers had placed more basic scientific enquiry or projects lacking 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 With time, the phase comparison guidance system for ballistic missiles would become 
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meet the needs of later generation satellites. See May 1952 studies on use of phase 
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immediate application on administrative back burners and several had voiced the desire 
to return to more basic research. Harold Dinger, of the ship-shore communication 
division, explained that in wartime “factors affecting the accuracy of radio noise meters 
had been noted, but little effort could be spared for systematic study.”97 However, he 
explained that immediately after the war researchers went to work on the problem, both 
in his lab and at the University of Pennsylvania. Many anticipated a return to more basic 
research pursuits following their wartime activities. X-ray physicist Herbert Friedman 
designed instruments for detecting radiation (radiacs), used x-ray diffraction to analyze 
the quality of quartz crystals being used in aircraft radios, and developed an improved gas 
tank gauge for B-17s. Postwar, he used sounding rockets to research properties of the 
upper atmosphere, ionosphere, and solar rays. Radio Physicist John Hagen, who would 
direct the Vanguard program at NRL and later NASA, spent the war working on radar 
and ultra-high frequency communication. Radio engineer Milton Rosen, chief designer of 
the Viking rocket and Vanguard launch vehicle, worked on radio and radar missile 
guidance during the war. John Mengel, who would design Vanguard’s satellite tracking 
network, had spent the war as a radio engineer at General Electric and later the Bureau of 
Ships, working in infrared detection and installation on ships.98 
 The sentiment of a postwar return to basic research was not at all particular to the 
NRL. Noting that the ratio of expenditures on applied to basic research had risen steadily 
since the 1930s, Vannevar Bush, head of the Office of Scientific Research and 
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Development, proclaimed in 1946, “We have been living off our fat [of fundamental 
knowledge]. For more than 5 years our scientists have been fighting the war…diverted to 
a greater extent than is generally appreciated from the search for answers to fundamental 
problems.”99 Later, a State Department study expressed a similar sentiment that, 
“technological advancements of the last war…appear to have drawn substantially on the 
potentialities of latent basic knowledge with almost no augmentation [of basic scientific 
knowledge].” “The technological development of really new industries is dependent upon 
the acquisition of new knowledge.”100  
 The urgency and the largesse of the war effort left labs with not only expanded 
facilities, a wide selection of researchers, and captured equipment from adversaries to 
spur further scientific and engineering research. As indicated by Dinger, these years 
focused on engineering and field use had exposed a variety of vexing (or alternatively 
promising) avenues of scientific research. While the dichotomy of basic and applied 
research has been thoroughly deconstructed by historians and sociologists alike, the 
researchers’ collective and individual perceptions of work as “basic” or “applied” 
functioned as important markers for identifying themselves, articulating the relevance of 
their work, and the degree to which it could be circulated as unclassified, restricted, or 
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fully classified. Milton Rosen explained in somewhat rosy terms: “Some of our men were 
trained as physicists—in spectroscopy, in nucleonics, in ionization. To meet the demands 
of war they had worked as engineers. But now the prospects for peace were bright—now, 
if ever, was the time to do basic research.”101 In the context of defense labs, the prospects 
of performing basic research were not just that it was perceived as more “academic” or 
“pure,” (perceptions openly fostered in the interest of recruiting promising researchers 
from universities or other federal labs). Basic research carried an appeal also because it 
communicated an autonomy if not an expression of trust between sponsor and the chosen 
researcher. 
 Looking back on the NRL’s relationship to one of its main sponsors, the Office of 
Naval Research, one Captain praised the ONR as an agency that helped “represent this 
…Laboratory and protect its integrity and independence.”102 As part of this gesture of 
confidence in the researcher, basic research was permitted in the “margins” of more 
formal, more applied research projects on the understanding that the central deliverable 
would still be met. Looking back three decades after his participation in the V-2 Panel 
Upper Atmospheric Research Panel, Herbert Friedman recalled “The Bureau of Ships 
was very generous with us, because we had produced all of these radiation instruments 
for the Navy radiac program.” In the immediate postwar years, he recalled that they, 
“were very indifferent to our sloughing off substantial amounts of money to do anything 
we please, and in fact, looked at it as kind of subsidizing research which might benefit 
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grown to satisfy wartime needs…” 
 64 
them down the road.”103 Similarly, physicist James van Allen, who had helped develop 
the radio proximity fuse at APL in the Second World War, wrote to a colleague in 1946: 
“I have no apologies whatever for working on investigations of no foreseeable 
application; but such a project will not divert any appreciable effort from our present 
program, since such evaluations will be essential by-products.”104 In this spirit, lab 
researchers and administrators pursued research into the properties of the ionosphere, 
cosmic rays, and solar physics not chasing after conceptions of “pure” knowledge for 
knowledge’s sake, but confident that these explorations would at some unpredictable 
point in time reinforce military’s more applied knowledge base in launching missiles and 
rockets.105  
 X-ray physicist Herbert Friedman offered his interpretation of the director of 
research’s policy, indicating that the lab would acquire the most competent researchers 
possible and “let them do whatever they want to do, and we feel certain we’ll get a 
payoff.” These forays into fundamental science were conducted ever on the presumption 
that down the road new scientific instruments such as sounding rockets promised to 
further the design of military applications. These included the development of reliable 
guidance systems, the detection of high-altitude craft and missiles, the development of 
countermeasures, and some even suggested the remote detection of nuclear explosions.106  
 Dealing essentially with unknown unknowns, research administrators and 
sponsors vested a degree of autonomy in defense-funded scientific researchers. Operating 
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at the epistemic edge, such researchers were often granted intellectual and managerial 
autonomies on the faith that they would identify the next viable course of development. 
Homer Newell, who over the course of his careers at NRL and NASA would author many 
books and reports about or outlining the effectiveness of basic scientific research 
characterized these as “uncommitted researchers,” explaining they, by definition “cannot 
point to the future and say that his researches will produce this or that specific application 
as a payoff.” Instead, basic research as Newell characterized it, demanded a more 
permissive organizational structure. He defined it as “nonprogrammatic” or “nonmission” 
meaning in the margins of formal research programs and projects, “nonapplied,” meaning 
not yet contributing to a material application and therefore harder to judge as effective or 
not.107 While the pressures to eventually produce useful applications or to identify new 
fields of research were undoubtedly high, collectively, these actor terms express 
expectations of intellectual and bureaucratic flexibilities and latitude they deemed 
necessary for institutionalized creativity. 
 Particularly after the close of the Second World War, lab managers made it a 
policy to encourage the publication of NRL research in scientific journals, in the 
romanticized words of one of the lab’s best-known physicists, “participation in the 
brotherhood of science has had the fortunate effect of greatly augmenting NRL’s 
reputation as an institution devoted to basic as well as military research.”108 Professional 
advancement of their researchers augmented the prestige of the institution, both of which 
would increase the lab’s standing in the eyes of potential job applicants or potential 
research sponsors. 
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 The wind down of war mobilization and the perception of the Lab’s rightful 
return to more basic scientific inquiry are important also because they provide 
organizational context for Krause’s assertive behavior in the V-2 Panel formation. In the 
fall of 1945, Krause began working with department and section heads of the Lab, to 
restructure research at the NRL to better accommodate the institution’s growing stake in 
guided missile technology and upper atmospheric science. By mid-December, 1945, 
NRL superintendents had established the Rocket-Sonde Research Section and expanded 
the Guided Missiles Research Program. 
V-2 Upper Atmospheric Research Collaboration & NRL Leadership 
 
. . . we had a tremendous fund of knowledge gleaned not only from our own 
experience, but also from almost every domestic and foreign missile project.109 
 
 While unusually well-coordinated and unusually large in nature, coordination on 
the V-2 Panel was not a complete anathema to defense research communities. R&D is an 
act of institutional coordination from an idea’s inception, to proposal, funding, research, 
development, and, when applicable, production in industry. For the Army and the Navy, 
the vagaries of radio operation (from low to high frequencies) led to calls for centralized 
labs in the First World War. While the Army Signal Corps conducted radio research in 
Evans, New Jersey as early as 1917, the Navy failed to centralized radio research until 
the 1923 formation of the Naval Research Laboratory. 
 Before and after the inception of these centralize research facilities, engineers and 
radio physicists at defense labs stayed networked in professional societies such as the 
Institute of Radio Engineers (IRE, later IEEE) and the International Radio Science Union 
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(URSI). Presenting at conferences and publishing papers was not only a means to hone 
professional credentials, but also a way to stay abreast of developments in partner labs 
and industry. Oftentimes, when beginning a new R&D project, researchers would visit 
institutions engaged in related research to exchange ideas and tour facilities. These 
professional connections facilitated transfers of expert knowledge, necessary to stay 
abreast—if not ahead of—competition and collaborators in the US and abroad.  
 Howard Lorenzen, referred to often as the “Father of Electronic Warfare,” 
recognized the necessity of these reciprocal partnerships. Arriving at the NRL in 1940 
and retiring in 1973, his career in electronic countermeasures rode the arc of American 
security regimes from World War Two through much of the Cold War. In spite of this, he 
asserted, “There’s no question about it…We had a policy from the very beginning. If you 
had a visitor show him what you’re doing. I mean, none of the ‘hold it in the back room 
and if somebody came from the Signal Corps Lab, well fine, bring them in and show 
them the works.’” Drawing important distinctions, he explained, “Unless somebody else 
said, ‘This is so damned classified you can’t show it to anybody.’” Otherwise, providing 
someone was from within the defense community, visitors would receive a tour of 
facilities in which “the guy that was working on it would tell you exactly what he was 
doing.”110 
 Lorenzen’s observations and the implication that the Army Signal Corps Lab was 
viewed as a constant research partner to NRL provide an instructive foreshadowing.111 
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Despite the fact that the defense labs frequency competed for resources, recognition as 
the originator of techniques, acknowledgement as rightful patent holders, and the like, 
they did commonly compare notes and even share facilities such as the White Sands 
Proving Ground Army Ordnance Test Station with one another.  
 In 1946 and 1947, the V-2 Panel proved a useful mechanism for coordinating 
research projects, setting ground rules for Panel activities, and the general 
professionalization of an emerging community of space scientists. In July of 1946, the 
Panel arranged division of labor along four lines: Ballistic measurements (by the Ballistic 
Research Lab, Aberdeen Proving Ground); Missile Behavior (General Electric as 
coordinating agency, NRL telemetering group); Detection and Warning (Army Signal 
Corps coordinating, Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces); Physics of the Upper 
Atmosphere (NRL coordinating agency, APL, Princeton, University of Michigan, Air 
Material Command, Wright Field).112 The Panel agreed upon radio frequency allocation, 
distributed procedures and news regarding preparing warheads for launch, compared 
notes on equipment performance, and reported on methods of instrument recovery after 
V-2 launches.  
 V-2 Panel proceedings have been reported as “unclassified,” however distribution 
statements on reports and related documents and details of minutes indicate that V-2 
participants still produced research and reports under classification restrictions. At the 
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second meeting, Col. Bain reported that classification of the missiles would remain 
restricted “until the public showing,” though groups could enact higher classification 
restrictions as necessary. To this, Krause went so far as to assert that “everything at NRL 
is unclassified” but specific documents dealing with “certain classified equipment” would 
be marked and classified accordingly. Later that year, Krause submitted an article to the 
classified publication, Guided Missile Magazine. Remarking that each agency was 
responsible for handling its own publicity, he did advise that they avoid giving the 
impression that one agency was doing all the work.113  
 Such networking was tremendously important for this group honing new skills for 
exploring the upper atmosphere and attempting to gain credibility in pre-existing fields of 
science. Fred Whipple, a Harvard researcher contracting for the Navy Bureau of 
Ordnance, proved a valued asset, being a member of the Joint Research and Development 
Board (promoting Army and Navy R&D) and member of several geophysical panels. In 
the summer of 1947, Whipple suggested that the Panel begin considering whether to 
associate themselves more with the American Physical Society or the American 
Association for the Advancement of Sciences.114  
 Throughout these years, the defense labs also maintained active international 
contacts in International Scientific Unions such as the International Radio Science Union 
(URSI). US military representation in the URSI included the Army Signal Corps 
Research Lab, the Naval Research Lab, the Air Force’s Wright Air Development Center, 
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the Navy Electronics Laboratory, the Ballistic Research Laboratory, the Atmospheric 
Ionization Laboratory of the Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratory, Air Force 
Geophysics Research Directorate, and the Applied Physics Laboratory. Representatives 
from these institutions contributed to deliberations on policy, such as radio frequency 
allocation, radio measurement, and standards. They also participated in scientific 
commissions such as radio astronomy, terrestrial radio noise, ionospheric radio 
propagation. While intelligence gathering was certainly one element in these interactions, 
its important to remember that lab recruitment policies quite candidly acknowledged the 
necessity for the labs to support and produce reputable contributions to the basic 
sciences.115  
Indigenous Rockets to Replace the V-2 
 Over the years, Operation Paperclip engineers remained on call for consultation, 
but minutes give no indication that they attended Panel meetings in any formal capacity. 
Rarely were they referenced by name, rather, minutes in the early years indicated: 
“German calculations indicate skin temperature…”116 “the Germans had fired 2 V-2 
missiles vertically with empty warheads…”117 “the Germans are working on a recovery 
device…”, and the like. At their 12 November 1946 meeting, the Panel voted to continue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 The USWB was also represented at URSI. See Report to the National Research 
Council USA National Committee of URSI on the XIth General Assembly of URSI 
August 23-September 3, 1954. 
116 V-2 Report # 1 Minutes of the V-2 Upper Atmosphere Panel Meeting, 27 February 
1946. Box 34, File Upper Atmosphere Rocket Research Panel, Wexler Papers. 
117 V-2 Report #2 Minutes of the V-2 Upper Atmosphere Panel Meeting 2 April 1946. 
Box 34, File Upper Atmosphere Rocket Research Panel, Wexler Papers.  
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using V-2s beyond the original twenty-five (Army-offered) firings “because of its merit 
and present relatively low cost.”118  
 As UARRP researchers approached the end of their “surplus” payload space on 
V-2s, they began to discuss arrangements for coordinating post-V-2 research. Before the 
invitation from the Army to use V-2s, most of these institutions had been planning to 
design sounding rockets to meet their specific needs. The Army-JPL WAC-Corporal was 
furthest along in development, designed specifically for upper air research, it had a 
limited payload-altitude performance. The WAC had been available for use even when 
the US Army Ordnance Corps offered to make available a large number of captured V-2 
rockets.119 Throughout 1945, several WAC Corporals were fired, carrying instruments 
over 200,000 feet (nearly 38 miles). The V-2 Panel reported that the WAC was useful for 
temperature and pressure readings, “but [was] not the same class with a V-2,” achieving 
lower altitudes and with a maximum payload capacity of only ten pounds (whereas a V-2 
could lift more than 1,000 pounds).120  
 That same year, the Navy Bureau of Ordnance partnered with APL developing a 
more affordable mid-altitude alternative. Named for Aerojet Engineering Corporation and 
its relationship to the Bumblebee family of APL missiles, the Aerobee sounding rocket 
wound up capable of carrying its payload as much as 80 miles aloft, with an average 
altitude of 47 miles.121 While the NRL did contribute to the Aerobee design (and later 
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1959), 236. 
120 V-2 Report # 1 Minutes of the V-2 Upper Atmosphere Panel Meeting, 27 February 
1946. Box 34, File Upper Atmosphere Rocket Research Panel, Wexler Papers.  
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would be one of the primary Aerobee users), it focused its efforts on producing a much 
larger launcher, more on scale with the V-2. 
 On February 18, 1946, NRL’s Ernst Krause met with the Navy’s Office of 
Research and Invention (later Office of Naval Research) to discuss procurement of a 
liquid-fueled very-high-altitude vehicle, the Viking.122 This launch vehicle would have 
more thrust than any of the other US rockets, but due to its lighter aluminum skin, would 
require less thrust than the V-2 to achieve equal heights. Lacking any specialists in 
liquid-propelled rockets, Krause sent radio engineer Milton Rosen to the Jet Propulsion 
Lab. There, Rosen recalled, he “found rocket work on a scientific basis.” For eight 
months he studied thermodynamics, aerodynamics, trajectory calculation, and more.123 
NRL would launch twelve Vikings between 1949 and 1955. 
 This relatively limited production run provided the lab with valuable experience 
designing and overseeing the construction of reliable rockets and support systems in the 
years leading up to satellite research. For the Viking, NRL developed a gimbaled motor 
to steer outside the earth’s atmosphere (useful for orbital insertion of satellites or missile 
guidance). The launch system also featured intermittent gas jets to better stabilize the 
vehicle after the main power had cut off.124 After only four trials, Viking had averaged 73 
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123 Rosen, Viking, 21. Record Number 002707, Folder “Background Summaries of 
NASA Top Staff,” NHRC.  
124 L. F. Hubert and Otto Berg, “A Rocket Portrait of a Tropical Storm,” Monthly 
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miles in altitude and had set a new record of 136 miles’ height (outperforming the highest 
V-2 by 3 miles).125  
 
Table 2.1 Viking Launches, Achievements, and Lessons Learned 
Viking Number Launch Date Peak Altitude (miles) Notes (Achievements in 
italics) 
1 3 May 1949 50 Premature cutoff due to 
steam leaks in turbine 
2 6 Sept 1949 32 Premature cutoff due to 
steam leaks in turbine 
3 9 Feb 1950 50 Rocket cut off by radio when 
westward drift was excessive 
4 11 May 1950 105 Shipboard firing 




11 Dec 1950 40 Night firing, fins failed, 
rocket executed violent 
maneuvers. Temperature day 
firing. 
7 7 Aug 1951 136 Highest measurement of 
atmospheric density and 
atmospheric winds 
8 6 June 1952 4 Rocket broke loose on static 
firing and destroyed itself 
9 15 Dec 1952 135  
10 7 May 1954 136 Motor exploded on first 
attempt; rocket rebuilt and 
flown. First measure of 
positive ion composition at 
high alt, highest exposure of 
cosmic ray emulsions 
11  24 May 1954 158 Highest alt exposure of 
cosmic ray emulsion 
12  
 
4 Feb 1955 144 Highest alt photographs of 
earth 
 
13  8 Dec 1956 126 Vanguard development Test 
Vehicle 0 (TV-0) 
14  1 May 1957 121 Vanguard development 
 
Table derived from “Table 1 Performance Data” and Rosen’s Viking Rocket Story. 126 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Milton Rosen and Richard B. Snodgrass, “High Altitude Sounding Rocket,” (NRL, 
Washington, D.C., Revised January 1953), 6. 
126 “Table 1 Performance Data” Record Number 006624 NHRC. 
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 The lighter and cheaper Aerobee rocket proved extremely well-suited to the 
needs, risks, and resources of this incremental science and was used for decades because 
of this. Explained Herbert Friedman: 
The sealing-wax-and-string approach to instrumenting the Aerobee typified much 
of our effort in the 1950s. We often went into the field with three rockets to 
attempt a single experimental objective because the rockets were relatively 
inexpensive. Mistakes experienced on the first attempt could be adjusted at the 
launch site by quickly preparing new detectors, for example, on a rudimentary 
vacuum system-often with liberal use of wax and Glyptal resin paint to cement 
new windows, seal leaks, and insulate the electronics against corona discharge.127 
 
 Thus, early sounding rocket research gave engineers experience building durable 
scientific instruments, maintaining stable and smooth flight, as well as refining skills in 
tracking bodies and telemetering data—all of which would serve them in satellite and 
space probe R&D.128 While many researchers gleaned useful data, others bore in mind 
the fact that they were biding their time, “going the sounding rocket route” until the 
resources or mandate presented itself for satellite exploration. Indeed, rocket technology 
left much to be desired. Between 1946 and 1953, the recovery of data remained a major 
problem129 The landings were too rough for even the most rugged instruments. Radio 
telemetry promised a solution, but itself remained in dependent upon a more refined 
understanding of the ionospheric disturbances to radio transmission, as well as dozens of 
engineering woes centered on the “closely packed maze of vacuum tubes, resistors, 
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128 NASA Sounding Rockets, 1958-1968: A Historical Summary (Washington D.C.: SP-
4401), 14-15. In the foreword, Newell briefly contrasts the “pioneering days” of research 
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129 Researchers reported that “One of the most important problems connected with the 
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data they yield.” Rosen and Snodgrass, 6. 
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condensers and transformers, every one of which must work perfectly or else the 
information form the rocket…will be impaired.”130 In this and other ways, rocket 
engineering itself could jeopardize instruments and data, compromising experiments with 
vibrations, carrying gases from the ground, and distorting the ambient electrical field.  
 Even when information was stored on board or telemetered successfully, in many 
respects it provided too brief a “snapshot” of data or at the wrong time. Liquid-fueled 
rockets took time to fuel and had to be used within just an hour or two of preparation, 
making it all but impossible to catch unpredictable solar flares in action. NRL’s Heat and 
Light Division’s Ross Gunn, once advised Homer Newell, “It [the rocket] moves too fast. 
You can’t get enough data to get good statistics. So I want you to forget it and do it some 
other way.’” Newell interpreted his remarks less as a desire to cancel sounding rocket 
research, but “to find a better way of doing it” in orbital spaceflight.131 
 Regardless of these risks (or perhaps specifically to overcome them one day with 
satellites), NRL researchers and administrators worked to develop something of a vertical 
monopoly over rocketry: applying V-2 experience to Viking design, coordinating 
manufacture with Martin Company, launching the Viking, identifying useful experiments 
for upper atmospheric research, producing telemetering equipment to send data from 
rocket to earth, and working up data into scientific papers and reports. Though they had 
not enjoyed the duration and breadth of resources that the German rocket team had over 
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the years, they were fast catching up to what would become their main competitor for 
launching the US’s first satellite132  
 At the same time, they worked to “market” their capabilities to other scientific 
communities, sending data and imagery with the US Weather Bureau, circulating it in 
scientific journals, and at conferences. 
Meteorologists’ Acceptance of High-Altitude Images 
 
 Overall, the Upper Atmospheric Rocket Research Panel was a well-coordinated 
operation, organizing the human and material resources of roughly two-dozen 
organizations over more than a decade. Reinforced by the experience of Germany’s top 
rocket engineers, several US defense labs, their university partners, and industrial 
contractors collaborated in UARRP research, knowingly laying groundwork for US 
satellite flight. DeVorkin has illustrated how sounding rocketry’s early years were 
colored by an acknowledged reticence among more established scientific communities to 
accept research results derived from rocketborn instruments. These included the fields of 
solar physics, ionospheric physics, and atmospheric physics.  
 Soon after the beginning of V-2 research, UARRP researchers began 
experimenting with using cameras on rockets to measure the aspect (essentially the tilt) 
of rockets while in flight. Representatives from at least the APL and NRL offered cloud 
images to the USWB, and responded positively when the USWB requested duplicate 
images and negatives of upper air images. USWB Chief, Francis Reichelderfer, quickly 
grasped the utility of high-altitude images from rocketsonde as a potentially useful aid to 
weather forecasting and even studies of interactions between weather phenomena and 
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land masses. Viewed from above, clouds would provide their own weather map and 
would aid in identifying weather fronts as well as advancing the study of complicated 
processes such as tropical cyclones. However, when the primary means of tracking a 
sounding rocket were optical, research teams rarely fired when cloudiness exceeded 10%. 
As a result, rockets provided precious few images of large areas of clouds.133 The few 
instances in which V-2 Panel and UARRP rockets captured images of cloudcover proved 
formative experiences to satellite meteorology, noted often in retrospective articles in 
meteorology journals.  
 
 In late 1946, Harry Wexler traveled to Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab to 
have a look at photos taken from a 24 October V-2 launch. A couple months later, USWB 
Chief Reichelderfer wrote to APL’s James van Allen, communicating Wexler’s interest 
in the V-2’s cloud photos and communicating his “desire to make an intensive study of 
these clouds in relation to topography and the prevailing atmospheric currents,” certain 
that when topographical information was paired with imagery of cloud forms, it would 
help explain “the distribution of vertical currents in the atmosphere.”134 Thus, the WB 
Chief asked van Allen for a copy of the negative of the photo for a 35 mm microfilm 
reader, heights and orientation of the rocket on each exposure, along with any other 
information that may be pertinent. Evidently intrigued by the prospects, he continued, 
“we hardly need stress the great importance of this high altitude photographic program in 
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Correspondence 1947, Wexler Papers. See also Reichelderfer to van Allen 3 January 
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weather forecasting and research.” He continued, “since a forecast must use as a point of 
departure the weather patterns prevailing at the time of the forecast, these cloud 
photographs would be of definite aid.” Reichelderfer communicated that perhaps one day 
such photos might even be made daily—a significant sentiment given the fact that he did 
not indicate with whose rockets the images might be attained.135 Likely, he expected the 
UARRP would do so. 
 In March of 1947, a V-2 launch vehicle equipped television cameras captured a 
number of intriguing images for the Panel researchers. That April at a National Advisory 
Committee on Aeronautics subcommittee meeting on Meteorological Problems, physicist 
Thor Bergstrahl expressed the concern that rockets were not ideal for regular 
observations; their expense and complexity made regular, let alone daily, launches 
impractical.136 Echoing the sentiment of Ross Gunn to Newell, Bergstrahl observed that 
sounding rockets “certainly made clear” “that if we had satellites, it would be 
fantastic.”137 Likewise, Reichelderfer commented that photography from V-2 rockets was 
“considered to be questionable,” likely referring to the expense and complexity of launch, 
though James van Allen suggested that the cheap Aerobee rockets would at least be 
viable for at least military weather reconnaissance.  
 Soon after, the Naval Research Laboratory released report No. R-3083, only two 
pages of text, but featuring 10 page-size reproductions of the V-2 photography. The 
following summer, Wexler wrote Newell, requesting eighty additional copies of the 
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“excellent pamphlet” to send to weather stations across the US, “so our forecasters can 
obtain a glimpse into what may well turn into a potent weather forecast tool in the 
future.”138 Wexler again communicated his aims for the future, saying, “I hope that 
sometime soon it will be possible for pictures to be taken from a high altitude rocket 
showing the entire cloud system associated with a cyclone [hurricane] located in the 
neighborhood of White Sands.”139 It would be six years before that would occur (covered 
in Chapter Four).140 
 A few months later, Reichelderfer wrote APL to thank them for sending a 
duplicate negative of the 24 October 1946 film, saying, “As soon as we receive the 
auxiliary data [indicating that they were interested in rocket data, not just images] we 
shall study this film and try to correlate the cloud patterns with upper winds and 
topography.” Additionally, Reichelderfer thanked van Allen for the invitation that the 
USWB attend an upcoming conference on high altitude photography and that Harry 
Wexler would be representing the Bureau there.141  
 Thus, the USWB was certainly interested in the use of sounding rockets to 
support both research and forecasting services and the UARRP certainly interested in 
sharing their observations with the Bureau. However, sources do not indicate the level of 
commitment or financing the USWB could attain for such a venture. Nor when. In the 
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armed services, however, speculation about the utility of satellites became more and more 
detailed. 
Proliferation of Methods & Consensus Building 
 
 As the rocket researchers shared images with the USWB to establish scientific 
credibility (and perhaps out of a desire to expand their base of collaborators), so, too, did 
they share data derived from rocketsonde observations. UARRP coordination fostered a 
proliferation of methods for making in situ measurements of the upper atmosphere. For 
instance, the Ballistic Research Lab had Warren Berning trained in physics and 
meteorology and engaged in testing and refining Doppler Velocity and Position 
(DOVAP) trajectory analysis. While doing so, Berning honed new methods for 
determining the charge density of the ionosphere.142 At the Army Signal Corps Lab, 
William Stroud and Michael Ference used grenade reports (the sound and the flash) to 
determine the density of the upper atmosphere (at heights as great as these, there is too 
little air for even a thermometer to be effective and so temperature had to be derived from 
pressure and/or density of the air.)143 
 Throughout this time, USWB meteorologist Harry Wexler attended V-2 meetings 
and kept apprised of events, as the Chairman of NACA’s Special Subcommittee on the 
Upper Atmosphere. In 1946, UCLA’s Joseph Kaplan wrote Wexler, sharing with him a 
thesis prospectus for student William Kellogg. Kellogg, who in the next few years would 
begin working for RAND and turning out reports speculating on the utility of satellites 
for meteorology, proposed a survey of the “diversity of disciplines which have been 
brought to bear” on upper atmospheric sounding. “The fact,” Kellogg predicted, “that this 
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region would be a theater of operations in any future war is partly responsible for this 
increased interest, and certainly adds a note of urgency to…the course of scientific 
research.”144 Depending on how one delineates among methods, Kellogg listed at least 
seven commonly used for direct measurement and indirect measurement of upper 
atmospheric temperature and composition.145 
 When Kellogg’s thesis, “The Atmosphere Above 100 Kilometers” was completed 
in 1949, he cited references spanning the globe including, the Proceedings of the Royal 
Society, the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal Monograph Ser., the Quarterly Journal of 
the Royal Meteorological Society, the 1948 Gassiot Committee Report, Oxford 
University Press, the Rep. Radio Res of Japan, the Proceedings of the National Institute 
of Science India, Cambridge Press, the Indian Journal of Physics, the Royal 
Meteorological Institute of Belgium, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
India, and radio data acquired from Peru, Alaska, and Western Australia.146 These 
citations not only indicate the number of places “consuming” atmospheric data and 
exploring the upper atmosphere (be it through direct means of rockets or indirect such as 
radio), but they also embody potential collaborators—a gradually accreting global pool of 
human resources. Within months of Kellogg’s completing his doctoral degree, these 
communities would begin making plans for the International Geophysical Year. 
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 Throughout this period, UARRP members struggled to establish accurate and 
reliable methods of determining atmospheric temperature, pressure, and density. The 
Army Signal Corps placed instruments in inflatable spheres and dropped them from 
rockets, telemetering measurements through the course of decent. At the suggestion of 
Weather Bureau and university researchers, the Army Signal Corps also experimented 
with grenade “soundings” of the atmosphere, measuring the flash and acoustic signals 
from the rocket-launched grenades to estimate wind and temperature. Harvard’s Fred 
Whipple opted to photograph meteor tails and used their properties to deduce 
temperature. The University of Michigan (funded by the Air Force) and NRL (both 
interested particularly in how ionospheric conditions effected radio propagation) 
exchanged thoughts at V-2 Panel meetings and during a site visit to NRL. 
 If collected within the same few hours and cross-referenced, atmospheric 
snapshots from weather balloons, meteor tails measurements, and sounding rocket 
experiments could provide some degree of reproducibility in spite of the atmosphere’s 
ever-dynamic conditions. Or so it would seem. Throughout late 1950, UARRP members 
marshaled resources in preparation for their largest coordinated effort yet, “Temperature-
Day.” December 11 and 12th of 1950, found the Navy, Air Force, and Army Signal Corps 
labs setting up for coordinated atmospheric observations alongside Harvard and 
University of Michigan. Significantly, Sydney Chapman, an internationally renowned 
geophysicist had attended UARRP’s planning meeting that summer.147 Less than two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 At that time, Chapman was on leave from Oxford and working as a research associate 
at CalTech on an Army Signal Corps Project: nomenclature of the upper atmosphere; 
points out that the term “upper atmosphere” itself is contextual, depending on the 
science/researcher. See Wexler papers for 1950 as well as Gregory Good, “Sydney 
Chapman: Dynamo Behind the IGY,” in Roger Launius, James Rodger Fleming, and 
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months after Temperature-Day had been first proposed, James van Allen and Chapman 
had discussed for the first time the possibility of what became the International 
Geophysical Year. David Devorkin points out that throughout these months, Chapman, 
van Allen, Lloyd Berkner, and other leaders in the field of geophysics had already begun 
considering a globally-coordinated Geophysical Year, making Temperature-Day an 
exciting dress-rehearsal for things to come. Anticipating a fruitful “interchange of 
experiments and techniques” and in particular, long-sought consensus on the NACA 
Atmospheric tables, the rocket teams transported their equipment and personnel to White 
Sands, New Mexico (Proving Ground and Army Ordnance Test Station).  
 Gradually, as data was reduced from observations by sounding rockets, weather 
balloons, and Whipple’s comet observations, the UARRP reached some degree of 
solidarity in revised temperature-altitude models. With great enthusiasm, James van 
Allen reflected on the “wealth of experimental information . . . and the impressive degree 
of concordance of the results from the diverse, independent methods.”148 Van Allen, 
Ference, Wexler, Newell, and Whipple attended the NACA subcommittee meeting, 
where NACA encouraged UARRP to publish their results, but “strongly recommended 
that the paper presenting the summary be so written and titled that it would be obvious 
that the information is a summary of data and not a proposed new standard for use in 
rocket work.” As an internationally recognized researcher not on any of the rocket teams, 
and whose results were the methodological outlier of Temperature-Day activities, Fred 
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Whipple became the man of choice for writing up the final analysis of the UARRP’s 
findings.149  
 The report, without indicating that the UARRP had NACA’s authority to set a 
new standard on atmospheric temperature-altitude tables, did highlight discrepancies 
between the UARRP and NACA Atmospheric tables and adopted the definitive-sounding 
title, “Pressures, Densities, and Temperatures in the Upper Atmosphere.” Predicting that 
future tables would be based on rocketsonde data, the report stated that continued rocket 
research was necessary “if we are to master scientifically this domain such a few miles 
distant.”150 Acceptance was hard-won from the NACA, hesitant to accept the UARRP’s 
data.151 
  
 Perhaps more important than the slow acceptance of a NACA subcommittee, the 
emerging research techniques piqued the interest of colleagues abroad, offering hopes of 
sharing research observations. In April of 1952, the Gassiot Committee invited the 
UARRP members to attend a joint conference at Oxford University on rocket exploration 
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150 DeVorkin, 294. R. A. Minzner (ed), The 1976 Standard Atmosphere Above 86-km 
Altitude: Recommendations of Task Group II to COESA (Washington, D.C.: NASA SP-
398, 1976), 58-59. In 1953, the USWB and Geophysics Research Division of AF 
Cambridge Research Center cosponsored the formation of a committee on the Extension 
of the Atmosphere to altitudes above 20 km. Beginning in 1956, Air Research 
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of the upper atmosphere.152 The Gassiot Committee’s mission was described as “to 
recommend as to the work of the meteorological and magnetic observatories…and to 
administer…funds applicable to their maintenance.”153 Between the 1952 invitation to the 
UARRP and their conference in August 1953, the Chairman of the Committee (a physics 
professor at the University College London) received a phone call from the Ministry of 
Supply, responsible for military procurement of the British armed forces, asking if the 
Committee would be interested in performing research using rockets available from the 
ministry. The UARRP members responded enthusiastically. The Office of Naval 
Research covered the UARRP’s travel and proceedings were published the following 
year.154 
RAND Uses UARRP Observations to Speculate on Meteorological Satellites 
 
 Whereas the V-2 Upper Atmospheric Rocket Panel images fueled Weather 
Bureau hopes for more sounding and more routine rocket images, in the RAND think 
tank, they ignited speculation on meteorological satellites for forecasting and research. 
Shortly after finishing school at UCLA, William Kellogg began work at RAND, Corp. 
There, the meteorologist made use of UARRP observations to reflect on the utility of 
meteorological satellites. In 1951 RAND published study R-218 coauthored by Stanley 
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Greenfield and William Kellogg155 in which they considered the effectiveness of a 
“satellite missile” or “high-altitude robot” defined as orbiting well above “the uppermost 
reaches of the known enemy defenses” performing weather reconnaissance.”156 Kellogg 
and Greenfield correlated photographs taken from UARRP rocket flights with coincident 
synoptic ground data, speculating on the practicability of weather satellite 
meteorology.157 The flights dated between 1947 and 1950 and usable photos ranged from 
60-70 miles in altitude. Kellogg recalled how “my favorite professor at UCLA, Joc 
Bjerknes, had great enthusiasm for the idea of doing a detailed analysis of rocket 
pictures.”158 In Kellogg’s report, classified as Secret when released in 1951, Bjerknes 
published his own analysis of UARRP images in an appendix.159  
 In their report Kellogg and Greenfield determined that the true value of satellites 
lay in their routine and broad spatial coverage of land and earth. This would permit 
meteorologists to identify and track weather systems as they developed over a period of 
days. The two determined that orbiting between 250 and 500 miles, satellites not only 
promised a larger field of vision than rockets (which were generally achieving an altitude 
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Vehicle for Reconnaissance.” Greenfield and Kellogg based their analysis upon four 
sounding rocket firings: NRL Viking No. 3, V-2 No. 28 (Air Force Cambridge Research 
Lab), Aerobee A-7 and V-2 No. 40 (no sponsor/investigator attributed). RAND reports 
available at www.DTIC.mil. 
156 Stanley Greenfield and William Kellogg, R-218, 2. 
157 Ibid, 24-31. Today, this would be referred to as establishing “ground truth,” for the 
remote sensing observation. 
158 Kellogg quoted in, William W. Vaughan and Dale Johnson, “Meteorological 
Satellites—TheVery Early Years, Prior to Launch of TIROS-1,” Bulletin of the American 
Meteorological Society 75 (December 1994), 2297. See also Friedman, Appropriating 
the Weather. 
159 William W. Vaughan and Dale L. Johnson, ibid. 
 87 
of about 60-70 miles), but that if placed in proper orbit they could remotely sense wind 
direction and wind shear. In the report, they also analyzed the albedo of a variety of 
ground surfaces, from those with the lowest reflective properties (cultivated soil and 
moist earth) to the highest (sea ice, old snow, and fresh snow). The authors noted while 
an infrared filter would be useful for solving aerial haze between the camera and ground, 
500-foot resolutions were generally attainable.  
 Significantly, Kellogg and Greenfield set their minimum usable resolution at 500 
feet—sufficient for studying cloudcover, but not too detailed—meaning instruments 
would be lighter in weight and less expensive. That same year, RAND had published R-
217, “Utility of a Satellite Vehicle for Reconnaissance” estimating that:  
For weather observations, resolutions as poor as 500 to 1000 ft can be utilized, 
although a better minimum resolvable dimension would be 200 ft. This latter 
resolution is ample to determine a major portion of the characteristics necessary to 
predict weather. At this resolution, orientation and structure of clouds, direction of 
winds, and presence of fronts can be seen.160 
 
At this time, RAND personnel had begun work on the well-known Project Feedback 
report, which included the RCA proposal for television cameras operating as an “upper 
atmosphere station” for observing atmospheric phenomena.161  
On the Eve of the IGY: “Leadership of a Divided World” 
 
. . . leadership of a divided world has brought into sharp focus the international 
aspects of science162 
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 It was about this time that the UARRP Panel began to attract interest from 
communities beyond the United States. In particular, it was at the Panel’s 13 June 1950, 
meeting (the same one that organized the Temperature-day) at which internationally-
renowned geophysicist Sydney Chapman visited. Newell attributed great significance to 
that meeting, noting that from then on the Panel’s international contacts broadened as 
Chapman and other influential figures in international space research visited from 
Belgium, Australia, Japan, and Canada.163 This was an opportune time for the US to be 
hosting international guests. Just one month before, UARRP members who were also in 
the URSI met informally at China Lake to discuss the possibilities of IGY 
collaboration.164  
 In May 1950, geophysicist Lloyd Berkner drew attention to US international 
science policy in two events. First, he made an informal proposal for the International 
Geophysical Year (at a dinner party celebrating Sydney Chapman’s visit.) Also that 
month, Lloyd Berkner and James Webb submitted their study, “Science and Foreign 
Relations: International Flow of Scientific and Technological Information” to the US 
Department of State.165 Berkner acted as special consultant to Webb, who was the Acting 
Secretary of the Department of State. Their committee had made a strong case for not 
only tolerating the status quo of American participation in international scientific 
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communities, but that Department of State had a responsibility to foster improved 
relations and increased circulation of scientific knowledge. This could be in the form of 
visiting researchers, scientific journals, or conferences. Daringly, Webb and Berkner 
specifically urged the State Department to encourage US scientists to have Soviet 
contacts.166  
 More than once they quoted Secretary of State Dean Acheson opining that 
American national and international policy was best as a manifestation of existing 
practice—it should be a bottom-up reflection of what citizens wanted rather than a top-
down relationship of policy dictating practice. Implicitly situating scientific practice 
among other daily American activities Berkner quoted Acheson at least twice in the 
report. Acheson invoked classic distinctions between communist and US lifestyles, 
including churches, businesses and other “natural” manifestations of US life: 
. . . let’s dispose of one idea right at the start and not bother with it any more. That 
is that the policies of the United States are determined out of abstract principles in 
the Department of State or in the White House or in the Congress. That is not the 
case. If these policies are going to be good, they must grow out of the 
fundamental attitudes of our people on both sides. If they are to be effective, they 
must become articulate through all the institutions of our national life, of which 
this is one of the greatest—through the press, through the radio, through the 
churches, and through the labor unions, through the business organizations, 
through all the groupings of our national life. . . 167 
 
 In their study, Webb and Berkner emphasized the value of collaborating with 
former and even potential war adversaries, repeatedly using post-WWII policy regarding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 International Science Policy Survey Group, Science and Foreign Relations 
International Flow of Scientific and Technological Information (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of State Office of Public Affairs, 1950), 78, 91. Regarding the 
reintegration of Japan and Germany—not only to the world markets, but in the 
international scientific communities examples on12, 23. Hereafter Science and 
Foreign Relations. 
167 Science and Foreign Relations, 86, 5. 
 90 
Japanese and German scientific researchers as examples of good science policy. Rather 
than problematize the principle of the US becoming dependent on Nazi science and 
scientists, they framed the V-2 Project Paperclip and similar postwar programs as 
successful co-option of formerly enemy resources. By way of being co-opted into the US 
security establishment, they were necessarily diverted from the new enemy’s (read: 
Soviet) availability. When the US scientific communities were open to collaboration with 
former—and even potential—adversaries, they stood to gain a better sense of their 
counterparts’ capabilities as well as the promise of their respective fields of study. For 
instance, in early 1947 the Weather Bureau was hosting a number of Soviet hydrologists, 
climatologists, geological surveyors, and meteorologists; exchanging thoughts and 
practical observations as they visited major manufacturing facilities and laboratories in 
the United States. Yet in September of 1949, Harry Wexler was in communication with 
the Secretary of the American Meteorological Society concerning the ineligibility of 
German and Japanese to join.168 These matters were not to be taken lightly, given the 
professional risks US researchers took on when maintaining international contacts.169  
 Bureaucratic machinery was still coming into place at this time as, the National 
Science Foundation was newly established and the federal government was still grasping 
to reach consensus on a truly comprehensive national science policy. Berkner and Webb 
opined that old paradigms for state-science relations had allowed a “tacit recognition” 
and “nominal support” to international science, but that times were changing. The 
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international scientific communities were facing mounting problems that demanded the 
authority and resources of their respective states: international standards, the necessity for 
international law governing the Antarctic. These questions of practice yielded material 
problems to be faced and policy to be made. 
 
 In reporting on the state of internationalism in the sciences at the time, the two 
used a recent reorganization in the field of meteorological services to illustrate a 
rethinking of the state’s optimal relationship to science. The committee observed that 
over the course of more than seventy years, the International Meteorological 
Organization had “served the cause of international meteorology well.” However in 
recent years, the organization’s leadership recognized the necessity to transition from 
non-governmental status to governmental. The IMO’s nongovernmental status functioned 
as a barrier to meteorologists. As an operating agency, WMO representatives could incur 
“considerable investments” from nations with an interest in economic development and 
“rapid technological discoveries and advancements.” The IMO re-chartered into the 
operating agency, the WMO electing USWB Francis Reichelderfer as the first president 
in 1951. Whether related or not, these events were concurrent with Lloyd Berkner’s 
earliest IGY coalition building.170  
 The WMO differed from the Scientific Unions in that it had a permanent staff and 
its meetings were regularly attended by civil servants charged with the formulation and 
execution of state policy. Coordinating, standardizing, routing, and archiving synoptic 
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data from member nations demanded a considerable overhead and a more direct 
affiliation with the United Nations. Thus the scientific unions operated on much leaner 
budgets than the WMO, with no permanent staffs and in the words of one member, 
existed “to promote science, not to utilize it.”171  
 Berkner and Webb make clear that the meteorologists reorganized their 
Organization to better secure and manage state resources. They did this to meet the 
demands of users of meteorological services—forecasting, climatology, and general 
research. Berkner and Webb situated the IMO-WMO reorganization in the “context of a 
vast national economic development and rapid technological discoveries and 
advancements.” “Full exploitation of such advancements through international 
cooperation—which would involve considerable investments—was not possible without 
the direct intervention and support of governments.172 Correspondence within the US 
Weather Bureau supports this interpretation. 
Weather Bureau’s Aims at Coordinating Meteorological Research &  
Services 
 
 Meteorologists at the US Weather Bureau wanted to perform their national and 
international obligations better. By the 1950s, it had become evident that the USWB and 
WMO faced four inter-related problems. (1) In order to improve standards and services 
throughout the world, they needed (2) to access to more data from across the Earth. (3) 
To improve synoptic forecasts in the short term, and the development of numerical 
weather prediction in the long run, would in turn rely on (4) an improved understanding 
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of the earth’s global dynamic and thermodynamic processes, which also demanded more 
observations better distributed across the globe. 
 However in order to do this they had to better coordinate resources on a national 
level. Months after the formation of the National Science Foundation, USWB Harry 
Wexler corresponded with USWB Chief Francis Reichelderfer. In a letter titled “New 
Approach to General Coordination of Meteorological Research Sponsored by the 
Government,” Reichelderfer predicted, on 13 August 13 1951: 
the time may soon be ripe for a new approach to the general planning and 
programming of meteorological research under the Federal Government. 
Theoretically, the WB might possibly take a much broader role in planning and 
coordinating research...173 
 
When USWB representatives expressed concerns about coordinating research, it was on a 
national scale, including both military and civilian resources. In July of 1952, well into 
the Korean War, Reichelderfer wrote Wexler, then Assistant Chief and the Director of 
Scientific Services. Therein, Reichelderfer observed that due to a “prolonged period of 
military expansion and military funds available for all manner of research and 
development,” there was reason for concern regarding a possibly permanent plan by the 
US military to “invade the civil meteorological field.” 174 Reichelderfer allowed that the 
evolutions in research policy leading to the armed services doing an increasing amount of 
research and forecasting work—work that normally fell under Weather Bureau—was not 
deliberately invasive nor treacherous, rather the logical response to perceptions that 
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“progress in meteorology is not as rapid as it should be and that they can do the job” in 
meteorological research as well as providing meteorological services.  
 There were a number of scientific fields and meteorological services in question, 
demanding “Plans for New Meteorological Programs.” For one, the Weather Bureau 
might undertake a survey of all meteorological functions performed by the armed 
services and USWB, that they might “relieve” the military of otherwise civilian 
responsibilities. Regarding R&D, Reichelderfer advocated that the USWB “pioneer as 
much as practicable” the use of electronic computers for numerical weather prediction. 
So far as meteorological services were concerned, the synoptic network of WBAN 
stations (Weather Bureau, Army, Navy; later Weather Bureau Air Force, Navy) ought to 
be reorganized, extended, and possibly even elevated within the USWB organizational 
structure.175 Since 1947, raw data had been flooding the USWB, leading them to partner 
with the armed services in plotting and analyzing data to produce as much as 68 weather 
charts a day.176 This service demanded 172 persons (98 USWB, 49 Air Force, 25 Navy).  
 In 1951, the Air Force’s Air Weather Service R&D branch contacted the 
numerical weather prediction unit, the Meteorological Panel, offering to provide funds to 
Carl-Gustav Rossby and Jules Charney on a five-year renewable contract. While 
Christine Harper suggests that this specific offer came to naught, the Air Weather Service 
certainly did enjoy a growing participation in (and influence over) US numerical and 
hand-prepared weather mapping.177  
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 In practice, meteorologists crossed boundaries among fundamental environmental 
research, improved forecasting procedures, and ultimately enhancing meteorological 
services, all necessitating a build up of USWB resources and authority and in the long run 
and a more explicit coordinating power over US resources. The USWB also sought to 
make the most of Defense Department resources. At the time of the Korean War build-up 
(1950-51), Francis Reichelderfer “suggested that if the Weather Bureau would propose 
one or more projects in research and development in synoptic meteorology pertaining to 
basic service problems and having general application in military meteorology as well as 
in the Weather Bureau, the military services would doubtless be willing to finance the 
Bureau…” The fall of 1952 found Reichelderfer musing over long-term planning for 
research in synoptic meteorology. The USWB Chief recommended that he and his 
associate “see what can be done to reshape the pattern of research in meteorology so that 
the Weather Bureau will eventually be the principal government agency responsible for 
such research in accordance with the intent of basic statutory authority.”178 In particular, 
with the formation of the NSF (and word from the NSF Director, Alan Waterman 
himself), the USWB could anticipate increased funding in fundamental research. 
Reichelderfer explicitly linked this change to a gradual decrease in military influence 
over R&D, stating that the USWB would “look toward opening the way for eventual 
resumption of research responsibilities by the Weather Bureau if and when the military 
projects in this field taper off…”179 
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 In 1954, the US WBAN would expand and move from downtown Washington, 
D.C. to Suitland, Maryland.180 In July of that year, the Air Force, USWB, and Navy 
began collaborating on the Joint Numerical Weather Prediction Unit. Its first director was 
an officer in the Air Force’s Air Weather Service. The USWB was largely reliant on US 
military for observations, a trend that grew throughout the 1950s. Most USWB 
observations available were north of the 20 degree north latitude, the least important (and 
best understood) third of the world atmosphere in terms of thermodynamics and 
dynamics.181 Throughout the 1950s, the USWB would remain reliant on the armed 
services for data from the earth’s equatorial region, Arctic, and Antarctic. The Air 
Force’s Air Weather Service stretched operated nine regional centers including Germany, 
Japan, Guam, Hawaii, and Alaska. Their Global Weather Center was in Offut, Nebraska, 
Serving Strategic Air Command.  
 If Reichelderfer was vexed by increasing military influence over research and 
anticipated a reduction in military support following the end of hostilities in Korea, then 
expanding his reciprocal alliances (local weather data in exchange for meteorological 
forecasting services) overseas provided at least a partial solution to the Weather Bureau’s 
want for funds and data. On an international stage, Reichelderfer took the initiative of 
expressing the notion that it fell to the WMO to aid the developing world. Following a 
recent Convention, Reichelderfer observed that while many presumed the WMO’s 
objectives were limited to providing “international coordination and meteorological 
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exchanges,” “its Convention shows that it is expected to promote development of 
meteorology, and we would like to get ahead faster in this aspect as well as in the 
coordination and exchange features…” The “development of meteorology” demanded a 
more refined understanding of the upper atmosphere improvement of standards and 
services of meteorology throughout the world, depended “much upon progress in 
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CHAPTER 3  
The Promise and the Threats of Satellite Capabilities:  




Why are scientists so interested in such a spectacular and expensive undertaking? 
…During this [IGY] period the scientific efforts of some 40 nations will be co-
ordinated to obtain observations on a world-wide scale, observations which will 
be vital to our scientific progress. 
RAND Report, 1956183 
 
 This chapter addresses the first, but temporary, collaboration between the 
meteorological community and the sounding rocket-satellite R&D community on 
meteorological satellites. A total of three meteorological satellite experiments were 
launched among a host of other proof of concept satellites for the International 
Geophysical Year (IGY). During this time, Weather Bureau representatives pondered the 
future of their field, attempting to strike a balance between the needs of forecasters and 
researchers, but also satellite instruments for forecasting and satellite instruments for 
fundamental geophysical research. 
 As an emerging technology, satellites writ large would prove jarringly disruptive 
to a number of social relationships.  
 (1) While the UARRP research centers continued to work together on UARRP 
and eventually IGY planning, interservice competition remained a driving force in the 
upper echelons of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, all vying to establish capabilities and 
recognition in the growing fields of missiles and satellites.  
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 (2) Many, including President Dwight D. Eisenhower, worried that a US satellite 
program would shift undue resources away from ICBM development, even if the research 
elements might contribute to missile development in the long run.  
 (3) Because of the dual-use nature of scientific knowledge, mid-1950s proof of 
concept satellites breeched barriers between the classified world and declassified.184 In 
1954, planners for the International Geophysical Year (IGY) began openly speculating on 
the utility of satellites for upper atmospheric observation, geomagnetic studies, solar rays 
studies, and the like. By inviting the participation of defense labs in the IGY, they 
temporarily drew a community of satellite thinkers, like William Kellogg, from an R&D 
world otherwise “muzzled by classification restrictions” into the more public sphere of 
the International Geophysical Year. In years previous, these same researchers had been 
engaged in classified studies of strategic and tactical satellite applications: weather 
reconnaissance, electronic intelligence, image reconnaissance, early warning, and anti-
missile studies. When the Eisenhower Administration chose to launch a small scientific 
satellite in the IGY, they not only funded a stalking horse to establish a peaceful 
precedent for satellite overflight, they subsidized long-awaited satellite experimentation 
in the Army Signal Corps Lab, Naval Research Lab, the Army Ballistic Missile Agency, 
and their research partners. 
 (4) The commitment to launch scientifically relevant satellites by the end of the 
IGY would strain already tenuous fiscal relationships among a number of institutions. 
These included the Congress and the four-year-old National Science Foundation, the NSF 
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and National Academies of Sciences, and finally the NAS and the armed services’ R&D 
centers (such as the Office of Naval Research, NRL, Army Signal Corps Lab, and Army 
Ballistic Missile Agency). As representatives of these institutions weighed the pros and 
cons of pursuing satellite flight, they considered how their accountability could be 
adversely affected by cost overruns, underestimated lead times, and sundry other shades 
of failure. 
 (5) Funded primarily through the Defense Department, but also the National 
Science Foundation and emergency appropriations from Congress and even the CIA, the 
UARRP sounding rocket communities recognized the IGY as a once-ever opportunity to 
prove the performance of their equipment and the validity of their work and (hopefully) 
secure more sustainable support from military or non-military sponsors. From the very 
start, this opportunity seemed to be slipping through their fingertips. On a programmatic 
level, the sounding rocket programs suffered the contracting woes, R&D uncertainties, 
and mission creep for which defense projects had become notorious. At the national 
level, between 1953 and 1956, the Eisenhower Administration sought a leveling off of 
defense spending, first with the New Look reduction in conventional forces and reliance 
on nuclear (read: Strategic Air Command) superiority and by 1956, transitioning to 
“sufficiency,” presuming superiority of neither the US nor Soviet nuclear arsenals, rather 
that both were by then adequate for mutual destruction.185 Military R&D that had risen 
steadily between 1952 and 1954 began to level and 1955-1957 brought a slight dip in 
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military R&D as a percentage of GDP.186 Then, 1957 brought a 10% across the board cut 
to the armed services, endangering the basic research programs.  
 (5) And then the unexpected happened. Sputnik brought the perhaps best-known 
instance of disjuncture caused by these satellites to light: a symbolic shift in geopolitical 
power resulting in a significant reorganization of defense and nondefense resources (to be 
addressed more fully in the next chapter). For the IGY researchers, the launch of Sputnik 
brought chaos before it brought cash. In the months that followed October 4, 1957, a 
broad range of critics fostered a climate of national emergency. Among these were critics 
who had accused Eisenhower of permitting a bomber gap (disproven by the first two U-2 
flights in 1956) and supporters of the Army’s Minimum Orbiter satellite proposal which 
Wernher von Braun claimed could have been launched at the start of 1957 (before the 
beginning of the IGY). Citing a desire to catch up in the space race, representatives of the 
Air Force, Strategic Air Command, Army Ballistic Missile Agency, and Navy Ordnance 
Test Station all offered “space spectaculars.” In varying ways, each of these crash 
programs would have threatened the carefully-negotiated order agreed upon by 
international researchers on IGY committees. Using small, quick and dirty satellites with 
no scientific payload, some advocated top secret launches so that the Soviets would not 
plan another space spectacular to upstage the US. There was even a proposal to send a 
Strategic Air Command bomber in nonstop “circumpolar orbit” around the earth to 
demonstrate the US’s strategic reach. 
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 The Eisenhower administration maintained the US’s policy of scientific-
administrative order over empty gestures to raise national prestige. Bringing von Braun’s 
Explorer satellite and the Juno launch vehicle into the IGY launch manifest permitted 
researchers to launch more instruments on more satellites, but the escalated pace of work 
would also threaten the existing order of management and operations of highly 
cantankerous systems. 
Jigsaw Sciences and the Earth’s ‘Heat Engine’ 
 
 In many regards, satellites were latecomers to a pre-set stage of international 
scientific activity. The IGY provided a formative experience for thousands of researchers 
worldwide as representatives of national and private scientific programs pooled data in 
fields diverse as meteorology, geomagnetism, oceanography, seismology, and the space 
sciences. Spanning eighteen months from July 1957 through December 1958, the 
International Geophysical Year necessitated years of planning and coordination. In the 
United States, funds were secured from Congress via the National Science Foundation, 
though the National Academies of Sciences consulted directly with the White House and 
Department of State in defining the scope and objective of scientific activities. 
Researchers coordinated with their international partners via one of many International 
Scientific Unions or the operating agency, the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO). As of 1955 there were twelve scientific unions including the International Union 
for Geodesy and Geophysics (IUGG), the International Union of Radio Science (URSI), 
the International Astronomical Union (IAU), International Astronomical Union (IAU), 
International Geographical Union (IGU), International Union of Geological Sciences, 
 103 
International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry, and the International Union of Pure 
and Applied Physics. 
 The Scientific Unions and WMO handled organization and funding for the IGY 
while the Special Committee for the IGY (CSAGI) acted as the governing body. The 
resulting network of researchers was unprecedented in scope. Forty thousand scientists 
and technicians represented sixty-seven nations and were distributed at four thousand 
research stations “blanketing the earth from pole to pole.”187 
 Given the fact that the IGY had been born of the International Polar Year, the 
Arctic and Antarctic remained important nodes of activity among a growing network of 
researchers. Laurence Gould, member of the IGY U.S. National Committee and Chair of 
the National Academy of Science’s Committee on Polar Research reflected on the 
geographic and epistemic interconnectedness of the sciences, explaining “the jigsaw 
puzzle of man’s physical environment needs pieces which are available only from 
Antarctica.”188 Making sense of these “jigsaw” sciences demanded a number of 
geographically distributed stations providing data on variations in geography, glaciology, 
weather, and climate. Thus, during the IGY twelve nations maintained 48 stations on the 
continent.189 
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 A sense of friendly-rivalry laced field activities and lent an air of historic 
significance to even routine bureaucratic activities. Thus, national defense, nationalism, 
and the professional drive of research crews proved a boon to a number of scientific 
disciplines. In July of 1955, Hugh Odishaw wrote weather researcher Harry Wexler, 
reporting on a trip to London and then Paris while attending an IGY-Antarctic 
Conference. Having assessed his collaborators, he reported that the British Royal Society 
had a very strong scientific program, in some regards even stronger than the US. In 
France he came away strongly impressed by the “increasingly keen competition” by 
nations trying to outperform one another scientifically and logistically, but also in 
“mutual aid and in general trying to build up good-will.” Regarding the proposed Soviet 
program, Odishaw noted that it had been “strongly influenced by the US program, even 
the number and location of their proposed stations.”190 As with sounding rockets and as 
would be the case with satellites, Soviet scientists were using the high profile of US 
scientific operations to leverage more resources and intellectual latitude out of their own 
state. This multifaceted competition in science, mutual aid, and implicitly, national 
systems of development, made it slightly easier for scientists on both sides to breech 
barriers and create a productive trading zone for interdisciplinary and international 
exchange. 
 In some instances, researchers did quite literally barter. When the USSR voted in 
favor of assigning the US personnel responsibility for operating the Antarctic Weather 
Central, it did so with the added provision that representatives from other countries could 
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be stationed there. Odishaw observed with evident amusement, “USSR meteorologists in 
particular could learn much about recent developments in weather forecasting and 
analysis in the United States; therefore, if the Russians insist on representation, then as a 
quid pro quo” he believed the US should be assigned to the USSR station to learn their 
geophysical techniques, particularly their coveted capabilities in polar meteorology and 
glaciology.191 As for the interest of the French, British, and Norwegians in Weather 
Central, “if the US is given the responsibility for running the Central, it must organize it 
the way it sees fit” and they had little interest in unnecessary duplication of resources, 
sending liaisons to Weather Central to “observe.” 
 
 At the opposite end of the earth, several nations built new observation posts or 
expanded existing research facilities, such as the Soviet Arctic Research Institute. Four 
months before the official start of the IGY, representatives of the Scott Polar Research 
Institute of Cambridge, England reported “Incidental Intelligence on USSR Meteorology” 
to their colleagues at the US National Academies’ Committee on Meteorology. Therein, 
they described how their hosts at the Soviet Arctic Research Institute operated. Using 
data gathered from 600 drifting oceanographic stations, 150 high latitude (not altitude) air 
expedition stations, air reconnaissance of ice (the forecasting of which remained 
classified information), and various other ground facilities, the Department of 
Meteorology and Weather Forecasting’s first priority remained the forecasting methods. 
The department head and most eminent member, G. Ya. Vangengeym, worked using 
synoptic data spanning 1891 to the present, using no electronic computers but abacuses 
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and “50 to 60 girls…tabulating and working up data.”192 The Leningrad Institute boasted 
approximately 500 staff members spanning the oft-overlapping scientific disciplines of 
geography, geophysics, weather forecasting, ice forecasting, and oceanography and was 
just one example of the hundreds of institutions contributing to the IGY. 
 Through participation in the IGY, the US and Soviet meteorological communities 
stood poised to fill their gap in Gould’s jigsaw puzzle of the earth environment. For 
decades, meteorologists across the globe had shared synoptic data through the 
International Meteorological Organization and later the World Meteorological 
Organization. Observations of temperature, air pressure, wind speed, precipitation, (and 
to a limited degree, solar activity) had in turn contributed to other fields of earth science. 
These were an important raw material to be worked into a refined understanding of global 
atmospheric processes. Distinguishing “scientific meteorologists” from “the professional” 
or forecasting “technician,”193 the NAS Committee on Meteorology laid out its intent to 
contribute to the research of scientists in other disciplines. These colleagues worried that 
the field of meteorology suffered from the appearance that forecasting had rendered it too 
technical and not the rich and diverse field of scientific inquiry as they experienced it. At 
a meeting to address “manpower in meteorology” attended by the likes of Lloyd Berkner, 
Hugh Dryden, Francis Reichelderfer, and Harry Wexler, Carl Rosby offered his recent 
paper on precipitation chemistry as an example of such cross-over interdisciplinary work. 
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Dr. Howard Byers agreed, citing the “university atmosphere” of their field as being just 
what had attracted the likes of John Simpson and Subrahmanyan Chandrasekhar to study 
atmospheric physics.  
Meteorology: Synoptic Forecasting and Meteorological Science 
 
 Lloyd Berkner, Chair of the NAS Committee on Meteorology articulated that the 
committee’s principal occupation ought to be identifying “gaps in the basic 
meteorological knowledge,” dismissing forecasting as a routine “test of knowledge.”194 
Fellowships and summer study groups would attract “new men” to meteorology: physical 
meteorologists, high altitude physicists, and specifically not forecasters. For persons such 
as these, the work of the IGY would be to establish essential scientific principles 
governing fluctuations in the earth’s atmosphere, not simply gathering data from new 
remote places.  
 Foremost among the Committee’s objectives was a more sophisticated 
understanding of the Earth Radiation Budget (ERB), a model for conceiving of the 
earth’s reflection, circulation, and loss of heat from the sun. With great regularity the 
physicists used the steam engine as an imperfect but vivid model for describing this 
global transfer of heat energy. The equatorial and mid-latitudes were a firebox; the poles 
a condenser; the ocean currents and the jet stream were “pipes” transferring energy from 
the firebox outward to the poles (with occasional “break downs” where hot and cold cells 
stalled.195  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Second Meeting of NAS Committee on Meteorology September 19, 1956 (from 
Wexler-Cornell notes). File ORGANIZATION NAS: Committee on Meteorology, NAS. 
195 Examples include “IGY 27 January 1959” talk delivered by Berkner to the Industrial 
College of the Armed Forces. This speech was printed from 
 108 
 Over the course of their planning meetings, the committee laid forth a number of 
research problems not divorced from weather forecasting, but not identifying weather or 
climatological forecasting as their sole end. The IGY could be used to establish a 
reference condition of the chemical composition of the atmosphere to be reanalyzed on a 
similar scale in the 1980 IGY (carbon dioxide and ozone measurements factored 
prominently in their interests). Berkner suggested that the community should investigate 
the causes of long-term climactic instability. They would consider the basic physics of 
rain and cloud formation and perhaps even the “the rapid retreat of the ice sheets” at the 
north and south poles. Synoptic radiation surveillance (a study Wexler worked for years 
to refine) would be “bailed out of abandonment” to improve both research in the 
circulation of the atmosphere and the prediction of radioactive fallout patterns.  
 
 But what of the professional meteorologist or forecasting technician? At this time, 
computer numerical forecasting was in its earliest stages and the state of the art was 
regarded as in its nascent form.196 Forecasters practiced synoptic meteorology, 
coordinating observations of as many weather systems as possible in as many locations as 
possible onto a weather map from which experience, college and/or armed services 
training, would guide them in rendering a prediction. Lloyd Berkner, Chair of the NAS 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.ndu.edu/Library/index.cfm?secID=210&pageID=126&type=section in 2008, 
but is no longer available. Write LibraryWebmaster@ndu.edu to inquire about access. 
Speaking to the AMS and American Geophysical Union, “Horizons of Meteorology” to 
the AMS and the AGU Section of Meteorology 1 May, 1957 Folder AGENCIES & 
Departments 1963 Interagency Group on International Program in Atmospheric Sci: US 
Position, NAS.  
196 Christine Harper, Weather by the Numbers: the Genesis of Modern Meteorology 
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2008), 151-186; Bates and Fuller Weather Warriors, 149-
154; Nebeker, Calculating, 143-165. 
 109 
Meteorological Committee, spoke before an audience of the American Meteorological 
Society and the American Geophysical Union took a far less charitable view of the skill. 
After gathering the initial data, he described their methods as: 
Then, based on some rather primitive hydrodynamic equations or perhaps just on 
subjective experience, he is supposed to estimate either in a computer or just in 
his head, what the circulation and weather pattern will be some hours, days…in 
the future. At this stage, as a non-meteorologist, I am feeling rather sorry for my 
meteorological colleagues…at present the uncertainty of hydrodynamic 
atmospheric flow is such that about three days after determining the circulation 
patterns, its actual transformation seems to bear statistically no resemblance to 
any prediction that can be made.197  
 
In spite of its limitations, synoptic meteorology was the best practice conceivable with 
the tools at hand for the US National Weather Service, meteorologists attached to a 
variety of manufacturing industries, transportation industries, and all branches of the 
armed services.  
 Thus even as Berkner, Reichelderfer, Wexler, and other leaders in the field 
problematized the methods and accuracy of synoptic meteorology, they relied upon these 
very networks to acquire data for meteorological science. To render the entire field of 
meteorology—including climatology, aeronomy, aerology, etc.—more rigorous, they had 
to expand upon pre-existing international synoptic networks to access more data. By the 
1960s, Wexler and Reichelderfer would adopt the term of “data sparse regions” to 
describe large expanses of (relatively) uninhabited land, ocean, much of the poles, and 
politically inaccessible geographies such as communist China.198 Francis Reichelderfer, 
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for all his desire to distinguish the “scientific meteorologist” from the forecasting 
“professional,” had been a leader on this front for more than a decade, guiding the IMO 
through reorganization into the World Meteorological Organization.  
   
 To rationalize and enhance the performance of pre-existing synoptic networks, 
mid-twentieth century atmospheric physicists looked to an arsenal of new and promising 
instruments for studying the earth’s atmosphere—from a molecular level to the global. 
Advancements in communication and computation would help manage data on a global 
scale. Electronic computers would synthesize exponentially more data. Radioactive 
tracers, radio, and radar all refined conceptions of what constituted a scientific 
instrument. Members of the UARRP had seen to it that sounding rockets would be 
recognized as viable platforms for research tools—for both special observations of 
unique phenomena (such as solar activity and hurricanes) or routine meteorological 
measurements.199 For the time being, satellites remained a cost-prohibitive object of 
speculation. 
Satellites Become Feasible 
 
“Of course we can put a satellite into orbit. All we need is the okay to go ahead, 
and the money to do the job.”200 
 
 In the early 1950s the Wernher von Braun vigorously promoted the notion of 
spaceflight into the public. Between 1952 and 1954, he wrote multiple articles for 
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Colliers magazine, detailing the ends and means of human spaceflight to the Moon and 
Mars. Soon after he began work with Disney studios on the movies “Man in Space” and 
“Man and the Moon,” both of which were aired in 1955. The rocket designer made 
similar proposals at a variety of scientific and professional societies such as the 
International Aeronautical Federation and the Hayden Planetarium. In many regards, such 
postulations were relegated the realm of science fiction by the press and his colleagues. 
At the same time, colleague Fred Singer, a physics professor at the University of 
Maryland began making the circuit with proposals for the US launch of “minimum” 
satellites.201 While these were far less ambitious than von Braun’s projections, they did 
draw criticism from engineers and scientists better familiar with more detailed (and 
classified) studies. In response, the Naval Research Lab’s Milton Rosen and Homer 
Newell each became vocal proponents of incremental and scientifically relevant space 
exploration. While the more daring and dramatic proposals of von Braun may have 
seemed to threaten the credibility of researchers who wished to launch satellites 
emphasizing scientific utility, they also ignited public awareness and made a field 
commonly described as “too Buck Rogers” seemingly realistic to a segment of the 
population. 
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 May of 1952 brought the foreshadowings of an important rivalry when von Braun 
spoke of the promise of a US expedition to the Moon and NRL’s Milton Rosen presented 
a paper criticizing von Braun’s plans as “being too far out and being beyond what could 
be done…using optimistic numbers…there was no margin for error in any of his 
calculations.”202 Rosen recalled that Willie Ley, German-American science writer and 
spaceflight enthusiast had wanted to prevent Rosen from presenting his rebuttal, but von 
Braun insisted that a lack of controversy “wouldn’t attract any attention at all.” 
 Later, when Rosen suggested that von Braun himself did not believe his own 
calculations (though historian Michael Neufeld asserts that he did), von Braun countered 
less as an engineer and more as a skilled technocrat, “Listen, Milt,” he said to the lead 
designer of the Viking sounding rocket, “you’re an American. You should know 
advertising is everything in America…The way you’re talking about space flight, it’ll 
never come. The way I’m talking about it will get people interested, and you’ll benefit 
from it as much as me.”203  
 Appealing to engineering rigor, to national security, and at times both, critics like 
Rosen also had brief forays in the public spotlight. December 1952’s Time magazine ran 
a story that included the outlook of “practical missile men” such as Rosen.204 In it, the 
article reflected criticisms that von Braun’s ostentatious plans overlooked not only 
critical incremental steps toward the grandeur of human habitation of space, it also 
threatened to divert resources from guided missile production and sounding rocket R&D, 
which were already suffering severe reductions in 1952. 
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 In January 1953, Rosen and fellow sounding rocket engineer Richard Snodgrass 
published a report on sounding rocket performance, special problems, and techniques. 
The conclusion, undoubtedly written in response to von Braun’s recent articles and public 
talks, reflected on the prospects of space travel. The authors described sounding rockets 
as the “remote and not the immediate ancestors” to space exploration. Hearkening to the 
divide between expert knowledge and readers who may not be able to distinguish 
between fact and fiction, the authors cautioned “reckless predictions of how much time 
and money will be required to bring [space exploration] about do violence to their 
scientific integrity.”205 Space travel would come “painstakingly” from the laboratories, 
industrial plants, and rocket test ranges. But “Any discussion about space travel,” they 
advised, “should start with the bald statement that ‘No one can say how long it will take 
or how much it will cost.’”206 
 It is possible that von Braun’s fantastical narratives may have been a method of 
sidestepping security restrictions covering more immediately viable satellite studies. 
Unbeknownst to Rosen and likely unbeknownst to von Braun, important discussions of 
spaceflight were taking place at the executive level. At this time, the Eisenhower 
Administration began retooling policy in a number of ways. Joseph Stalin, leader of the 
Soviet Union for nearly three decades, died in March of 1953. July 1953 marked the end 
of the Korean War and soon after, the US and Soviet Union were on speaking terms 
regarding nuclear disarmament. Eisenhower announced his carefully calculated proposal 
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for an Atoms for Peace initiative in the UN, December of 1953.207 Similarly, significant 
changes were taking place in the Eisenhower White House favoring the establishment of 
satellite overflight for reconnaissance purposes. The Technological Capabilities Panel 
chaired by James Killian recommended that the US launch a small scientific satellite to 
establish freedom of space (the final report was presented February 1955).  
 In June of 1954, the President submitted a supplemental IGY budget for FY 1955, 
including a small, instrumented satellite to be used for geophysical measurements.208 
Funding for the satellite program would be independent of the entire IGY line, the money 
would be appropriated by Congressional action and not at any point be allocated to the 
DOD: “In noway [sic] is this to be a part of existing IGY activity.”209  
The Meteorological Community Considers Satellites  
 
 By 1954, USWB’s Harry Wexler was widely recognized as a proponent of the use 
of satellites in meteorology, fueled in part by achievements in UARRP rocketsonde 
technique, ongoing correspondence with physicist and satellite enthusiast Fred Singer, as 
well as RAND meteorologist William Kellogg. Due to the fact that sounding rockets 
were rarely launched in more than 10% cloud cover, there were few cloud images that 
meteorologists could study. In the days of V-2 rocketsondes, the Weather Bureau 
expressed interest in photos retrieved from two launches, one in late 1946 and the other 
March of 1947 (detailed in the last chapter). October 5 of 1954 brought new excitement 
to the Weather Bureau—an NRL Aerobee rocket fired during a large opening of cloud 
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cover over White Sands Proving Ground had unexpectedly captured the picture of a 
tropical storm “and one associated vortex.”210 This “atmospheric monster,” reported an 
ONR research review, “with its spiral tentacles, embraced an area of more than 1000 
miles in diameter.”211 Of greater significance, the storm was as-yet unpredicted by 
forecasters—the sounding rocket images had been the first indication of the hurricane. 
Later named Hazel, this hurricane had been identified while it was near Grenada and 
moving west-northwest. Making landfall in North Carolina Hazel proceeded to plow its 
way north. The storm retained hurricane force winds moving rapidly through Virginia, 
western Washington, DC, and into Ontario. 
 The soon famous October 5 sounding rocket image had been derived from a 16-
millimeter motion picture camera mounted in the Aerobee nosecone. After shooting (in 
both senses of the word) it was separated from the last stage of the rocket and parachuted 
back to earth. Researchers reported that the camera had been equipped with a semi-
telephoto lens and was capable of taking six pictures a second. At approximately 100 
miles altitude, the rocket rolling on its axis and gradually tipping downward allowed 
enough time for several overlapping swaths of the earth to be imaged. Back on earth, 
researchers reproduced and enlarged 90 prints of the color film and assembled them into 
a mosaic. The mosaic was analyzed in an issue of the ONR Review and the American 
Meteorological Society’s Monthly Weather Review where it was printed in black and 
white. The authors of the AMS article directed their readers to the September 5 issue of 
Life magazine where they could find the mosaic in full natural color.  
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 When USWB and NRL researchers shared their analysis of the Aerobee mosaic in 
the AMS article submitted July 8, 1955, they predicted that the Kodachrome images 
“may well launch the era of rocket photo-reconnaissance for meteorology” but signaled a 
reticence in the scientific community regarding satellites.  
Techniques that will be developed by rocket reconnaissance of hurricanes may 
find wider application in an expanded program of ultra-high altitude 
meteorological reconnaissance. Dr. Harry Wexler of the U.S. Weather Bureau has 
discussed the utility of such ultra-high photography in connection with 
hypothetical synoptic situations.212 
 
Making no reference to satellites by name, they opted to endnote Harry Wexler’s 
September 1954 article “Observing Weather from a Satellite Vehicle” published by the 
Journal of the British Interplanetary Society. Nevertheless they communicated the clear 
message that sounding rocket technique could facilitate the transition to the use of 
satellites. 
 Later that fall, RAND Electronics Division’s William Kellogg wrote to his friend, 
Harry Wexler thanking him for copies of Wexler’s British Interplanetary Society article. 
Looking forward to the AMS symposium that January, Kellogg hoped that Wexler would 
“bring along your famous colored slide,” noting that his satellite talk would provide 
useful background for Stan Greenfield’s analysis of specific synoptic situations.213 
Kellogg, who would soon serve on the Working Group for Internal IGY satellite 
Instrumentation, remained extremely supportive of his colleagues at the USWB with 
whom he collaborated with on a number of synoptic studies pertaining to atomic fallout. 
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Meantime, Kellogg and Greenfield published a number of studies and presented at a 
number of conferences predicting the form and function meteorological satellites must 
take to reach their full potential.214 In June the coming year, Kellogg would publish 
another co-authored report with Kallman, Research Memo 1500, “Scientific Uses of an 
Artificial Satellite.” 
The Sounding Rocket Community Before Satellites 
 As IGY planning commenced, developers of sounding rocket systems had only 
recently proven the efficacy of their systems for observing upper atmospheric 
temperature, pressure, wind speed and direction. On 7 October 1953, the Panel reviewed 
results from the Gassiott Committee symposium and discussed their upcoming 
participation in the IGY. In February of 1954, they selected members for the Special 
Committee for the IGY (SCIGY) to work on Arctic firings. In IGY preparation, the 
Weather Bureau had sought unsuccessfully to secure federal support for a geographically 
diverse synoptic IGY rocket network (on behalf of the DOD, meaning that they likely did 
so anticipating the armed services would be able to fund it). By Reichelderfer’s 
observation, the only times sufficient sums of sounding rocket money had been when 
they were “squeezed out of military appropriations ‘for national defense purposes.’” 215 
UARRP members would have readily agreed with that assessment, particularly the 
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semantics of “squeezing out” funds from military appropriations. In the end, members of 
the IGY Executive Committee would fret about the concentration of funds at one location 
(Ft. Churchill, Canada) with “Too little geographic spread!!”216  
 In the fall of 1954, Joseph Kaplan, Chair of the US National Committee of the 
IGY wrote Allan Waterman, Director of the National Science Foundation. Perhaps 
unnecessarily he reminded Waterman that the Defense Department represented the US’s 
primary source of scientific and engineering knowledge of rocketsonde. In his letter, he 
alluded to the last nine years of UARRP collaboration over which the institutions had 
developed extensive networks among commercial suppliers and contractors that could 
now be put to use “most economically” by the US IGY program.217 Having observed 
these formalities, Kaplan explained that he was requesting a two-year advance on funds 
for the procurement of sounding rockets—already notorious for their long lead time.  
 The state of rocketsonde funding sets the tone of fiscal risks and uncertainties in 
upper atmospheric research and also helps put the magnitude of the Vanguard satellite 
investment and risk in perspective. Already, as opposed to the synoptic rocketsonde 
network requested by Reichelderfer, UARRP members made due with firings at White 
Sands Proving Ground; Holloman AFB (near White Sands); Fort Churchill, Canada; San 
Diego High, California; the Antarctic; and from ships at sea. As of September 1955, the 
NSF covered the cost of sounding rockets, facilities, support contracts, and travel for 
select individuals, amounting to $1.7M. The US armed services and one university, the 
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State University of Iowa, covered the cost of research programs and logistics with money 
supplied through ONR, other DOD organizations, and for a couple experiments, the 
Atomic Energy Commission. The participants were all UARRP members: the NRL 
($2M), Navy logistical support ($2.4M), Iowa State University ($0.2M), GRD/AFCRL 
($1.7M), ASRL ($1M), Army Ordnance ($0.5M), total Army logistics and support 
($3M).218  
 Homer Newell, UARRP representative to the Special Committee for the IGY 
(CSAGI) and chair of the CSAGI Rocket Working Group directed the expenditure of all 
US DOD rocket funds.219 The sum total, $14.8M, was substantial, but a decade of R&D 
had demonstrated that investment in a rocket was far more expensive than vehicles on 
sea, land, or the lower atmosphere. Speaking of the upper air program at the NRL, 
Newell explained: 
The cost of the program, however, is about twice that of a normal laboratory 
research program, because of the need for rockets, launchers, telemetering ground 
stations, special airborne equipment, and expeditions to remote locations such as 
the Artic, Antarctic, and the mid-Pacific. The cost is about $45,000 per man per 
year as opposed to about $25,000 per man per year for normal research…The 
program would have gone under…had not the International Geophysical Year 
[funding] rescued it.220 
 
 In addition, there might be delays do to repairs that would incur “standing army” 
costs for the launch crew. Contractors might for any number of reasons experience 
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overruns—modification orders, extension of completion dates, and the like. A rocket may 
(go off course) and have to be destroyed without ever gathering or telemetering data. 
Cloud cover might scrub the launch of a rocket intended to observe a time-sensitive 
event, such as the observation of an eclipse. An instrumented rocket alone was uncertain 
enough without adding a second and third stage and attempting orbital insertion at an 
altitude never before analyzed by a sounding rocket. Since 1946, these communities had 
speculated and calculated. Better than any other community, they fathomed the technical 
complexities, risk to professional prestige, and sheer investment of time and energies in 
launching a scientific satellite.  
IGY Administrators Consider Satellites 
 In the summer of 1953, at the International Astronomics Federation and again at 
the Hayden Planetarium’s 1954 symposium on space travel, Fred Singer made proposals 
for a Minimal Orbital Unmanned Satellite, Earth (MOUSE). Singer, a professor at 
University of Maryland and friend of both Lloyd Berkner and Wernher von Braun, kept 
in contact, too, with USWB’s Harry Wexler. The same handful of individuals crossed 
paths many times for their professional duties and IGY preparations. Wexler, despite his 
many obligations at the USWB and for the IGY found time to present at the Hayden 1954 
symposium as well, speaking on the promise of “Observing the Weather from a Satellite 
Vehicle.”  
 As the International Scientific Unions were preparing plans for the IGY, in 
August 1954, Singer spoke before the International Radio Science Union (URSI) on earth 
satellites and soon after, Berkner endorsed URSI’s recommendation for an earth satellite 
to be flown in the IGY. After URSI and the IUGG had passed resolutions favoring the 
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principal of inviting satellites as contributions to the IGY (in August and September of 
1954), CSAGI still had not yet approved.  
 Such machinations aligned national and transnational interests. The US did indeed 
require a certain scientific authenticity for the stalking horse satellite. At the same time 
US satellite enthusiasts such as Fred Singer viewed this as an opportunity to influence 
international science policymaking. His and Berkner’s proposals to the URSI, the IUGG, 
and ultimately CSAGI functioned to build an (albeit temporary) community of 
researchers vested in the success of a scientific satellite launched by the US and perhaps 
the Soviet Union.221  
 With the funds soon to be appropriated and a clear presidential mandate, several 
influential IGY representatives still voiced reservations about pursuing a satellite 
program. Newell, who had invested his last decade in building the scientific sounding 
rocket program and was at the time director of all DOD funds for sounding rockets spent 
months cautioning colleagues against the high risk and technical uncertainties of placing 
a working satellite in usable orbit and getting viable data back from it. 
 Years later, Singer would suggest that Newell had been opposed to satellites 
altogether. Newell maintained that his opposition was not to satellites per se, rather to the 
means by which Singer proposed one be brought into being. Singer’s confident approach 
to the minimal satellite proposals was overplayed in the interest of making it sound 
inexpensive and easy, if not flippantly so. Newell and the sounding rocket community he 
represented were also deeply concerned about the hard-won legitimacy of the sounding 
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rocket program. Recognizing the tenuous nature of IGY financing, he feared that 
satellites would somehow come at the expense of the more reliable and newly-accepted 
rocketsonde. The preparation for and execution of the IGY posed a one-time opportunity 
to the sounding rocket community to underscore its international scientific relevance, to 
gain access to unprecedented geographic locations, and secure much-needed funding for 
upper atmospheric research. The satellite project was just shy of an existential gamble: 
losing dwindling sounding rocket (read: UARRP) resources to a satellite of negligible 
scientific credibility would only add insult to injury.  
 
 The opening of Chapter Four details the financial straights of the sounding rocket 
community and the perception that IGY R&D funds kept many research centers from 
running out of sounding rocket research funds altogether. The UARRP community’s 
reservations about satellites were justifiable. Many within the DOD were aware of a 
classified Air Force Study estimating the cost of launching a satellite at $100M.222 Other 
figures considered were $150M or as low as $82M.223 Years later, James Killian 
reflected, “was the Vanguard ever a good bet?” Wanting to get as much “ball for a buck,” 
Killian, too, realized that initial estimates of cost “were so low that the project suffered 
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from inadequate financing throughout its history.”224 Thus, when preliminary (and low-
balled) estimates of an earth satellite ranged from $15M to $20M between 1954 and 
1955, they not only surpassed the $14.8M allocated for sounding rockets, they also 
promised astounding cost overruns, the risk of funds being pulled from other programs, 
and the severe re-scoping of related projects (i.e. sounding rockets).  
 Perhaps one of the most critical moments leading to the inclusion of a satellite in 
the IGY took place at the informal gathering of CSAGI members in Rome. Lloyd 
Berkner, the powerhouse behind the IGY invited ten colleagues to his hotel room. These 
included Joseph Kaplan, US National Committee chair, Hugh Odishaw, committee 
secretary, Athelstan Spilhaus, Dean of the University of Minnesota’s Institute of 
Technology, Harry Wexler of the USWB, Alan Shapely of the National Bureau of 
Standards, Homer Newell of the NRL, and Fred Singer of the University of Maryland. 
The meeting took a more urgent air when attendees discussed the November 1953 
announcement of Soviet Academy of Sciences’ A. N. Nesmeyanov, stating that satellite 
launchings and even moon probes were within Russian capabilities. Very recently, the 
USSR had committed to participate in the IGY (though they would not announce their 
intent to launch a satellite for the IGY until August 2, 1955—hours after the US had 
made it’s own announcement).  
 At the meeting, Singer dominated discussions of the technical challenges and 
capacities of an earth satellite, with Newell interjecting to point out technical challenges 
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such as the likelihood that batteries would bubble in zero gravity.225 Years later Newell 
would assert that he and other colleagues in the DOD had in most settings been “muzzled 
by classification restrictions” and therefore “could not engage Singer in debate…could 
not point out that Singer’s estimates overshot the mark somewhat, and that his suggested 
approach was not as workable as others that couldn’t be mentioned.”226 Perhaps because 
formal proposals were already circulating, at the informal gathering Newell spoke up 
more than usual and gained a reputation as a naysayer. He first pointed out detailed 
technical shortcomings in Singer’s satellite plans and later, returned to his apprehensions 
about sounding rocket funding. Whatever the details of the meeting, reassurances must 
have been made to put Newell’s mind at ease, for the men voted unanimously for CSAGI 
to endorse the use of satellite instruments in the IGY. 
 By November 1954, Newell was in full support of an IGY earth satellite. That 
month he contributed to an influential American Rocket Society report on which Milton 
Rosen was the chair. The report was careful to not designate what sort of launch vehicle 
ought to be used for such a satellite. It featured six appendices from researchers at a 
variety of institutions explaining the utility of satellites for astronomy, biomedicine, 
communications, geodesy, meteorology, and observation of the ionosphere. In keeping 
with the stance of the Navy researchers, the report explained that “to create a satellite 
merely for the purpose of saying it has been done would not justify the cost…the satellite 
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should serve useful purposes…which can command the respect of the officials who 
sponsor it, the scientists and engineers who produce it, and the community who pays for 
it.”227  
 This recurring principle of accountability to the state and citizens coupled with the 
moral ramifications of International Geophysical Year participation offered in the eyes of 
some, a culturally and diplomatically superior case for spaceflight. In time, this “higher 
ground” would help justify scientific payloads and extensive ground support systems 
impossible to attain with a “minimal” one- or two-shot launch plan.  
 In spite of guaranteed executive level support and CSAGI’s official indication of 
interest, many members of the scientific community maintained a critical bent. In January 
1955, the IGY Executive Committee set up a special study group to investigate the 
feasibility of satellites. This panel was originally known by the ambiguous name, the 
Technical Panel on Rocketry, but adopted the even more evasive “LPR” committee (for 
Long Play Rocket) in both formal and informal circumstances. NASA’s official 
Vanguard history indicates that part of this “LPR” obfuscation was due to the fact that the 
NAS had not yet committed to participating in the program and wanted to avoid 
premature publicity under “protective coloration.”228 All the scientists on the panel would 
have remembered the public response to the first atomic bomb blasts.229 Years later in an 
oral history, Homer Newell would suggest that this was also due to concerns over of a 
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public uprising against scientists. “The idea was that the long playing rocket wouldn’t be 
scary. People would just relate it to what’s been happening for the past ten years.”230  
 In the March 1955 meeting of the LPR committee, there was much productive 
discussion of satellite instrumentation, support networks, and cautious estimates of 
cost.231 Merle Tuve, whose deep concerns over the preservation of pure science—pure in 
the sense that it was unadulterated by national defense demands—voiced his reservations 
over the budding satellite program.232 Given its undeniable origins in armed services 
studies and labs, he believed that it ought to be funded and executed openly by the 
military. Fred Whipple and Athelstan Spilhaus clarified the NAS’s interest in the 
program, alluding to the necessity of easing “permission to go over other countries” and 
also to the probability that Defense Department would one way or another see to it that 
satellites were launched in the near future. Additionally, by demonstrating to their Soviet 
peers that the US IGY program was not actively controlled by the military, they would 
facilitate the work of their international colleagues, clearing papers for publication and 
gaining permission to attend conferences, workshops, and the like.233 Tuve adamantly 
opposed while other members remained wary of dealing with an as-yet classified satellite 
program and the international controversy it might bring. 
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 On 26 May 1955, the National Security Council approved plans to orbit an IGY 
satellite, providing it did not interfere with ICBM development, but that by no means 
guaranteed that the IGY Executive Committee would welcome the instrument. On 2 June 
Dr. Wallace Joyce, a geophysicist with the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics, articulated a 
common concern regarding cooperation with the Defense Department. Members of the 
LPR committee had anticipated that the satellite budget would be part of a supplemental 
budget going before Congress. However, Joyce explained that his extensive experience 
with guided missile work had convinced him that “and the amount of effort in such 
programs was always underestimated.” Thus, he advised that considerable development 
work was necessary by the DOD before the satellite could be integrated to IGY 
budgeting.234 (This reputation of defense, and particularly rocket and missile, developers 
underestimating the cost of work will be addressed more in the chapter conclusion.) 
 Nevertheless, in early July 1955, the NRL Rocket Development Branch, Rocket 
Sonde Branch, Atmosphere and Astrophysics Division, Electron Optics Branch, and 
Optics Division published Memorandum Report 487, “Scientific Satellite Program.”235 
Emphasizing the necessity of contributions from a wide range of scientific experts, the 
report recommended that the NRL function as primary scientific responsibility for the 
satellite program.236  
 On August 2, 1955, President Eisenhower formally announced selection of the 
Vanguard satellite system. IGY critics rightly predicted that early proponents of an IGY 
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satellite had underestimated the cost. On 8 September 1955, the budget estimate was 
doubled to $28.8 million. Historians have suggested that Vanguard was selected because 
the Navy was the only service that would not have to divert resources from ICBMs to 
launch a satellite. Historians have suggested that the Army Orbiter proposal was not 
selected due to racism and nationalism. They have also suggested that the decision was 
made by Stewart Committee members voting along lines of long-standing service 
rivalries, rather than the proposal’s actual merit. Historians have even, in an obtuse 
fashion, suggested that Vanguard was selected because it’s long development time would 
guarantee a Soviet lead into space.237 Vanguard satellite system was at its core, a more 
capable scientific instrument than its counterparts and was put forth by a research lab 
with more than a three-decade long record of upper atmospheric research.238  
 Though all three services submitted proposals when requested, it is widely 
accepted that the Air Force proposal was soon dismissed, leaving the competition to the 
joint Army-Navy Orbiter proposal (offered by the Army Ballistic Missile Agency) and 
the Vanguard. Neither the Air Force nor Orbiter proposal included specific details of how 
satellite tracking would be carried out. The Orbiter was projected to weigh a mere five 
pounds, placing harsh limitations on scientific payloads. The Vanguard proposal allowed 
for 10 pounds for the scientific instruments, 2 pounds for Minitrack instrumentation, 2 
pounds for telemetering equipment, 12 pounds for batteries, and 8 pounds for the spun 
aluminum sphere structure.239 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 See McDougall, Neufeld in Reconsidering Sputnik, and Stares, The Militarization of 
Space. 
238 Launius, 22 also addresses scientific pedigree. 
239 NRL Memo Report 487, 20. 
 129 
 On 27 October 1955, the UARRP held a symposium to select instruments for the 
IGY satellites. Proposals were only accepted from UARRP member institutions and only 
unclassified experiments were allowed.240 The following January, in celebration of the 
Upper Atmospheric Rocket Research Panel’s ten-year anniversary, UARRP members 
presented thirty-eight talks summarizing a variety of earth satellite experiment proposals 
and research studies. Experiments included studies of the satellite system itself (such as 
methods of tracking, measuring the influence of atmospheric drag on the satellite, and 
influence of micrometeorites, in addition to the use of satellites for remote sensing: 
meteorology, observation of ionospheric activity, and use of orbital computations to 
calculate the earth’s geomagnetic properties.241  
 The Symposium featured several papers contributing to meteorology, with strong 
representation of Air Force interests. One researcher from Princeton University 
Observatory spoke on determining air density with a satellite; one from the University of 
Michigan addressed pressure and density measurements; William Stroud and his partner 
William Nordberg, of the Signal Corps, presented on their meteorological instruments; an 
Air Force Cambridge Research Center researcher spoke on heat transfer; Fred Singer of 
the University of Maryland presented a paper on meteorological measurements; Air 
Force Cambridge Research Center researchers also speculated on visibility from a high 
altitude satellite; and the third paper offered by AFCRC. University of Michigan, the 
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fourth institution likely funded by the Air Force, addressed the upper atmosphere and 
insulation of a satellite.242 
The Vanguard System: Prelude to TIROS 
Project Vanguard 
 1. Launch Sat. 
2. See it. 
3. Use it.243 
 
 Because the Eisenhower Administration and NAS insisted that satellites be 
credible scientific instruments (and not one-off stunts) they wittingly and unwittingly laid 
infrastructure for what would become the NASA-TIROS satellite system. The quote 
above indicates that it was not enough to simply launch a satellite into orbit. The three 
steps were in many regards interdependent: improper orbital insertion would jeopardize 
the payload’s efficacy; tracking was necessary for assuring proper orbit and for 
operations of satellite (in particular being able to perform command and data acquisition 
when the satellite passed over a station’s radio horizon.) While the Vanguard system’s 
scientific credibility (as a US contribution to the IGY and stalking horse assuring the 
world of the US’s peaceful intentions in spaceflight) was important to the Eisenhower 
administration, as schedules slipped, experiments were added, and support systems 
refined, Eisenhower did at last complain that the Project was getting “bogged down” and 
in particular, that it was due to the extra scientific instruments. The President reminded 
his scientific advisors in frustration “Such costly instrumentation had not been 
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envisaged” and “stressed that the element of national prestige…depended on getting a 
satellite into its orbit, and not on the instrumentation of the satellite.”244 
“Launch Sat:” From Viking to Vanguard 
 The Viking sounding rocket program proved an important R&D experience. In 
1955, the Viking, Aerobee-Hi, and Sergeant rocket motors re-emerged in a three-stage 
test vehicle, intended to carry Vanguard satellites into orbit. Thus, the last two Vikings 
were removed from their research manifest and used as engineering prototypes in static 
tests for the Vanguard launch vehicle.245 Diverting the last two Vikings (one sixth of the 
run) to the Vanguard project likely reduced procurement costs for Vanguard and/or 
transferred the expense of those last two launches from one project line to another 
(Viking to Vanguard). Having reached the end of their 1940s “surpluses” and fighting 
tightening DOD budgets, Viking fast became too expensive for her users. Homer Newell 
explained, “The groups engaged in rocket sounding each had perhaps a few hundred 
thousand dollars a year to expend on the research, and a single Viking would have eaten 
up the whole budget.”246  
“See It:” Tracking 
 The Stewart Committee which selected Vanguard to be the US’s IGY satellite 
system and Vanguard designers regarded the radio-tracking network as one of the 
hallmarks of the Vanguard system. Given NRL’s reputation in radioelectronics, even von 
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Braun’s 1954-1955 Orbiter proposals presumed that the NRL would supply tracking 
stations, satellite instrumentation, satellite command, and data acquisition for his “no-cost 
satellite” (implying that all of the resources necessary for his satellite were already 
available in the DOD).247  
 Von Braun, who had speculated plenty on reconnaissance, meteorological, and 
communications satellite applications, was still primarily driven by his desire to beat the 
Soviets into space. Thus, he tended to be somewhat cavalier about tracking methods, 
confident that optical tracking would be sufficient to prove that the US had indeed placed 
a satellite in orbit. After the International Scientific Unions and CSAGI had endorsed the 
contribution of a satellite to the IGY, von Braun redoubled his efforts to gain permission 
to launch a satellite.  
 NRL researchers, had spent years speculating on the utility of satellites to perform 
geophysical experimentation and insisted that a more rigorous tracking capability would 
be necessary, rather than optical or even the standard radar tracking used for satellites and 
sounding rockets. Written and published before the first Vanguard proposal, Milton 
Rosen’s “popular” book detailing development of, and experimentation with, the Viking 
sounding rocket and the transition to the Vanguard precision tracking would be a critical 
element to the system, rendering satellites viable scientific instruments.  
…the capability of being tracked…will make the satellite an extremely valuable 
tool. From it we should be able to determine more accurately the size and shape of 
the earth and the intensity of its gravitational field. This should permit more 
accurate mapping over large distances and, eventually, more precise all-weather 
navigation at sea.248 
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 As of 1955, two options were considered for satellite tracking, originating with or 
refined by methods for tracking missiles and sounding rockets. These were optical 
tracking (which in reality relied on optical enhancement provided by cameras) and 
RADAR interferometry. The classic Azusa tracking radar would necessitate the use of a 
transmitter too heavy for a satellite that had to be less than 30 pounds. The option of 
optical tracking proved contentious for a number of reasons. For one, the Navy 
researchers preferred professional paid observers to the volunteer program proposed by 
Fred Whipple for the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory.249  
 NRL’s Minitrack (so named because its transmitter was designed to be 
significantly lighter than the Azusa hardware) was touted as offering orders of magnitude 
more and better data than optical tracking. It could remain in operation in inclement 
weather and total cloud cover and it could operate at any time of the day or night, not just 
twilight as was necessary for optical tracking.250 However the Minitrack network was a 
passive tracking network, meaning satellites had to be instrumented with transmitting 
hardware in order to be tracked. Also, when on board batteries ran out of power or solar 
systems failed, optical trackers could continue to chart satellite orbits. Thus, the optical 
trackers recorded data on the orbits of “silent” satellites long after their batteries had been 
depleted. 
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 Despite their technical and cultural distinctions, both the optical “Moon Watch” 
tracking network and Minitrack met US needs for maintaining positive Cold War 
international relations. 251 Complimenting the primary Minitrack stations was the Mark II 
Minitrack System, a simplified radio system intended to be used by universities, 
professional groups, and advanced amateur radio clubs throughout the world. Amateurs 
across the globe participated in the Moon Watch program for 15 years, well beyond the 
span of the IGY.252 The institution of Minitrack under the IGY enabled scientists to place 
stations across North and South America—sufficient for tracking satellites in equatorial 
orbit, but not yet polar orbit, which would require a more comprehensive longitudinal 
network than the north-south fence Minitrack was arranged in. 
“Use It:” Computation Center 
 While the distribution of tracking stations across the Americas set a useful 
precedent for network expansion in years to follow, and the Moonwatch optical tracking 
network engaged a variety of amateur astronomers in IGY satellite activities, the 
computation capabilities of the Vanguard program helped validate the endeavor as a 
legitimately scientific satellite and not a one-off stunt executed with surplus missile parts.  
 As was standard practice with scientific computers at the time, the machine was 
leased from IBM. In a press release, IBM reported on its role supporting the US IGY 
program. Having taken “18-20 man-years of scientific effort” to develop its programs for 
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orbital computation and analysis, IBM had produced a computer capable of calculating a 
satellite’s orbit from eight passes over the Minitrack “fence.”253  
 Satellites at the time had a useful life of only weeks before the batteries would be 
depleted—even solar-powered satellites had relatively brief lives of a couple months. 
Compounded by precious few opportunities to telemeter data from the satellites to ground 
stations (and with orbital insertion still an imperfect art), the computation center helped 
data acquisition stations predict the span of time the satellite would pass through their 
radio horizon and therefore optimize what time they had to communicate with the 
vehicle.  
 The first scientific discovery revealed by the satellite computation center (sources 
do not indicate if this could have been achieved with optical tracking, which it might 
well) was that the earth was not shaped as predominant scientific thought believed. 
Rather than bulging at the equator, models of Vanguard Beta’s orbit showed curious 
shifts in its perigee, indicating that the earth mass below the equator was greater than 
above.254 As with the Minitrack stations, the Computation Center, too, would transfer to 
NASA where it would eventually support TIROS operations.  
“Use It:” Meteorological Instruments 
 By 1956, satellites—the only scientific instrument planned for the IGY that had 
never been used before—had been accepted by at least some within the meteorological 
community as a “permanent scientific tool from now on.”255 But the precise form and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 IBM information sheet, “The Computer’s Role in Satellite Programs,” Folder Title 
Project Vanguard Misc, LEK 3/13/5 NHRC. 
254 IGY General Report Number 21, 551. 
255 Meeting Notes, Sept 20 1956 from Second NAS-NRC Meeting 19 September 1956 
Folder ORGANIZATION NAS Committee on Meteorology Advisory 1956, NAS. 
 136 
function of the IGY proof of concept satellites remained remarkably fluid into 1958 and 
the 1959 extension of the IGY. Between the spring of 1956 and into 1957, the NAS 
Technical Panel on Earth Satellites and Meteorological Committee deliberated on which 
instruments to suggest for IGY meteorological satellite experiments, what order to orbit 
them in, and which experiments could be launched on the same satellite bus. 
 USWB’s Harry Wexler served on the Technical Panel on Earth Satellites and had 
long championed the use of satellites to aid in meteorological forecasting. For synoptic 
meteorologists, the most promising satellite instruments were cloud cover cameras—TV 
for daytime coverage and infrared (heat) cameras for distinguishing clouds from 
landmasses on the dark half of the earth. In order to determine the orientation of the 
satellite and therefore identify precisely what part of the earth was represented in any 
given image, the Project Director William Stroud of the Army Signal Corps Engineering 
Lab intended to use the configuration of cells and the pulse width data. (It is worth noting 
that well into the 1960s, meteorologists struggled to accurately identify the location of 
cloud masses over the earth).256  
 In September of 1956, a researcher at the University of Wisconsin, Verner Suomi, 
proposed an instrument to study the earth’s heat budget—a research topic much more in 
line with the NAS Committee on Meteorology than Stroud’s cloud cover experiment. 
Suomi had developed a proposal for an instrument to determine the heat budget of the 
earth. Attempting to cover his bases, Suomi opened by stating that the instrument would 
contribute to both “practical (synoptic and forecasting) aspects and basic energy 
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considerations of the atmosphere.” Suomi suggested that imbalances caused by variations 
in the sun’s rays, variations in the earth’s reflectivity (albedo) and the transmissivity of 
the atmosphere may play an important part in climatic variations.257 In his note, Suomi 
stipulated that polar orbit would be optimal, undoubtedly because this would provide 
global coverage of the earth. 
 RAND meteorologist William Kellogg wrote Wexler in November, indicating 
that Suomi’s was a worthwhile experiment, but with the proposal arriving so late, a 
development study would have to be undertaken very soon. “As a meteorologist who 
would like to see these measurements made,” Kellogg suggested that the two begin 
exploring methods of building the equipment in ways that would be compatible with 
other experiments already underway (as all planned satellites would carry at least one 
experiment in the payload.)258  
 On 28 November 1956, the Meteorological Committee expressed clear support 
for Suomi’s Earth Radiation Budget experiment as first priority and a television camera 
cloud cover experiment as a second choice. Given the long lead time on satellite 
instrumentation, testing, and construction, it was not surprising that a year later, on 3 
November 1957, Harry Wexler wrote USWB Chief Reichelderfer to inform him that the 
IGY Earth Satellite Panel would meet to discuss which instrument (Stroud’s cloud cover 
experiment or Suomi’s ERB experiment) to promote for a satellite. Allowing that both 
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experiments were useful, Wexler indicated that the opinion of Sig Fritz and himself was 
that the ERB “is needed for the overall global energy picture and might contribute to such 
practical matters as anticipating changes in global wind regime.”259 Nevertheless, the 
Technical Panel preferred Stroud’s instrument in part, because it seemed a more reliable 
system.260 In Stroud’s own words, Suomi’s “experiment was a better experiment; it gave 
more quantitative information; but our experiment was in a better state of readiness.”261 
 Ultimately, the Earth Radiation Budget won out as being the US’s top priority, 
but due to the expanded launch manifest following the inclusion of the Explorer satellites, 
both Stroud and Suomi’s instruments were certain to be placed in orbit.262 Instruments 
from both Stroud and Suomi would also be incorporated on the ARPA plans for post-IGY 
meteorological satellites and NASA plans for meteorological satellites.263 
Dual Use Systems 
 It was no secret that data and proceedings resulting from the IGY could be used 
the world over for military or non-military purposes. While there were likely formalities 
such as fees or membership dues to scientific organizations, these resources were in 
principle available to all participating countries. Armed services just as well as academic 
institutions, national weather services, and businesses could use IGY information.  
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 Embedded within scientifically-relevant acts of collaboration were often 
seemingly inconsistent compromises favoring national defense over transparency. For 
instance, during the course of Vanguard operations, Minitrack stations outside the US 
followed strict visitors’ hours and were from time to time shut down to visitors during 
select operations. The Army Corps of Engineers, however, insisted that the periods of 
exclusion were “kept as short as possible and frank explanation was made,” and even 
went so far as to advise that these practices were “highly recommended for good public 
relations.” 264 
 Hardware and facilities developed with IGY funds were also often dual use in 
nature. Data retrieved from the Minitrack network on the shape and magnetic field of the 
earth could be used to improve the accuracy of intercontinental ballistic missiles as well 
as predict orbital variation in satellites. The techniques honed on Minitrack led directly 
the US’s Space Surveillance System. Whereas Minitrack could not track non-radiating 
satellites (such as a satellite with a dead transmitter battery or the third stage casing of 
launchers that tend to orbit with the satellite before re-entry or an ICBM), the Space 
Surveillance System could use radio waves to “illuminate” non-radiating bodies.265 By 
epistemically “flipping” the Space Surveillance network upside down, putting the atomic 
clocks on multiple satellites and transmitting exact measurements of time to persons on 
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the ground, Richard Easton devised a critical element for the Timation satellites, which 
were integrated with Air Force plans to form the first generation of GPS satellites.266  
 As for the meteorological instrumentation, while the climatological instruments 
were of less interest to the armed services, the Navy, Army, Air Force, and Strategic Air 
Command in particular would take great interest in developing and orbiting an 
operational weather satellite system as soon as feasible.  
Looking Ahead: The Vanguard Team | The TIROS Team 
 David DeVorkin reports that by 1956, the UARRP had established a community 
of workers who “placed themselves in the dual role of contributors to science and 
inventors of a new way to conduct science.” Thus, it is little surprise that in celebrating 
their tenth anniversary, the Panel members, rather than looking back over a decade of 
scientific discovery, looked ahead, discussing how to build scientific satellites for the 
IGY.267 
 Why do the nitty-gritty instances of technical uncertainty, expense, and risks in 
sounding rocket research matter? Many of these are one-time learning experiences (a la 
Rosen being sent for a pseudo-apprenticeship at JPL) or “modular” achievements (in that 
the Viking could be incorporated into Vanguard design). The fact that the USWB never 
considered going down this road of rocket and satellite exploration—and never could 
have achieved the same economies in R&D as the UARRP members—tells us something 
about the nature of the Cold War build-up and federal reorganization for “peaceful” space 
exploration.  
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 If Newell, Hagen, and Rosen were approached in 1956 and asked the likelihood 
that in four years their Vanguard team would be transferring the world’s first Television 
InfraRed Observation Satellite (TIROS) system to their operation, they would have likely 
deemed it feasible. If William Stroud’s research team at the Army Signal Corps Lab were 
asked the likelihood that they could integrate RCA cameras into an operational satellite 
system and glean useful cloud images for forecasters, they, too, would have found the 
prediction likely.  
 The shock would have been organizational. Satellites were logical extensions of 
sounding rocket practice, demanding far more thrust and reliability from launch vehicles, 
tracking stations across at least two continents, and data acquisition through an as-yet 
unmapped ionosphere. Thus, an operational scientific satellite system (emphasis on each 
of the four words) required resources far beyond the reach of just NRL, the Army Signal 
Corps Lab, or the entirety of the UARRP.  
 Participation in the International Geophysical Year demanded considerable funds 
from the DOD, but it also promised substantial temporary backing from the White House 
and Congress via the NSF. Thus, in the IGY they would operate proof of concept satellite 
systems intended to establish the precedent of satellite overflight as a scientific activity. 
Beyond the IGY lay a less certain future. 
Threats to the IGY Order: Space Stunts and Spectaculars 
 
 On 4 October 1957, the Soviets launched the world’s first artificial satellite into 
space. Although the US had been notified that the launch was imminent, 
miscommunications led to it being quite a shock to US researchers, elected officials, and 
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the public. For many, this event marks the beginning of the Soviet-American space race 
that policy and historiography have framed as the core driver to the US space program.268 
 In the fall of 1957, the Army resurrected plans for the Orbiter satellite, to which 
many Vanguard/IGY researchers remained unwelcoming, but at the very least high-level 
Navy officials took serious note of. Dated two weeks after Sputnik’s launch, one proposal 
explained: “The propaganda catch-word is ‘the moon.’” Therein, the proposal 
recommended stacking a Vanguard third stage atop a Jupiter C cluster to send a satellite 
into orbit with an apogee equaling the distance of the moon or to even place a payload on 
the moon. As with the original Orbiter proposal of 1955, this one, too, recommended 
taking advantage of Navy tracking capabilities. However in glaring opposition to US IGY 
policy, the plan recommended “this backup program be conducted on a completely 
classified basis in order to prevent any undue acceleration of the Soviet effort and to 
make possible reasonable speed in our effort.” 269 The plans, calling for a four-pound 
satellite made no reference to plausible scientific instrumentation, nor any conceivable 
contributions to the IGY. Instead, its author(s) suggested, “If moral commitments so 
dictate, an announcement of a planned launching could be made just prior to the 
scheduled event,” presuming the lead time was short enough to preclude a second 
upstaging by the Soviets.  
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 In outlining the IGY operating principles, the Secretary of the Navy explained 
how through transparency of operations the US had set itself up for a one-upping by the 
Soviets (who had never agreed to give launch warning).  
… in accordance with the spirit of international cooperation, every effort was 
made to conduct this program in such an open manner that all interested countries 
were completely aware of all its aspects. Special effort was made to insure that 
every detail of the proposed scientific experiments was well publicized. Initially, 
even the scheduled date of the first satellite launching attempt was authoritatively 
reported as 30 October 1957. The availability of this information provided the 
Soviet government an ideal framework for conducting a propaganda campaign to 
prove to the world the spectacular advances of Soviet science and 
technology…This practically assured the Soviets a major “First” in the eyes of the 
world.270 
 
The Secretary of the Navy, Thomas Gates (who in two years’ time would be Secretary of 
Defense) went on to warn that the US and Soviet scientific satellite experiments were 
“practically identical” in timing and scientific objectives. In the end, he concluded that 
“the only rational conclusion that can be drawn from this, considering the pointed effort 
made by the Soviets to reap full propaganda effect from the initial satellite launching, is 
that the Soviet program is to make the initial scientific investigation in each of the 
fields.”271 Indeed, the Secretary of the Navy opined, “The degree of sophistication and 
the quality of each scientific experiment is of only minor value in terms of its propaganda 
value. The important propaganda question is ‘who was first?’” If the US was to respond 
effectively to the Soviet threat, they must accelerate the pre-announced satellite manifest, 
thus trumping the Soviets’ secret launch schedule. 
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 Perhaps one of the most extreme examples of this race mentality is the Non-Stop, 
Round-the-World circumpolar flight of a B-52 proposed by Strategic Air Command.272 
AF Director of Research and Development explained that this, the first such 
circumnavigation of the earth, would “Provide assurance to the free nations of the world” 
and “remind the Soviet Union and its satellites that the US Air Force has a current 
operational capability of reaching even the remotest areas of the earth in support of the 
United States national interests and policies.”273  
Rather than launch an unannounced satellite lacking any scientific instruments, by 
November 6, the IGY Technical Panel for the Earth Satellite Program had begun 
discussing the possibility of a second “crash” series of scientific satellites, what were 
named the ABMA Explorer satellites. With additional satellite vehicles to consider, the 
committee began rearranging what had been a solely Vanguard launch manifest. Van 
Allen moved his cosmic ray instrumentation from Vanguard’s SLV-2 (essentially its 
second launch attempt) to Explorer I. In its place would be the Army Signal Corps’ 
meteorology instruments that had been slated for the fourth and final Vanguard satellite. 
RSRP panel chair Homer Newell pointed out that additional funds would be necessary 
for the speed-up—no small detail given the financial straits of the IGY satellite program.  
As with the Stewart Committee competition between the NRL and ABMA 
satellite proposals in 1955, NRL representatives emphasized qualitative issues—efficacy 
of ground support, reliability of instruments, prospects for data reduction. The ABMA 
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emphasized how soon their equipment could be in orbit. Precisely one month before the 
launch pad failure of Vanguard Test Vehicle 3, the IGY TPESP resolved:  
In view of information presented today by the NRL concerning the proposed 
speed-up of IGY satellite firings, the Panel desires to point out that any such 
schedule as is now proposed would adversely affect the possibility of completing 
the orderly series of scientific experiments now contemplated.274 
 
The resolution continued, cautioning that if by some chance NRL would prove capable of 
providing the necessary satellite testing and ground support necessary for the Explorer 
satellite series, “the scientific program would still be jeopardized by vehicular difficulties 
as well as by problems associated with tracking and telemetering which would inevitably 
result from the proposed speed-up.”275  
 Whereas NRL representatives voiced doubts that they could provide adequate 
support to Vanguard and the Explorer projects—both operating on a crash itinerary—
Army Signal Corps Director of Research, H. A. Zahl and researcher, H. K. Ziegler 
worried about the Signal Corps’ and contractors’ abilities to launch their meteorological 
cloud cover experiment months ahead of schedule. Even with “top priority” designation 
by the Army, Zahl and Ziegler cautioned “although rapid data analysis and presentation is 
especially desirable…the data evaluation equipment may not be ready until three months 
after the satellite instrumentation.”276 In the months that followed, many researchers 
would testify to Congress advising against the long-term efficacy of crash projects and 
advising that the US government instead invest in methodical plans for fundamental 
research programs. Noting the limited capacity of labs to accelerate programs in the latter 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 Minutes of the Fourteenth Meeting Technical Panel for the Earth Satellite Program, 
Record Number 15605 NHRC. 
275 Ibid.  
276 Ibid.  
 146 
stages of development, NRL’s Head of the Rocketsonde Branch within the Atmosphere 
and Astrophysics Division, John Townsend, opined that the most important priority was 
to make certain that “there is available the fundamental knowledge that only can come 
from basic research.” Townsend continued, contrasting crash projects and propaganda 
stunts with scientifically (yet still diplomatically) relevant activity, stating:  
I was considerably heartened a few weeks back by the amount of testimony to 
your committee, and by statements by our scientific leaders in the press, to the 
effect that one of the most important things for us to do now is to increase our 
efforts in basic research. However, I have been distressed recently at the decay in 
such sentiment. It seems to me now that we are talking more of crash production 
programs or ‘stunts’ to impress our allies and enemies. 277  
 
He closed, predicting that US capabilities in missiles and rockets twenty years in the 
future would be “determined by our efforts in basic research today.”278  
Concluding Thoughts 
 These post-sputnik days were a formative period for the president and others 
growing wary of an as-yet-unnamed military-industrial-complex. Looking ahead, to 
varying degrees, historians have argued that Eisenhower’s farewell address cautioning 
that public policy could “become the captive to the scientific-technological elite” links as 
much, if not more, to his concerns over the formation of a policy elite controlling these 
resources. Gregory Pascal Zachary allows that the President did have sincere concerns 
about scientific patronage and an imbalance of power that may threaten his democratic 
ideals as well as the US economy. However, he suggests that to a degree, Ike was “crying 
wolf.” 279 While he wanted to alert the public to the ominous military-industrial 
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circumvention of checks and balances, he offered no concrete indictment against the 
scientific elites. For several years, the fiscally conservative president had fielded 
accusations of bomber gaps and missile gaps and a lack of civil defense infrastructure for 
a fundamentally unwinnable “New Look” war.280  
 James Killian, in his memoirs, refers to the “hard-sell technologists and their 
sychophants,” as being the people who irritated Eisenhower the most. Playing upon the 
ignorance of the public and the legitimately terrifying prospects of nuclear holocaust, 
enthusiasts emerged offering spectacular salvation of US prestige through one-off 
displays of technological capability and the dubious escalation of such saber rattling. 
Killian cautioned: “We were to be wary of accepting their claims, believing their 
analyses, and buying their wares.”281 Such spectacles would have proven spectacularly 
expensive, not simply in terms of taxpayer dollars, but as threats to long-run national and 
international order. James Killian many years later recalled that the Air Force’s case for 
control over the US space program might have been stronger if the Air Force had 
“suppressed some of its own special brand of fantasies about space.” There, top-ranking 
officers “freely predicted that the next war would unquestionably be fought with space 
weapons, and some of the smaller air force fry had visions of space wars and dropping 
bombs from satellites.”282 Killian, who had served several years on the Army’s Scientific 
Advisory Panel, observed with concern when General Medaris, Commander of ABMA 
which had launched the US’s first satellite, “campaigned with a fierce religious zeal” to 
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secure the role as central agency of US space exploration. Medaris believed that military 
satellites (including manned space stations) would surpass even missiles in tactical utility 
and thus resisted the formation of a civilian space agency in favor of centering the space 
effort at the ABMA. 
 The Navy, too, continued with ambitious plans for the future. The Naval Research 
Laboratory intended to perform studies into navigation satellites, reconnaissance 
satellites, electronic intelligence satellites, communication satellites, and sundry 
geophysical and space research satellites. Unbeknownst to even the Vanguard directors, a 
group of physicists representing the Naval Ordnance Test Station made plans for a 
“miniscule donut-shaped” satellite weighing only 2.3 pounds.283  
 
 A decade after the launch of Sputnik, Vannevar Bush reflected on the “damaging” 
and “disgraceful” interservice rivalries for missile projects, satellite projects, and 
ultimately, control over the US space program. As early as 1948 and 1949, he had heard 
such enthusiasts hyperbolize over the speed, thrift, and efficacy of weapons programs. 
Bush judged their programs possible but impractical, “officers…were proclaiming loudly 
that such missiles were just around the corner, that we would have them in a year or two, 
and that they must be controlled [within their branch of the military]…”284  
 At the 1960 dedication of the Marshall Spaceflight Center (essentially transferring 
Wernher von Braun’s Army Ballistic Missile Agency team from the military to NASA), 
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Eisenhower credited all that Americans had and would accomplish to “unrestrained 
human talent and energy relentlessly probing for the betterment of humanity” and not the 
“outgrowth of a soulless, barren technology, nor of a grasping state imperialism.”285 
Walter McDougall asserts that the Huntsville engineers positively were not the “cause of 
Eisenhower’s distress.” I would posit that Walter McDougall is extremely canny about 
what he writes and what he leaves between the lines. What of von Braun himself?  
 The next two chapters illustrate how in spite of the political chaos following the 
launch of Sputnik, a line of satellite specialists were drawn from the world of classified 
studies and not just placed in the public sphere, but became integral elements to orderly 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Seeking Sustainable Resources and US Leadership in Space 






 NASA’s ten-month gestation period from Sputnik to Space Act is well-
documented as a Cold War political construct, absolutely attributable to the Sputnik 
saltation286 and cries for a US recovery in the Soviet-American space race.287 While 
Congress and the Eisenhower White House actually approached post-Sputnik 
reorganization considering the same handful of options: centralization under a military 
authority, centralization under the AEC, or centralization under the NACA, Democrats in 
Congress (Lyndon Johnson central among them) seldom missed an opportunity to 
criticize Eisenhower for complacency—even senility—in defense in the years leading up 
to Sputnik. Lyndon Johnson’s designs on the 1960 White House led to political posturing 
in the “Johnson hearings” which fostered a climate of public hysteria over the so-called 
“missile mess.”288  
 Tracing the lineage of the technical systems and precedents in scientific practice 
from the V-2 Panel to the World Weather Watch, this dissertation sheds light on the 
subtle manner in which non-elite scientists and middle managers also shaped policy 
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discourses.289 This chapter focuses on what NASA was intended to do, what 
shortcomings in federal organization it was intended to overcome, and the groundwork 
laid for the US’s eventual leadership WWW organization. Given that so many significant 
events were happening concurrently, this chapter at times teases out important historic 
themes, rather than maintaining one chapter-long chronology. 
 First and foremost, the rocket and satellite R&D community sought sustained 
programs, not the one-off projects of the Defense Department and the temporary IGY. 
Research community representatives proposed that basic research in space have a home 
analogous to the National Science Foundation and the Atomic Energy Commission. This 
“National Space Establishment” was to be the US’s “non-military” program. It was to 
remain a center for international collaboration. On all these points, Eisenhower 
eventually assented to his Presidential Science Advisory Committee and the wishes of 
Congress (who had themselves been influenced by reports, letters, testimony, and studies 
by Rocket and Satellite Research Panel members).  
 Between October 1957 and July of 1958, drafts for critical legislation were 
negotiated, not only institutionalizing the principles of IGY internationalism in a NASA, 
but giving hopes to the Weather Bureau for a national meteorological satellite system to 
be managed and operated outside of the DOD. Once the legislative and executive 
branches reached a consensus on the necessity for and principles of a centralized civilian 
space agency, lawmakers equipped NASA with the necessary governmental authority to 
pursue space exploration with the authority of an administration, implicitly garnering 
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more power than defense agencies such as the Advanced Research Projects Agency and 
ABMA. 
 What factors led to the formation of NASA in the guise it took? Working from the 
“bottom-up,” the Rocket and Satellite Research Panel’s (RSRP, formerly UARRP) 
Committee on the Occupation of Space (COS) began considering the feasibility of a 
space establishment between September and December 1957.290 During that time, 
members reached a tenuous consensus emphasizing the importance of sustainable basic 
research, preferably in a civilian agency. RSRP members circulated their proposals for a 
national space establishment under their NAS-IGY credentials.291 Their reports, 
proposals, and letters of testimony proved influential to both Congress and the 
President’s Science Advisory Committee.  
 While RSRP members were eager to protect their professional networks abroad, 
they were less inclined to remark on public opinion abroad. Instead between February 
and April 1958, congress, the President’s Science Advisory Committee and Vice 
President Nixon added diplomatic nuance to these scientific justifications, convincing the 
reticent president that an agency featuring a nonaggressive/nonmilitary posture in space 
might serve the administration’s diplomatic interests.  
 As the world’s first satellite Sputnik captured public imagination and ignited calls 
for a US recovery in the so-called space race. Two months later, on December 6, the 
failed launch of the US Vanguard Test Vehicle-3 underscored the US’s apparently dire 
circumstances. In response to Sputnik, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, chair of the Senate 
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Preparedness Investigation Subcommittee, invited the testimony of leading experts in 
military procurement, missile research, and upper atmospheric science. Aiding him was 
congressional researcher, Eilene Galloway. Galloway was an established expert in 
military preparedness, having authored influential reports on guided missiles in foreign 
countries and DOD manpower organization in the US. For these individuals, the space 
race was a thoroughly military enterprise begging the thoughtful reorganization of DOD 
resources.  
 The testimony of most scientists and engineers centered on four questions: With 
respect to missiles and satellites, had there been an adequate use of scientific manpower? 
Second, it asked that witnesses outline the bottlenecks encountered in research and 
development work. Third, witnesses were asked to outline bottlenecks that impeded 
development and production of missiles and satellites. Finally, Congress asked that 
scientists and engineers outline recommendations for accelerating the development and 
production of missiles and satellites.  
 With the first three questions, Congress demonstrated that it was not blindly 
moving forward with reorganization (referenced in question 4), but sought an intensive 
review of events and activities past. Sputnik did not precipitate the dawn of the space age; 
Sputnik had incited the political, scientific, and organizational energies that ended the 
US’s 1945-1957 ad hoc and defense-managed space program. This signaled the end of 
the RSRP’s relative autonomy as well as space science’s unpredictable sponsorship. 
Having been promised a space program (and being freed of the piecemeal funding of 
projects), how would the scientists reach an amenable compromise of interests with 
Congress and the Eisenhower Administration? A flurry of meetings changed the tenor of 
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congressional preparedness hearings and led eventually to the formation of NASA in a 
guise very closely resembling the recommendation of the RSRP’s Committee on Space. 
 It is important to note that the initial intent of this congressional investigation was 
not to divide US resources between military and civilian space programs. Congressional 
leaders conceived of the space race as being a military undertaking and thus, the January 
testimony was dominated by talk of centralization under the military and reducing 
unnecessary duplication of R&D among the armed services in an effort to better compete 
in the missile and satellite race. Furthermore, subcommittee members demonstrated an 
extremely limited understanding of the principles under which the IGY—implicitly and 
explicitly—had been planned.  
 In the face of a growing Congressional and White House consensus for a 
centralized DOD-operated US space program, a handful of RSRP members lobbied the 
Eisenhower Administration, the President’s Science Advisory Committee, the Vice 
President, the AEC, and congressional leaders for the formation of a National Space 
Establishment independent of the DOD’s ARPA for basic research and non-military 
applications.  
 Eilene Galloway would credit these IGY scientists with reframing the 
investigation from military preparedness to the broader scope of national governance and 
in time, international governance.  
A curious thing came about. Instead of being a problem that was solely national 
defense where we were really afraid for our security, it became a problem of 
maintaining peace. It became a problem where the scientists and engineers came 
up and told us of all the benefits we could derive from using outer space. They 
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told us about communications, increasing the benefits of meteorology, all the 
information to solve [civilian] problems on the Earth.292 
 
Whereas congressional leaders had begun their investigation absorbed with solving the 
problems of Sputnik and the space race, testifying provided scientists and engineers—
some of whom had engaged in IGY research and many of whom had contributed solely 
to military R&D—an opportunity to express their wide range of concerns. Some 
members of the COS conceived of a federal reorganization that would coordinate military 
(i.e. ARPA) and civilian centers of R&D. Doing so would overcome shortcomings 
suffered by the RSRP in the ad hoc years of 1945-1957 while laying groundwork for the 
US’s position of long-term leadership in the occupation of space. 
 William Stroud, project manager for Vanguard II’s meteorological satellite 
instrument as well as NASA’s follow-on TIROS weather satellites, described how the 
RSRP explicitly sought programmatic support from Congress for a National Space 
Establishment (as opposed to the project-by-project funding of space sciences under the 
armed services). This included permanent facilities, salaried personnel, a constant supply 
of materials, essentially an organization complete with financing, and logistical 
capabilities. These demands were shaped by experiences outlined previously in Chapters 
Two and Three, covering the ad hoc years of 1945-1957. During that time, the space 
science community operated under four formative conditions necessary for understanding 
the formation of NASA. These included: the desire to augment technical work with basic 
or knowledge-driven research, the desire for an orderly program as structured by 
researchers and not in response to political demands, wariness of validating each project 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




by its immediate applicability to defense capability, and finally, the desire to maintain 
open relations with and sustained access to international partners.293 While DOD 
sponsors and lab management were not patently opposed to all four of these conditions in 
all circumstances, these do provide a useful framework for considering the formative 
experiences of researchers who would soon advise Congress on the formation of a 
National Space Establishment. 
Missile Preparedness Hearings and the Sounding Rocket Research Funding Crisis 
 
 As sounding rocket researchers, the UARRP members were the US’s de facto 
experts on missiles and satellites. Thus, by the time COS researchers were preparing 
statements for the 1957-58 Missile and Space Preparedness hearings; they had identified 
their aim. The RSRP needed sustainable funding, preferably independent of the armed 
services, but institutionalized and programmatic nevertheless. Leading members of the 
RSRP were sent letters requesting their written testimony, but Vanguard director, John 
Hagen and Wernher von Braun were the only two RSRP participants who traveled to the 
Hill to testify (and von Braun had just joined the RSRP in December 1958). The other 
fifty-five witnesses called to testify read like the index of a Cold War history book: 
Edward Teller, Vannevar Bush, James Doolittle, Neil McElroy, Donald Quarles, David 
Sarnoff, a host of armed services generals, and more.  
 Newell, Stroud, Townsend, and colleagues, too, had been invited to explain the 
success of Sputnik and the failings of a system that had produced the Vanguard Test 
Vehicle-3 explosion, but they were to do so by letter. In their testimony, they used their 
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experience on the UARRP to illustrate not only the complexity of their procurement and 
operational systems, but the dire state of DOD funding for basic research over the past 
few years. 
 Since the 1940s, members of the UARRP had attempted to strike a sound balance 
between meeting national security needs, but at the same time investing sufficient 
resources in scientifically-relevant exploration of the upper atmosphere. Chapter Two has 
outlined the various “surpluses” supplementing Panel activities in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s—enemy hardware captured during the war, surplus US hardware left over 
from war research, personnel who federal labs campaigned to keep on staff despite the 
war’s end, even surplus ideas—leads for postwar basic research and avenues that could 
not be explored at the expense of crash engineering projects necessary to support the war 
effort. 
 Over time these researchers justified and re-justified rocketborne basic research 
activities to their DOD sponsors—themselves facing substantial budget cuts. In the early 
days various “surpluses” provided justification for performing space R&D, but 
researchers had locked-in to an upward ratchet of resource consumption. Whereas the V-
2s had provided a relatively “free ride” for scientific instruments in the immediate 
postwar years, by the time the armed services began costly development and testing of 
follow-on sounding rockets, 1947 military reorganization forming the DOD actually 
muddied the waters of missile development policy and heightened latent animosities 
among the services.  
 In their testimonies, UARRP participants explained how they had honed creative 
accounting methods to sustain their programs, such as the drawing off of lab overhead to 
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cover expenses when the Iris sounding rocket funding was cut or partnering between 
Army and Navy to save the Arcon sounding rocket. The Viking sounding rocket 
(unsuccessfully marketed by Newell as a test vehicle for ballistic missile research) 
survived only because of the influx of funds provided by the IGY: in 1955, Viking 
became the first and second stage of the Vanguard launch vehicle.294 Sounding rocket 
budgets declined and entire projects were cancelled.  
 Years later when lecturing students at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 
Lloyd Berkner was asked if the US had acted upon 1945-1947 satellite proposals and 
invested all resources necessary, how soon the US might have launched a satellite. 
Knowing full well that the von Braun team at ABMA had stood prepared to launch a 
minimum orbiter years before Sputnik, Berkner responded with a pithy critique of the US 
rocket R&D. “[W]e have lost a lot by our failure to continuously support our rocket 
activity,” he said, contrasting the US with the German V-2 R&D teams who “got going” 
in 1928 and sustained research into the 1940s. Berkner pointed out that the US had not 
been supportive of rocketry as soon or with the same degree of commitment. “All our 
money was pulled away in 1952 and our people all dispersed. We got going again, and 
again our money was pulled away in 1954 and all our people dispersed.” Berkner 
suggested that IGY money provided in 1955 was how the sounding rocket community 
“finally got to stay in the business.”295  
 Indeed, IGY planning provided an important windfall to sounding rocket 
exploration, promising a total of $14.8M to UARRP members, but again, raising the 
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obligations between researchers and sponsors. Further complicating matters, the National 
Academies of Sciences and Department of Defense at times differed on their respective 
funding responsibilities. In April of 1955, the Eisenhower Administration instituted the 
noninterference clause for IGY research and funding responsibilities—demanding that 
IGY participation under no circumstances draw personnel or other resources away from 
ICBM development. This gave DOD sponsors further leverage when they were forced to 
cut funding for IGY participation. The IGY sounding rocket program was very nearly 
stillborn. 
 Before the official start of the International Geophysical Year, the Air Force – 
University of Michigan research team progress reports indicated dire circumstances. In 
addition to the Air Force reducing in-house funds and personnel, two contracts would run 
out of funds before the end of the fiscal year. The Principal Investigator noted five 
contributing factors: the AF and university had underestimated cost of operations, severe 
limitations to AF funds “precluded any safety factor,” unexpected and large amounts of 
overtime, a requirement that all funds be committed by the close of the last calendar year, 
and a “general deficiency of contractual funds at ARDC after 1 January 1957.296 
 To the Weather Bureau, these cuts in DOD spending were a welcomed 
opportunity. Following an August 1957 freeze in AF R&D funding and a 10% cut in 
R&D funds for the whole DOD, the AF Geophysics Research Division (GRD) cancelled 
two contracts at New York University, two at Texas A&M, and one at the University of 
Wisconsin. Wexler prompted Reichelderfer to “seize leadership in the meteorological 
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research and development field in accordance with your hopes expressed over the last 
few years.” Wexler was confident that with minimal investment the USWB could keep 
some of the projects funded through the end of the fiscal year. 
 Soon thereafter Fred Whipple, chair of the IGY Technical Panel on Rocketry 
received a letter from Homer Newell, Chair of the Special Committee on the IGY. In it, 
Newell cautioned that the overall budgetary situation in the DOD looked grim. All DOD 
agencies participating in the IGY were deeply concerned about widespread shortages in 
the “internal funds” required for the IGY science program. The situation at the University 
of Michigan was “extremely desperate,” as the UARRP stood to lose two upper air 
research groups.297 
 Sources do not indicate if the RSRP considered approaching the USWB for 
assistance. Ultimately, Newell requested that Whipple’s Technical Panel on Rocketry 
urge the IGY National Committee “approach the appropriate DOD areas immediately and 
obtain positive assurance that DOD will meet its scientific commitments to the US-IGY 
Rocket Programs.” In the months that followed, mid-level managers at DOD labs 
exchanged similar narratives of procurement complications and cut funding. The Army’s 
Signal Corps Lab was reported as being “desperate for operating funds.” The Air Force 
was $121,000 behind on just two contracts and at least one Navy rocket program was 
facing contractor overruns.298 The launch of Sputnik brought a public uproar and cries for 
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an accelerated IGY program, but no immediate financial respite for the rocketsonde 
groups who were performing rocket and satellite R&D.  
 Rocket procurement was just one element of coordination suffering under the 
IGY coalition. Even after Sputnik, RSRP sponsors could not (or would not) allocate 
funds for the group to order post-IGY equipment. Eighteen-month and two-year lead 
times on rockets demanded it.299 In his testimony, William Stroud, responsible for the 
Army Signal Corps’ satellite cloud-cover experiment explained that his lab’s satellite 
research group and upper atmosphere rocket research program existed solely because of 
the infusion of IGY moneys. Half his officers and enlisted men were temporarily 
assigned and sixty percent of the civilians on temporary loan until Vanguard was 
complete.300 The Naval Research Lab’s Jack Townsend, Head of the Rocket Sonde 
Branch within the Atmospheric & Astrophysics Division, offered almost precisely the 
same observation, stating that the NRL program was in “dire straights” and unable to 
secure funds for post-IGY research. Echoing a familiar sentiment, he, too, speculated that 
his branch would be “out of business” were it not for IGY.301 If such dismal funding 
trends continued, December 1958 would signal not only the end of the 18-month IGY, 
but perhaps even the end of consequential coordinated research among RSRP members.  
RSRP Politicking 
 How did a nonmilitary space program emerge from post-Sputnik America? The 
answer is complicated by the many motivations of individuals and refracted by a flurry of 
meetings, hearings, and general correspondence taking place over the course of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299 Satellite and Missile Hearings, 2129. 
300 Satellite and Missile Hearings, 2125. 
301 Ibid, 2129. 
 162 
approximately eight months. Individual-by-individual, motivations ranged broadly and 
changed dramatically as the Congress and the Eisenhower Administration (and countless 
derivatives thereof) consulted scientists, engineers, and representatives of the armed 
services on how best to reorganize resources.  
 In fall of 1957 and winter 1958, the Rocket and Satellite Research Panel met 
regularly in the interest of analyzing the possibilities of a National Space Establishment 
(NSE)—even as the representatives labored on their respective IGY projects Explorer 
and Vanguard (see Appendix A for a list of meetings). In the winter and spring of 1958, 
Kellogg reported that some other “big guns” began to join the COS. These included 
James van Allen, Wernher von Braun, William Pickering, John Townsend, and several 
others, who in large part had been encouraged by IGY’s Joseph Kaplan in an effort to 
bring more proponents to the cause of a civilian space agency.  
 William Stroud of the Signal Corps took credit for finally swaying Wernher von 
Braun. Stroud had for years been working in collaboration with von Braun, Ernst 
Stuhlinger, and others from the ABMA and more than once had functioned as an 
informal liaison between the IGY participants and the missile-oriented ABMA team.302 
Von Braun attended the 19 December 1957 RSRP meeting (thirteen days after the 
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Vanguard TV-3 failure) where “we spent hours trying to convince von Braun to back the 
civilian approach. He wanted to go military."303 
 On the 14 December 1957 von Braun had carefully crafted his response to 
congressional testimony. Rather than refer to a National Space Establishment (the 
terminology used by the COS for their proposed civilian space agency on a document he 
had signed), von Braun stated: 
…the outer space physical research program which is presently going on under 
the auspices of the IGY, should most certainly be continued after the IGY is over. 
But right now there is no agency in this country which is really responsible for its 
continuation…The continuation of this research program would, in my opinion, 
be a logical assignment to the National Space Agency.304 
 
Hedging his bets, von Braun did not want to yet go on the record in favor of a civilian 
program. However he did opt to distinguish such a National Space Agency by its 
“continuation of a research program.” Historian Michael Neufeld described von Braun’s 
“public flexibility” regarding a space agency. In Congress, he endorsed the notion of a 
centralized space agency, under either civilian or military leadership (so long as it 
managed both civil and military space exploration and remained under “one man”—
himself and General Medaris being the most speculated candidates).305 Von Braun also 
signed the American Rocket Society’s proposal for a space agency and in time would 
attend COS meetings and (at least ostensibly) support COS campaigning for a civilian 
space program. In addition to this, von Braun remained ever concerned with the US’s 
domination in space. In Congress, he interpreted Soviet policy in space as being “’If we 
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want to control this planet, we have to control the space around it.’”306 In addition to his 
engagements with the IGY scientists and the American Rocket Society, von Braun 
authored a classified proposal of his own “A National Integrated Missile and Space 
Development Program.” Therein he proposed a $1.5 billion dollar budget (von Braun 
undoubtedly meant per year, given the COS budget of $1B/yr) to support the use of Army 
launch vehicles for heavier scientific satellites, moon probes, one- and two-man 
spacecraft, and by 1965 a twenty-person space station.307 
 Whereas Von Braun was covering all possible bases with space agency proposals, 
military and civil, it was while serving on the NACA (National Advisory Committee on 
Aeronautics) Stever Space exploration committee that he settled upon endorsing NACA 
as the center of the new space agency—viewed as a non-military center of basic research 
into aeronautics.308 In the meantime, he maintained a presence with RSRP colleagues, 
providing them vital access to the White House. Thus, on 22 January 1958, Von Braun, 
Newell, Pickering, Ehricke, and Stroud met with the Vice President Nixon. Newell gave 
opening comments based on COS proposal and found the VP not only a willing listener 
but active supporter of the ramifications of international cooperation, providing leads and 
contacts to the AEC and the US Information Agency. 309  
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 US Information Agency Director George Allen and staff proved supportive of the 
COS, “greatly interested” and appreciative of not only the scientific and technological 
significance of a NSE, but also its prospective role in diplomacy. While these self-
appointed representatives of the scientific community cannot be identified as 
policymakers in the sense that they determined NASA’s precise function or the details of 
its form, their role as advisors provides a critical linkage for understanding the 
complicated origins of the US’s nonmilitary space program and how a growing number 
of congressional and White House officials began to recognize their stakes in the 
(re)organization of space R&D. 
 Newell, Stroud, Townsend, and Cummings attended back-to-back meetings with 
the AEC, US Information Agency, and Congressional committees. That morning they 
met with the five AEC commissioners including Strauss. Newell was sick with a cold and 
NRL’s Jack Townsend had to do the talking.310 RSRP minutes indicate that the meeting 
was wholly “unproductive.” This was due in small part to the fact that Newell shocked 
AEC members, explaining that the proposed space program would likely require as much 
as a billion dollars a year, rivaling the AEC’s budget.311 Signal Corps’ Stroud, was more 
candid, indicating that AEC commissioners were interested only in “taking over.” “They 
wanted the job,” he explained. “The science, they didn’t understand” and by implication, 
were not concerned with.312 At this point, the RSRP COS activities attempting to garner 
support for a non-military center of space R&D were quite daring, for if they backfired, 
space R8&D— and their jobs—would remain under military management.  
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 The National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA), too, was under 
consideration as a home for the space program, but many worried that the R&D 
organization had become too “ingrown,” it was described as subject to the desires of 
military and industrial customers and that “science carried little weight.” One historian 
described it as a “captive of the military-industrial complex.313 NACA’s Hugh Dryden 
indicated his sensitivity to these concerns, courting the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences 
in January of 1958. Summarizing the situation in Congress and the White House, he 
stated that the essential necessity for a “new civilian space agency is plain. The scientific 
community, understandably, is worried about the possibility that extremely important 
non-military aspects of space technology would be submerged or perhaps even lost if 
included as a mere adjunct to the military program.”314 There remained the risk that a 
civilian agency may be stood up on paper as independent of the armed services, but like 
NACA, still allow its research agenda to be dictated by the armed services. 
Civilian Applications and Fundamental Research as Congressional Concerns 
 
 Winter congressional testimony, proposals in periodicals for a National Space 
Establishment, as well as the actual COS-NSE proposals indicate that most 
representatives of the space science community tended to be unwilling to speculate on the 
significance of worldwide public opinion or to weigh in on the space for peace rhetoric. 
Instead, they focused on the necessity of their national space establishment as a home for 
basic research and/or development of non-military technologies. Rather than be 
constrained to demanding lists and deadlines of space spectaculars, select representatives 
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of the scientific community advocated a methodical and sustainable program of scientific 
research. Implicit to the joint American Rocket Society-Technical Panel on Earth 
Satellite Program-RSRP proposal (released publicly in January and supplied to Congress 
and the PSAC) was a civilian managed civilian agency, removing select researchers from 
ARPA authority and the risk of centralization under Army Ballistic Missile Agency or 
the Air Force. Actor terms centering on basic research remained a constant element 
defining the agency’s mission, with varying prognostications of civilian weather and 
communications services. 
 Testimony gathered over the winter shaped congressional discourses into the 
spring. William Pickering, Director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory advised against: 
“crash missile programs,” and instead, advocated maintenance of an “orderly progression 
from research to production.” Concerning the notion of a centralized national space 
program, he suggested a “national program for the exploration of space, under scientific 
direction but closely integrated with the military hardware programs.”315  
 The Army Signal Corps’ William Stroud stated: “It is not only a matter of 
accelerating certain weapons programs such as the Jupiter, Thor, Atlas, Polaris, and 
possibly the Titan system, which, I believe, should be done.” In the interest of a more 
balanced space program, he suggested that, “simultaneously and immediately we must 
prepare for the long-range challenge; namely, the exploration and habitation of outer 
space. This is not a military problem.”316 Instead, he called for a “national project, 
civilian managed, scientific in concept and spirit with a sufficient budget, independent of 
the DOD with the responsibility, authority, and accountability for the mission of carrying 
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out the scientific exploration of outer space.” This and only this would provide the US 
with the “scientific and technological strength necessary for its survival.”317 
 William Kellogg, RAND’s head of Geophysics in the Engineering Division who 
authored the first papers speculating on the viability of meteorological satellite 
instruments, enclosed the COS’s proposal for an NSE in his testimony and quoted it at 
length:  
Space research will contribute enormously to the educational, cultural, and 
intellectual character of the people of the United States and of the world…There 
will be a rich and continuing harvest of important practical applications as the 
work proceeds. Some of these can already be foreseen—reliable short-term and 
long-term meteorological forecasts, with all the agricultural and commercial 
advantages that these imply; rapid, long-range radio communications of great 
capacity and reliability; aids to navigation and to long-range surveying; television 
relays; new medical and biological knowledge, etc. And these will only be the 
beginning. Many of these applications will be of military value; but their greater 
value will be to the civilian community at large….”318  
 
Hand-in-glove with these calls for a sustained program of basic research were judgments 
of the Defense Department as constraining technological developments to military 
applications. Appealing at times to the principles of the Atomic Energy Commission and 
at times the National Science Foundation as institutional models, they hearkened to the 
rationale that basic science was best managed by civilians, free from undue military 
influence or the constraints of classification. 
ARPA Formation & Resistance to a Wholly Military Space Program 
 
 In the first week of February 1958, the Congress passed US Public Law 85-326, 
instituting the Advanced Research Project Agency and consolidating all US space 
projects under ARPA. Between the passage of the law in April and the formal “opening” 
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of ARPA in April, congressmen, and central among them, Senator Lyndon Johnson and 
Representative John W. McCormick began campaigning for the institution of a civilian 
space program. By this time dozens of US institutions had identified some stake in 
satellites and/or suborbital space research. These included multiple research facilities 
among all three armed services, university researchers, the Weather Bureau, the National 
Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA), the Atomic Energy Commission, along 
with their industrial partners that took the initiative to fund their own research into 
satellite instruments, launchers, and support systems. Among these many interest groups, 
the main contenders for control of the national space program included: ARPA (as final 
home), NACA, AEC and to a less-seriously considered, the ABMA and Air Force.  
 Congressional hearings drew unprecedented attention to the once-ignored missile 
and satellite programs. Lawmakers sought a long-term fix for what they and many in the 
science community perceived to be inadequately organized resources. Given the fact that 
the armed services had pursued space exploration for so many years ad hoc, 
policymakers deliberated over the proper placement of several projects. These projects 
included: the AF Discoverer satellites (cover for the Corona reconnaissance satellite), 
NRL’s IGY satellite project Vanguard, the ABMA’s Explorer satellite series instated 
after the success of Sputnik and launch pad failure of Vanguard, as well as drawing board 
plans for navigation satellites, reconnaissance satellites, meteorological and 
communications satellites among the Army, Navy, and Air Force.  
 
 Even before ARPA was in formal operation, many viewed it as a stopgap measure 
while Congress and the White House determined what to do about non-military 
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applications and fundamental research. Preferring to expand a pre-existing center of 
federal R&D, the two most serious proposals debated housing civil space under the 
Atomic Energy Commission or the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. While 
Congress deliberated, President Eisenhower consulted with the Presidential Science 
Advisory Committee (PSAC). 
 Consensus emerged in the PSAC supporting NACA as the seedbed for the civil 
space program. Some such as the Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy and Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles warmed to NACA’s history of fruitful DOD 
cooperation (for indeed, NASA and the DOD would have to negotiate and share a great 
deal of common ground in the years to come).319 COS members tended to prefer NACA 
over the AEC for a number of reasons. For one, there was the perception that AEC 
officials were actively pursuing space technologies for the bureaucratic clout. On 14 
February 1958, Wernher Von Braun testified to Congress indicating that the aviation 
industry favored NACA over the AEC.320 
 That March, Lloyd Berkner called for a civilian space program in the Bulletin of 
Atomic Scientists. Considering both the threats and the promises of space exploration as 
an analog to atomic energy, he suggested that the US had faced a similar decision when it 
settled on the Atomic Energy Commission. The AEC, he explained, provided a 
“mechanism through which ‘atoms for peace’ and other friendly international activities 
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sparked by the atom can aid in breaking down international tensions.”321 Berkner’s BAS 
piece was just one of several opinions recorded from influential scientists. Eilene 
Galloway collected these in her study “Compilation of Materials on Space and 
Astronautics No. 3 Organization of Space Activities of the Federal Government: Selected 
Statements for the Special Committee on Space and Astronautics.”322 Within the selected 
statements Galloway cited Lloyd Berkner, James van Allen, George Sutton (President of 
the American Rocket Society), 323 
 
 That April, the NAS’s TPESP members outlined their consensus for a National 
Space Establishment in the journal Science. In their article, “Research in Outer Space” 
the members stressed that while there would be many “benefits of a practical nature,” the 
fundamental objective of a long-term space exploration program, must be the “quest for 
knowledge” about the solar system, universe, and beyond.324 The researchers envisioned 
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a wide variety of pursuits being achieved in an explicitly incremental fashion by a non-
military organization. These pursuits included: sounding rockets, earth satellites, lunar-, 
planetary-, interplanetary- probes, and ultimately human spaceflight.325 Due to White 
House opinion (with PSAC influence), congressional testimony, and public opinion, that 
month Congress gradually transitioned from notions of a lost “space race” to long-term 
solutions for US space exploration and basic research. Reinforcing a sentiment stated 
earlier in this chapter and expanding upon it, National Defense Analyst Galloway 
recalled: 
The initial assumption was that we faced a military problem. By Jan. 23, 1958 
[the close of the first round of testimony], we had recorded 1,377 pages of 
testimony by preparedness experts. But it was the testimony of scientists and 
engineers from many sectors, including the International Geophysical Year that 
helped change our perception of the problem. These witnesses discussed the 
important practical applications of space… including long-term meteorological 
forecasts and rapid long-range radio communications.326  
 
 The researchers earnest call for a basic science research program mated neatly 
with Congress’s (particularly Representative John McCormack and Senator Johnson’s) 
interest in a peaceful/nonmilitary space program and the necessity of this agency for 
garnering international goodwill, at the same time securing US leadership in space. 
Galloway (who for decades would carry unofficial mantles such as “grand dame of 
space” and “grand matriarch of space law”) attributed the unanticipated shift in tenor to 
the testimony from IGY scientists and engineers: “Use of space was not confined to 
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being, the authors took it as an, “article of faith” that in time humans “would be required 
to do the job of cosmic exploration personally—and furthermore, that he will want to do 
the job himself, whether required or not.”p. 802 
326 Emphasis added, Galloway Interview.  
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military activities. It was remarkable that this possibility became evident so soon after 
Sputnik and its significance cannot be understated.”327 Galloway’s formal and informal 
influence over legislation increased gradually. She continued stating:  
…the scientific community that had been working on the IGY studying the whole 
earth including outer space, the Nation States, and the United Nations were three 
that combined to make it possible for us to emphasize peace rather than war. We 
would be prepared for national defense, but we were also going to use outer space 
for peaceful purposes.328 
 
As spokesmen and representatives, if not the material developers of emerging space 
technologies, the expertise of the scientific community validated lawmaker’s faith that 
the US could oversee the development of at the very least meteorological and 
communications satellites for the US public. Developing civilian technologies for non-
military purposes served a spectrum of practical and diplomatic needs. For some, this was 
a logical extension of the space race into Cold War diplomatic posturing. For instance, 
PSAC Chair Nelson Rockefeller and Johns Hopkins President Milton Eisenhower 
stressed the importance of a civil space program in world opinion, stating, “The 
psychological impact of the Russian satellites suggests that the US cannot afford to have 
a dangerous rival outdo it in a field which has so firmly caught, and is likely to continue 
to hold, the imagination of all mankind.”329  
 
 The trajectory of Galloway’s career (from defense analyst to US representative on 
the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space) plot important events and ideas 
leading to the formation of NASA in the guise that it took. Galloway identified herself as 
a National Security/International Relations analyst. She began her career in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
327 Ibid, emphasis added. 
328Ibid, emphasis added, 5. 
329Mcdougall, 171 
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Congressional Research Service, but in 1947 and 1953-54 was on loan to the Senate for 
work on Armed Services reorganizations. Thus, she was a logical choice in 1957 when 
she served on the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee during hearings chaired by Johnson on the Missile-Satellite 
Situation, beginning in November 1957. During this time she also worked for the 
Chairman, Senator Richard B. Russell on the impact on the US of the Soviet Union being 
the first to send a satellite in orbit. The following year she was appointed as Special 
Consultant by Johnson to the Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics to 
work on NASA legislation. She also assisted John McCormack, Chair of the House 
Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration. She assisted Johnson in 
writing the speech he delivered at the United Nations, November 1958, at the request of 
President Eisenhower, on the peaceful uses of outer space. In 1959, Galloway was on 
loan from the CRS as Appointed Special Consultant to the Senate Committee on 
Aeronautical and Space Sciences (1959-1975). During that time she wrote and edited a 
number of Senate documents on international organization and cooperation in outer 
space, including space law. Beginning in 1958, she was a member on the US Board of 
Directors of the International Institute of Space Law for the International Astronautical 
Federation. She served on the American Rocket Society Space Law and Sociology 
Committee from 1959 to 1963. Her career continued well into the 1980s with work in the 
National Academies of Sciences and Engineering, the State Department, George 
Washington Law School, the International Astronomical Federation, and the Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.  
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 On 25 July, representative McCormack passed a unanimous house bill in favor of 
preserving the use of outer space for research, development, and exploration. “We want 
to dedicate the use of outer space to peace and cooperate with the world in this regard.”330 
Significantly, the bill went on to note that if the Soviet Union were to develop space 
capabilities “alone,” that the US and free world would face the “terrible” possibility of an 
“ultimatum for surrender.” The formation of NASA stood at a complex intersection of 
state-level posturing, scientific practice, and federal accountability to taxpayers and 
voters. 
Internationalism 
 Questions of sustainability were not only couched in terms of resource allocation, 
but policies conducive to long-term international coordination. In particular, researchers 
worried about maintaining access to partner nations’ data, human resources, hardware, 
and facilities in a diplomatically palatable fashion. Here the principles of “nonmilitary” 
or “basic” research provided the key to international exchange. Like the IGY, NASA 
functioned at once as a place within the US bureaucracy to conduct sounding rocket and 
satellite R&D as well as a nexus of experts tasked with maintaining US leadership in 
space and the upper atmosphere.  
 Paradoxically, the climate of crisis following Sputnik I’s launch at once 
threatened the orderly and scientifically-relevant attributes of the IGY satellite program 
even as it galvanized federal opinion that something must be done to ensure US 
leadership in space. Between the fall of 1957 and summer 1958, the notion of a National 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
330 On 16 July MCormack gets this passed unanimously in the House. “Just as surely as 
we fail to make a real effort to develop these new scientific means across a broad front of 
research, development, and exploration, a terrible disaster will await us. We want to 
dedicate the use of outer space to peace and cooperate with the world in this regard.”  
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Space Establishment remained quite up in the air—perhaps under DOD leadership, 
perhaps under civilian leadership. Meantime, policymakers considered a range of “space 
stunts” and crash programs that may or may not salvage US prestige abroad. Federal 
reorganization in response to Sputnik and the Vanguard TV-3 launch failure certainly 
begged an increase of financial support and acceleration of launch schedules, but a small 
minority of congressional witnesses insisted on institutionalizing IGY doctrines of 
transparency and inclusivity in a permanent space agency as well. These doctrines of 
transparency were evident in the earliest days of IGY planning. As early as 1956, the 
CSAGI (English translation: Special Committee on the Geophysical Year) put forth a 
Proposal for Data Interchange in the IGY Rocket and Satellite Programs. “Interchange” 
was a more accurate term than “exchange,” given the fact that there was no expectation 
of one-to-one exchanges of like data for like data from country to country. Rather, each 
country would contribute its own heterogeneous mix of information, at times concerning 
its own hardware, at times in observing other nation’s instruments. 
 Within the proposal, CSAGI members offered important precedents for data 
exchange, simply stating that the following would be published in the forthcoming 
CSAGI “Rocket and Satellite Manual” and that supplements would be made available as 
new information arrived. Its precedents of data exchange included the following:331 
 Sounding Rocketry Data: This included the types of rockets launched, 
descriptions, altitude ranges, schedules of firings, objectives for on board 
instrumentation, and accuracy of experiment. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331 “Draft of preliminary proposal for data interchange in the IGY Rocket and Satellite 
Programs” Lloyd V. Berkner, Reporter for Rockets and Satellites Dec 19, 1956.. File 
USNC Member File, Newell H. E., Technical Panel on Earth Satellites Program 
Correspondence, NAS. 
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 Experimental Data: The draft requested that, “Within a few weeks after each 
rocket firing…a report will be submitted to the World Centers for international 
distribution as appropriate.” These would include descriptions of the firings, objectives, 
flight information, rocket information, pyrotechnics and weights, range instrumentation 
facilities including radio frequencies, and radar and beacon telemetering. Final 
conclusions of IGY rocket experiments were to be published in the open literature. These 
included measurements of atmospheric structure, solar radiation, ionospheric ionization, 
earth’s magnetism, aurorae, cosmic rays, etc. They were to be published “as soon as 
possible” “in journals of general availability and of recognized standing” with reprints 
deposited in World Data Centers. 
 Data for Radio and Optical Satellite Tracking Stations: Information “needed by 
the nations participating in the IGY in connection with the establishment and operation of 
ground stations,” included the visibility of satellites, observational methods, operational 
information for radio tracking systems, on-board transmitter characteristics, methods of 
data encoding and storage, feasibility of reception of telemetered signals by general 
observers, location of stations, and “recommendations by satellite-launching nations as to 
desirable sites for establishment of such stations by other countries.” 
 Launching Information: CSAGI requested launching information that its 
representatives deemed “necessary if IGY participants throughout the world are to 
observe successfully the IGY satellites.” This information included launch site, orbit 
inclination, approximate period of launchings, radio, telegraph, and press announcements 
within one hour after launch as to success and repeated as necessary. 
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 Short-Range Prediction Data: This included satellite altitude, latitude of orbital 
subpoint, longitude of orbit subpoint, values for each given in for time intervals of one 
minute with a true accuracy of one second (using kilometers and to 0.1 degrees), 
additionally, “all current values of orbital elements will be made available regularly upon 
request and in accordance with individual arrangements.” 
 Precision Observations of Satellite Orbits: This orbit data derived from tracking 
observations should be provided with two-directional angles, time, and place of 
observation must be published within five months in a standard periodical of astronomy 
having wide international circulation. Ephemerides were to be expressed in 10 meters in 
space and 10^-3 seconds in time. Raw data—be it film records, optical observations, or 
radio observations were not deemed suitable for exchange, but would “be made available 
for consultation at the World Data Centers.”  
 Observational Data on Satellite-Borne Experiments: Within eight months of 
launch, data from satellite experiments were to be submitted to World Data Centers in 
reduced, corrected, and calibrated form. In the event that solar batteries or other improved 
power sources permitted the operation of experiments for longer than a two or three week 
period, bi-monthly increments of fully reduced data were requested for the World Data 
Centers with no more than an eight month delay.”332 
 The sources and time at hand do not allow for an analysis of what elements of this 
proposal may have been disputed, creatively distorted, or amended. However this does 
provide a glimpse at the aims of the IGY leadership. Tucked within these data 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
332 “Draft of preliminary proposal for data interchange in the IGY Rocket and Satellite 
Programs” Lloyd V. Berkner, Reporter for Rockets and Satellites. File USNC Member 
File, Newell H. E. Technical Panel on Earth Satellites Program Correspondence, NAS.  
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interchange agreements were both promises to international partners and requests of 
them, setting norms for standardizing data, its circulation, but also setting a carefully-
regulated example of national transparency with dual use technologies. As with the 
UARRP’s decision to treat scientific data about rockets as unclassified information, these 
data, too were necessary for divining natural processes, but they also provided useful 
glimpses into the engineering of dual use hardware from missiles, to satellite tracking, to 
radio direction-finding, and radar’s function within the natural (and manmade) 
electromagnetic environment. If followed, even in part, these data interchanges would 
achieve a number of things: it would advance scientific understanding of the earth’s 
geophysical properties, it would expose scientific researchers and their policymakers to 
precedents of data exchange, it would lessen information asymmetries among 
contributing nations, and provide a useful reference for the capabilities, interests, and 
perhaps even aims of partner nations’ scientific programs. The Interchange Proposal 
functioned as an invitation to all these things.  
 
 In April 1958, Chairman of the IGY Joseph Kaplan, was called to testify before 
Congress on the details of NASA’s formation. When asked his outlook on the exchange 
of scientific information with international partners, he communicated great enthusiasm. 
Having served as the geophysics chairman on the Science Advisory Board and having 
worked many years with the Air Force, Kaplan reported that the UARRP had “released 
all the [UARRP] information.” Indeed, Kaplan was certain that the US was the only 
nation “that had used rockets for upper atmospheric soundings and published all the 
information freely.” The result? Leading theoretical physicists in England along with 
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“dozens of men, men from our allies and men on the other side of the Iron Curtain,” 
analyzed the data. Because the UK researchers tended to be stronger in theory than their 
US counterparts, Kaplan and his colleagues only stood to benefit. The program had been 
improved and sounding rocket researchers in the Antarctic and Fort Churchill, Canada 
were progressing “marvelously.”333 
 James van Allen (who had moved from APL to Iowa State University) used the 
success of the IGY to remind policymakers of the practical benefits of maintaining 
independent military and civilian programs. Referring to the Minitrack stations 
monitoring Vanguard, Explorer, and Sputnik satellite orbits he observed: 
…at the present time we have IGY satellite observing stations distributed over the 
world in at least twenty countries. Both practically and diplomatically, this is a 
very fine undertaking, but it is not at all clear how such arrangements can be 
managed if space is a military undertaking. I think it is rather difficult to imagine, 
let us say, the United States Air Force and the Soviet Air Force collaborating on 
any undertaking…334 
 
Thus the political palatability of IGY collaboration—as a temporary and near-global 
agglomeration of state resources for the pursuit of geophysical science—was a critical 
part of the initial conceptualization of NASA and its mandate, opening geographies and 
pocketbooks.335  
 In April 1958, Eisenhower officially proposed his general notion of a civilian 
space agency to Congress, centered not within the Atomic Energy Commission, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333Aeronautics and Space Exploration Hearings of the Select Committee on Astronautics 
and Space Exploration 95th Congress, HR 11881, April 15 – May 12, 1958 (Government 
Printing Office, 1958). April testimony, 1132. Hereafter HR 11881. 
334 Van Allen was at Hearings before the Select Committee on Astronautics and Space 
Exploration, 85th Congress HR 11881 (April and May 1958) Cited in Frutkin, 29, 79. 
335 The IGY was not entirely “non-military,” in the sense that plenty of tactical value 
could be derived from IGY research. The value of IGY research to the US (and other 
nations’) militaries is evident in the fact that the armed services often provided logistical 
and personnel support. 
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instead adding manpower and greater bureaucratic potency to the NACA. This ostensible 
redundancy between military and civil programs demanded a painful compromise for the 
fiscally conservative president. Eisenhower’s own experience at this juncture was shaped 
by two overlapping tensions: one with Congress over spending and the other with the 
Defense Department centered on wasteful duplication among the services, unnecessary 
interservice rivalry, and too much power being centered in the DOD.336  
Diverging Weather Satellite Communities:  
IGY, ARPA, and the National Space Agency 
 
[The new space agency] would have an important function in making it possible 
for us to get the basic data, viewing the atmosphere from outer space.337 
 
 US Weather Bureau researchers remained eager to make use of meteorological 
satellite data for fundamental research explaining atmospheric phenomena as well as 
applications such as weather prediction and possible weather modification. When he was 
called to testify before the House of Representatives in the spring of 1958, USWB Chief 
Reichelderfer communicated his Bureau’s stand on the matter: the USWB did not want to 
fund or design weather satellites per se. Reichelderfer used existing USWB practice to 
illustrate: “...it would be absurd for the USWB to have ships in the ocean to gather to 
gather weather reports [data]. Instead, we gather the reports from ships that are there for 
another purpose.”338 Reichelderfer’s reference to the Voluntary Observing System—with 
roots extending to the 1850s—provides important insight into the USWB’s removed 
stake in future of US weather satellites. Rarely had the USWB designed its own 
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337 HR 11881, 916. 
338 Ibid, 916. 
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instruments, instead, it focused on acquiring data and making the most of it—
standardizing practice, expanding its pool. 
 Except in rare circumstances such as wartime interruptions, the fungibility of 
weather data remained a given, particularly among governmental organizations. Weather 
data was a commodity shared among the US armed services and the USWB, among 
commercial ships at sea, and routinely contributed to international circulation (the WMO 
in particular) where it could reach potential and real adversaries. Perhaps more important, 
USWB predictions derived from such weather data were viewed as a distinctly public 
commodity: at once available to, and affecting, the US as a whole. Earlier in his 
testimony, Reichelderfer had elaborated on the extent of communities benefiting from 
USWB predictions. His testimony included US regions, industrial sectors, agricultural 
pursuits, air and ground transport. The aging meteorologist recalled that roughly a decade 
prior the Bureau had undertaken a study to determine the value of forecasts and storm 
warnings to the public and national economy. “However,” Reichelderfer confessed, “the 
figures that were presented to us by business and agricultural interests were so high that 
we never have been quite willing to come out with the values for fear that someone might 
think we were exaggerating. They were well in excess of a billion dollars a year.”339 
Many of these users of USWB predictions— airports, industries, armed services and the 
like—reciprocated with local weather observations. 
 When the WB Chief demurred on the possibility of the WB launching its own 
satellites, he may have done so presuming that the WB and the space-agency-to-be would 
offer reciprocal services to one another. Reichelderfer opted not to mention the long 
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history of collaboration between the US armed services and the USWB, sharing data and 
storm observations. Like plans for Vanguards and Explorers, satellites designed and 
operated for the IGY, Reichelderfer postulated that future satellites would be launched 
“for general purposes,” serving a variety of research and operational communities. As in 
the past, “what we want again” he said, “is to get a ride to get the weather reports we 
need without becoming a space agency ourselves.”340 The WB anticipated the right to 
design and/or influence the design of satellite payloads but a priori abdicated any rights 
to launch its own satellites. Speaking of what would become NASA, the WB Chief 
predicted, “The new Agency will have, I understand, the responsibility for the satellites 
where we would get our source of information.”341 Reichelderfer’s expectations mated 
with executive policy. 
 Indeed, it seemed as though the new space agency certainly ought to have 
responsibility for designing and launching US weather satellites. Eisenhower wrote to the 
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of NACA on 2 April 1958, directing that “the 
new Agency will be given responsibility for all programs except those peculiar to or 
primarily associated with military weapons systems or military operations.”342 The 
Eisenhower administration, then facing its second recession in five years and roughly 
nineteen months from Eisenhower’s famed farewell address warning against 
“unwarranted influence” of the military-industrial complex sought to avoid unnecessary 
duplication of effort between ARPA and the new Agency, but also to draw clear lines of 
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342 Emphasis original. John Logsdon (ed) Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in 
the History of the US Civil Space Program Volume I Organizing for Exploration , 644 
Memo for the President from Director of the BOB, May 13, 1958. 
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authority and jurisdiction. For a time, the Administration depended upon the 
(complicated) notions of “science” or programs with “no immediate relationship to 
established defense needs” to distinguish between ARPA and NASA mandates.  
By July 29, the legislative and executive branches had settled upon the National 
Aeronautics and Space Act in which Congress declared, “that it is the policy of the 
United States that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the 
benefit of all mankind.”343 NASA’s Administrator of International Affairs (whose 
background had been in the IGY), Arnold Frutkin would later describe this as “a bill to 
create a new civilian agency for the purpose of achieving national leadership in space, in 
a framework of peaceful purposes and international cooperation.” Building upon the old 
NACA, such activities would be directed by a civilian agency exercising control over 
aeronautical and space activities sponsored by the United States,” with the important 
exception of, “activities particular to or primarily associated with the development of 
weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the United States (including 
research and development)” which would fall under ARPA and the armed services. 
 US space policy would not be so much compartmentalized as it would be 
coordinated between a NASA and ARPA, two sides of the same coin. For some, such as 
Eisenhower, James Killian, and others in-the-know on Air Force reconnaissance satellite 
program, diplomatic posturing inherent to the “peaceful purposes” mandate of NASA 
provided a palatable public façade to balance (if not function as an outright front) for 
ARPA’s tactical reconnaissance, covert weather reconnaissance, communications 
satellite systems, and navigation satellites on the drawing board. But for Harry Wexler of 
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the Weather Bureau, William Stroud of the Signal Corps, and countless other IGY 
researchers, the institutionalization of IGY principles in NASA promised sustained 
funding for knowledge-driven research, a non-military institution for international 
collaboration, and freedom from the necessity of justifying all space R&D by its 
immediate contributions to the armed services.  
 Whereas meteorological satellites were perhaps the most obvious civilian space 
[read NASA] application, the Weather Bureau, the most logical user of civilian 
meteorological satellite data, denied having any interest in operating such a joint weather 
satellite program. ARPA plans for meteorological satellite systems continued apace. 
Whereas Bill Stroud and his team at the Army Signal Corps Research Lab had already 
developed meteorological satellite instruments for the Vanguard satellite program, they 
had also begun development work for the Army’s follow-on operational satellite system, 
eventually named TIROS. Expecting NASA to bear the expense of satellite development 
and launch, the WB preferred to consolidate its extremely meager resources in data 
handling, weather prediction, and basic research.  
 At this point, all that was settled was that NASA would be a non-military 
institution, that it would be a center of space science research, and that it would subsume 
the old NACA’s facilities and manpower. Significantly, the Space Act included imprecise 
language indicating that the NASA would only perform basic research. The armed 
services were left to presume that meteorological satellites were instruments for tactical 
support and therefore would remain in the DOD. Lyndon Johnson later observed that the 
Space Act “whizzed through the Pentagon on a scooter” before Easter holiday.344  
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 What remained uncertain? The House Representatives in particular wanted NASA 
to have enough bureaucratic clout to stand up to DOS and armed services, this would 
have to be settled in the drafting and re-drafting of the Space Act between April and July. 
The next chapter will address the ambiguities of NASA and how between April and 
October, NACA officials set policy precedents that were counter to the wishes of the 




















‘The Weather Bureau is About to Enter the Space Age’ 




…the longer range research and early development programs on missiles, 
satellites, and the exploration of space should be directed by an agency with funds 
to insure the best utilization of research and early development facilities in 
universities, in research organizations, in industry, and in the Department of 
Defense. 
Fred Whipple, Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory Director345 
 
 
 When the White House and Congress wrote legislation for a National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration, they were in many regards trying to leap onto a fast-moving 
ill-defined object. Of Congress, the White House, the public, and even representatives of 
the Defense Department, very few individuals voiced a desire for a national space 
program centered entirely under the Defense Department. In the crisis atmosphere 
following Sputnik I, the creation of an organization under the DOD was logical, but early 
on notions of a non-military counterpart were under serious consideration. With this in 
mind, ARPA, giving it 12 months to get the entire US space program off the ground (as it 
were) and implicitly, time for a national civilian space program to be legislated.346  
 However space science expertise was embedded almost entirely in the military 
and its contractors in industry and academia. For decades, the Army, Navy, and Air Force 
had been investing resources into manpower and technologies for operation in the upper 
atmosphere and space. When in house capabilities were insufficient, they partnered with 
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responsibilities in the field of basic and applied research and development which pertain 
to weapons systems and military requirements…,”13. 
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industries, universities, or the NACA. Through the UARRP-RSRP, researchers in armed 
service R&D organizations had voluntarily coordinated R&D with universities, industry, 
international partners, and kept institutions such as the Weather Bureau appraised of their 
activities. Representatives of the Weather Bureau and National Academies of Science 
also viewed themselves as possible assets and advisors to a national space agency (be it 
military or civilian), but at the same time hoped to shape space policy to better meet 
public needs.  
 As a national space establishment, NASA was intended to coordinate all these 
interests with the priorities of the White House and Congress. However NASA was not 
formally defined until the Space Act was approved in late July 1958 and NASA did not 
become an actual institution until 1 October 1958. Between April and October, NACA 
officials attempted to represent NASA interest, but did so compromising civil space 
policy in the eyes of the USWB, Bureau of Budget, and White House. 
 Thus, Weather satellites were situated at a complex intersection in bureaucracy: 
NACA/NASA officials viewed themselves as having been tasked with R&D for space 
systems, but not day-to-day operation of operating systems (though they could, in their 
opinion, operate experimental systems). The USWB did not have the mandate to perform 
space R&D nor to operate meteorological satellites. At the same time, millions of dollars 
had already been allocated to Army and Air Force meteorological satellite projects 
underway.  
 For a time, NACA officials forfeited any interest in operating the national weather 
satellite system on the presumption that the armed services would share data with the 
USWB. USWB officials, having no satellite system and having been denied mandate 
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over ARPA meteorological satellite data, perceived this as yet another encroachment of 
the military into their jurisdiction.  
 Weather satellite systems were so big, expensive, complicated and so politicized 
that only after the USWB had secured its own system could they begin setting their own 
policies for international circulation of US weather satellite data. Here again, Francis 
Reichelderfer invoked his perception of the Weather Bureau’s authority over US basic 
atmospheric research. 
A Promising Start? 
 When Congress edited Eisenhower’s 2 April 1958 draft of the Space Act, they 
amended it to give NASA more power within the federal bureaucracy. In particular, 
analyst Eilene Galloway prompted Senator Symington to make it an administration and 
not an agency. In their perspective, the national space establishment lacked sufficient 
bureaucratic clout to carry out its mission. To a few key individuals in Congress, 
including Senators Russell, Symington, and Johnson, NASA was intended to wield a 
strong coordinating power. While the DOD figured prominently in this concern, in order 
to bring the US into a position of international leadership in space, NASA needed clout 
vis a vis the State Department, Commerce Department, PSAC, the Atomic Energy 
Commission, US Information Agency, the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, 
Federal Aviation Administration, National Academies of Sciences, Department of 
Treasury, ARPA, and all the armed services were just a few of the bodies with which 
NASA needed to coordinate policy.347 Galloway years later recalled, “creating NASA as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
347 “I knew that NASA could not have a program of international cooperation if 
everything had to come to the Senate” p 34 Logsdon, Legislative Origins, 34. 
http://www.nasa.gov/50th/50th_magazine/gallowayEsaay.html 
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an administration was the best solution to the problem of coordinating under centralized 
guidance the programs of the new space institution and other executive agencies already 
engaged in space-related activities.”348 However NASA administrators would not be 
eager to take on this coordinating power. 
 Between 13 and 15 May 1958, Congress’ Special Committee on Space and 
Astronautics held a session regarding a bill to provide support for research into problems 
of flight within and without the earth’s atmosphere.349 When discussing whether or not 
the new space establishment would perform research and/or the operation of satellite 
systems, NACA’s Hugh Dryden offered meteorological satellites as a specific example, 
saying that the NASA would indeed operate such vehicles for the Weather Bureau so the 
US, “would not have 8 or 10 Government agencies independently putting up 
satellites.”350 USWB officials were quite pleased with this division of labor and took this 
as an opportunity to underscore to Congress their enthusiasm for the utility of weather 
satellites. Wexler spoke at length about the Suomi IGY radiation budget experiment that 
would be used to measure the Earth’s reflected and outgoing radiation to space. Looking 
to an ambitious future, Wexler stated that the IGY was “merely the beginning.” “We 
think that by the development of improved instruments, we can measure other properties 
of the atmosphere, such as temperature, winds, total amount of water in the atmospheric 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348 Ibid. 
349 National Aeronautics and Space Act Hearings Before the Special Committee on Space 
and Astronautics US Senate 85th Congress, Session on S. 3609, A Bill to Provide for 
Resarch into Problems of Flight Within and Outside the Earth’s Atmosphere, and for 
other Purposes. May 13-15, 1958, 263. Hereafter S. 3609. 
350 Ibid. 
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columns [meaning at different altitudes]…and other important properties that cannot be 
undertaken during the present short International Geophysical Year.”351 
 For these researchers, NASA would function as a continuation of the IGY—as a 
source of sustainable funds for scientific research, as an organization to coordinate 
national scientific and technological communities, and as a US representative in 
international collaboration. Senator Lyndon Johnson attached great significance to 
NASA’s mandate to collaborate with international partners. When questioning NACA’s 
Hugh Dryden about the executive branch’s re-drafting of the Space Act, Johnson asked 
Dryden why international collaboration was not included in the White House’s original 
bill. He did this either to assure that NASA’s mandate for international collaboration 
would remain in the Act, and/or he did this as a means of political posturing to 
underscore his interest in NASA’s role as a leader of international space activities.352 To 
the State Department and White House, it was unnecessary for the Space Act to explicitly 
lay out NASA’s right to collaborate with international partners. Johnson asked Dryden to 
clarify why it might be in NASA’s best interest to keep international collaboration 
explicit in the Act. Dryden responded that doing so would be: “in order to emphasize the 
desire in setting up the new Agency to work for peaceful purposes and to join with others 
in the world in this direction, it is better to have something specific in the bill.”353 
Guyford Stever, Associate Dean of Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology and Chair of the NACA Special Committee on Space Technology 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 Emphasis added, S. 3609, 370. 
352 Ibid, 254. 
353 Ibid. 
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summarized the policy in eloquent candor: the first objective was, “to prove to the world 
that we are interested in and will lead in the nonmilitary uses of space”354 
 Stever’s and Dryden’s interpretation of the draft Space Act sets up a frustrating 
paradox in the evolution of weather satellite policy. In spite of Dryden’s 13 May 
testimony stating that NASA would operate meteorological satellites for the USWB, that 
very same week the Bureau of Budget contacted Eisenhower indicating that NACA had 
signed away a number of projects intended for NASA to the DOD’s Advanced Research 
Projects Agency.355 While weather satellites are not mentioned specifically in the memo, 
NASA and USWB documents do indicate that NACA officials did alter course from the 
May 13 testimony. Either NACA officials expected the US government to pay for the 
development of two independent satellite systems (one designed entirely by NASA for 
the USWB and one by ARPA for the armed services) or NASA had signed away the 
national military-civilian weather satellite system by endorsing ARPA’s plans for its own 
post-IGY satellites.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
354 Ibid, 273.  
355 Exploring the Unknown Vol. I, 644. 15 May, the Director of the Bureau of Budget was 
writing Eisenhower, informing him that the NACA team had reached an agreement in 
which ARPA contrary to White House wishes. NACA, feeling obligated to accept an 
agreement “on the best terms acceptable to Defense” had signed away human spaceflight 
and the million pound thrust rocket engine. In April 2 letters coinciding with his 
submission of the Space Act, Eisenhower had written to the Defense Secretary and 
NACA Chairman that, “the new Agency will be given responsibility for all programs 
except those peculiar to or primarily associated with military weapons systems or military 
operations.” Instead, months before NASA had even come into being, the Chairman of 
NACA had signed away all interest in space programs. The Bureau of Budget and White 
House viewed these projects “lacking an immediate military application,” therefore 
belonging in NASA.  
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 Obtuse language in the NASA Space Act—language that in part facilitated its 
“whizzing through the Pentagon” before Easter recess—led eventually to 
misunderstandings centered around two unclear notions. One was defining precisely what 
the technologies were to remain in the military. Weapons systems were easily identified, 
but to what degree did weather satellites constitute systems “peculiar to or primarily 
associated with military weapons systems or military operations”? Second was the 
question of whether or not NASA was supposed to “operate” systems in space or 
whether, like NACA, they were primarily an R&D organization developing technologies 
for (other) users.356 From NASA’s Glennan Administration until the Space Shuttle, 
NASA has interpreted this conservatively, developing systems and providing technical 
support when needed, but not operating operational systems.357 Perhaps interested in 
maximizing the use of resources at hand (i.e. already in development by the armed 
services), the NACA-NASA transitional officials simply worked in support of ARPA. 
Given the fact that meteorological satellites certainly were of direct military application 
and that the DOD had such a significant lead in development, it was reasonable to NACA 
officials to continue supporting ARPA in meteorological satellite R&D. If NACA was 
planning to develop meteorological satellites for the USWB down the line, they clearly 
gave no such indication to the USWB.  
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Logsdon, 33. 
357 A special amendment was made to the space act so that NASA could design and 
operate the Shuttle. 
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ARPA’s Meteorological Satellite Plans (Minus the USWB) 
 The summer of 1958 brought disappointments and frustration for the Weather 
Bureau. USWB officials wondered the degree to which satellite studies and atmospheric 
research were being conducted by the DOD and concealed by classification restrictions. 
In spite of having attended recent ARPA meetings, Wexler remained uninformed, but for 
a “vague rumor” that research was being performed at the Air Force Cambridge Research 
Center-Geophysics Research Division and also the Signal Corps Research Lab.358 These 
rumors were accurate.  
 By 6 June, Reichelderfer, having apparently received no word from NACA-
NASA on meteorological satellite coordination, completely changed tack, proposing to 
the Commerce Department that they fund “substantial budget in satellite meteorology.” 
With this money, he intended for the USWB to begin its own weather satellite program, 
circumventing ARPA, supporting Suomi’s group at the University of Wisconsin, 
developing new meteorological satellite instruments, and instituting a USWB satellite 
data analysis unit under Sig Fritz, (who would indeed run the USWB Meteorological 
Satellite Section when NASA began funding it later in the year). However, the Bureau of 
Budget refused to fund satellites under the USWB. Wexler was uncertain if the program 
would even go to NASA upon its formation, but was certain the delay would “set us back 
quite a bit in our scientific space program.”359 The longer it took for the new space 
agency to officially come together, complete with the bureaucratic power intended by 
Congress, the more time ARPA spent at the helm of US meteorological satellite 
development. Given the fact that NASA had not yet formally formed, nor had an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358 Wexler to Kellogg, June 6, 1958, General Correspondence 1958, Wexler Papers. 
359 Ibid. 
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administrator been selected, NACA representatives (described frequently as captives of 
the military industrial complex) represented NASA interests, essentially rubber-stamping 
ARPA plans for space programs.360  
 For their part, the armed services and their labs took a keen interest in the success 
of weather instruments on Vanguard and Explorer satellites and were making plans for 
follow-on projects for weather reconnaissance. The Army Signal Corps would run 
systems integration for the RCA photocell experiment along with command and data 
acquisition for the Vanguard II weather instruments. Von Braun’s team at Army Ballistic 
Missile Agency were retrofitting the Suomi heat budget experiment to mate with the 
Explorer VI satellite bus. At this time, the NRL remained “very much interested in 
weather reconnaissance” and even considered developing a branch of the lab in that 
field.361 Meantime, the Air Force Cambridge Research Center/Geophysics Research 
Division began exploring methods for processing, analyzing, and applying satellite data 
to tactical use. They did this in-house but also contracted with Florida State University, 
the Imperial College of Science and Technology in London, England, and the Blue Hill 
Observatory at Harvard University. Beginning in the spring of 1958, results from these 
earlier studies provided quantitative analysis of camera resolution required for assorted 
types of cloud information and radio bandwidth for telemetering data back to ground 
stations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
360 Keith Glennan was sworn in as NASA administrator 19 August 1958. NACA 
officially became NASA on 1 October.  
361 Rocket Sonde Branch Interest in Space Research Program Activities. NRL Lists 
weather satellites as number five of seven tasks. Folder Ad Hoc Committee on Rocket, 
Satellite, and Space Research, 1958, Box 2, Folder 3, Smithsonian. 
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 On the 24 June 1958, NACA hosted a “scientific satellite payloads” meeting 
concerning the “future status of meteorological payloads.” Present were a bevy of 
representatives from armed services who would be dependent on these systems for 
operations as well as research. The Air Force Cambridge Research Lab, Jet Propulsion 
Lab, Ballistics Missile Division, the Naval Research Laboratory, Office of Naval 
Research, Army Ballistic Missile Agency, Naval Weather Research Facility, Army 
Signal Corps Research Lab, Office of the Chief Signal Officer (Navy), Office of Chief of 
R&D (Army), Office of the Assistant of the Secretary of Defense, Wright Air 
Development Center (USAF) were present; NACA, the USWB, and the University of 
Wisconsin were the only non-military organizations in attendance. No indication was 
given whether the National Academies of Sciences was invited or consulted in any 
capacity, which would have been logical given their management of the IGY weather 
satellites and their planned influence of the Space Science Board as an advisor to 
NASA.362 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362 See Robert Smith, Naugle, and Newell for details on NASA’s relationship with the 
NAS and Space Science Board. The Glennan diary, The Birth of NASA, offers a 
provocative encapsulation of the NASA-NAS relationship: “At noon, the members of the 
space science panel of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee came in for lunch. 
They had sent us a long memorandum of complaint about the manner in which we were 
dealing with the scientific community, so called. Homer Newell did a fine job of 
answering, very patiently, each of their complaints. Lloyd Berkner was his usual 
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 Resolving that a “basic scientific understanding about our world” was necessary, 
the NACA meeting participants discussed continuities between the IGY Suomi and 
Stroud experiments and follow-on experiments being funded by the armed services. 
Although the panel was stacked with researchers supported by DOD funds, they held 
similar priorities to the Weather Bureau, but in a different order: Stroud’s television cloud 
cover experiments came first and Suomi’s earth radiation balance second. Third, they 
desired Stroud’s photocell experiment operating in the visual IR range and fourth an 
experimental TV system sensitive to IR.363 
 Given the fact that the Army TV-IR satellite (still not formally named TIROS) 
was based on well-developed plans for a reconnaissance satellite as well as simpler in 
design than the Air Force’s plans, it was deemed the closest to operational.364 Meeting 
participants discussed the challenges of inserting this new satellite system into pre-
existing networks of IGY satellite system hardware as well as institutional networks 
already trading weather data. The space science community (in particular, NASA’s 
Vanguard team and Stroud’s Signal Corps team) would oversee modification of the 
satellite to accommodate a Minitrack instrument. This meant bandwidth would permit a 
maximum resolution of 1200 x 1200 mile picture. The armed services, which for years 
had shared meteorological observations with the US Weather Bureau and allies abroad, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
government.” May 5, 1960, The Birth of NASA: The Diary of T Keith Gennan 
(Washington, D.C.: NASA SP-4105). 
363 Attendees of June 20th meeting at NACA Headquarters re scientific satellite payloads, 
Project TIROS Record Number 6467, NHRC.  
364 In April of 1958 ARPA cancelled the ABMA-RCA reconnaissance satellite (citing it 
as an unnecessary duplication with the Air Force’s SAMOS satellite) and had it 
transferred to the Army Signal Corps Lab to be developed as a meteorological satellite 
system.  
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made the astute observation that meteorological observations could be “telemetered 
directly to foreign stations while overhead with obvious propaganda advantages.”365 
 At the June 1958 NACA meeting, the Air Force presented the most elaborate 
proposal for an integrated meteorological system, based on the 117L (117L was the 
predecessor to the Discoverer scientific satellite, SAMOS reconnaissance satellite, and 
MIDAS Missile Detection Alarm System). Weighing three thousand pounds, NACA’s 
minutes reported that it “would measure everything possible in the way of meteorological 
information” and would cost $88.8 M.366 This system, the 117-W, would by far exceed 
the receiving capabilities of the Minitrack stations, necessitating part time operation of 
satellite remote sensing equipment. While the Army volunteered the observation that 
sharing data would benefit the US’s public image, meeting notes do not indicate to what 
degree the Air Force intended to share their observations with the USWB or international 
partners. 
 The armed services, eager for immediate operational coverage of cloud cover 
patterns and data regarding the earth’s heat budget determined that the proper course of 
action would be to launch the Army’s lighter simpler experiments as soon as practicable 
while continuing R&D on the Air Force’s more complex system. Thus, they favored 
foremost the RCA TV (capable of 3.5 mile resolution), more versions of Suomi’s Earth 
Radiation Budget, the Stroud experiment with photocells in the visible IR range, and a 
TV system sensitive to various IR wavelengths. These experiments would help better 
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Project TIROS Record Number 6467, NHRC. 
366 Types of observations included cloud cover, cloud definition, cloud layers, and 
thickness, moisture content, ozone content, wind direction and velocity, albedo, spectra 
of incoming radiation, reflection and absorption of this radiation by earth and various 
cloud and atmospheric layers, overall heat balance, and lightning location. 
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define the specifications for the Air Force’s 117-W equipment as well as deliver “useful 
information soon!”367  
USWB Response to ARPA’s Control of Meteorological Satellites 
 Harry Wexler used his participation in the National Academy of Sciences to try to 
influence what meteorological instruments would be used in IGY follow-on satellites. 
Because expertise necessary to plan and operate IGY satellites had amassed in NAS IGY 
committees (such as the Technical Panel on Earth Satellites and the Meteorological 
Committee on which Riechelderfer served), both Congress and the White House desired 
that the NAS would continue to influence national space policy in the years following the 
IGY. Thus, in June of 1958 Lloyd Berkner, president of the International Council of 
Scientific Unions met with Hugh Odishaw, executive director of the new NAS Space 
Science Board, Herbert York, Chief Scientist at ARPA, and Alan Waterman of the NSF. 
The group determined that the NAS would continue to coordinate the work among 
ARPA, NASA, and NSF (an act later perceived by some NASA officials as overstepping 
NASA’s mission to coordinate with the DOD through ARPA).368 In July 1958, RAND 
meteorologist William Kellogg submitted to Wexler a proposal for an integrated military 
and civilian meteorological satellite to submit to the NAS Space Science Board. While 
Kellogg, too, prioritized the cloud coverage experiments first, he listed the Suomi 
experiment second. Third, the NAS desired solar UV and x-ray measurements and 
finally, a continuation of lightweight sounding rocket experiments. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
367 Emphasis original, Attendees of June 20th meeting at NACA Headquarters re scientific 
satellite payloads, Project TIROS Record Number 6467, NHRC. 
368 Naugle 29-33. See also Robert Smith. 
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 To backtrack and summarize, because these are very important points: in April, 
the USWB Chief testified before Congress that he viewed it as outside the USWB’s 
jurisdiction to pursue its own weather satellite program. Instead the USWB wanted data 
and, if possible, to provide input on the nature of instruments orbited on NASA 
satellites—all this “without becoming a space agency ourselves.”369 Convinced that the 
NACA was following and not coordinating ARPA interests, in the summer of 1958, 
Reichelderfer lobbied the Department of Commerce to pursue a weather satellite program 
of its own (the USWB was under the DOC), but was denied this by the Bureau of Budget 
presumably because the Space Act had not yet been passed and the BOB and Congress 
took it as a granted that NASA would build and operate meteorological satellites. 
Reicheldefer’s willingness to pursue his own satellite system functions as an indication 
that the USWB was serious about pursuing weather satellites and willing to do so with or 
without the backing of NASA—but the Executive Branch blocked the effort, preferring 
that NASA coordinate the effort. At this time NACA-NASA officials entertained no 
intention of developing meteorological satellites, instead, NACA was providing support 
for future ARPA meteorological satellite R&D and NACA officials initially supported 
ARPA plans to give data handling responsibilities to the Air Force.370  
 
 Thus, the USWB began working with the National Academies of Sciences to 
determine parameters for a weather satellite system. Wexler was confident that between 
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the NAS, the incoming NASA civil servants, and the explicit mandate for a civilian space 
agency, the USWB would at last be able to exercise some degree of authority over 
meteorological satellite planning and operations. Documents at hand do not give a clear 
indication to what degree the USWB was pushed from the ARPA-NACA committee and 
to what degree they defected by choice. After having attended several months of 
meetings with ARPA regarding the ARPA meteorological satellites, NACA’s Edgar 
Cortright reported that the USWB and various universities “have been generally absent” 
after the first meeting.371 Perhaps the USWB presumed that there would be an 
independent non-ARPA meteorological satellite program after the formation of NASA; 
perhaps ARPA had made it clear that USWB contributions were not needed and that 
other obligations took precedent over the USWB’s operational interests. In spite of the 
USWB’s nonparticipation in the NACA-ARPA meetings, NACA’s Cortright insisted that 
he wanted the USWB to play a major role in the ARPA satellites. Tellingly, he also 
indicated NACA-NASA interest in “providing support for R&D on subsequent 
meteorological satellites and data handling and utilization.”372  
 As a result two sets of plans were made, one meteorological satellite program 
came together under ARPA - NACA/NASA auspices, and a second between the Weather 
Bureau - NAS planners in hopes of directing NASA operations once NASA was 
officially on line on 1 October. During this time, representatives of what would become 
NASA engaged in deliberations concerning the formation of a joint data 
reduction/processing facility with ARPA’s Roger Warner. Because the Army Signal 
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Corps was the furthest along in satellite analysis studies, the NACA-DOD partners were 
clearly leaning toward launching their system in 1959, and using the AF Weather 
Research Facility as either an independent military facility or the dominant institution 
handling satellite data in a joint agreement. This situation puzzled and frustrated WB 
officials. There was no institution whose experience with atmospheric data processing 
exceeded the volume of data, or number of collaborators managed by the USWB. The 
USWB was also the US representative in the World Meteorological Organization, and as 
such a world leader in helping determine WMO methods and standards of data 
dissemination. Multiple times in 1958 representatives from both NASA and Air Force 
Weather Research Facility visited the facility and commented with favor on their 
operations and equipment. Yet in spite of all this, USWB officials were deeply concerned 
that the NASA would select the AF Weather Research Facility as the lead center for all 
meteorological satellite data reduction.  
 Nearly all of these events transpired before Keith Glennan had so much as been 
asked to serve as the first NASA Administrator (on August 7) or even laid eyes on the 
Space Act.373 Glennan was sworn in on 19 August, which coincides with a definite 
increase in activity between NASA and the USWB. On 29 August 1958, Roger Warner 
ARPA Chair for Meteorological Satellites brought up the topic of data reduction to 
USWB Harry Wexler, pointing out that he recognized control over data reduction was a 
“thorny problem.” Wexler asserted his and the USWB authority, pointing out that as 
opposed to the satellite systems proper, data, “was one area where I felt the Weather 
Bureau would want to come in very strongly.” Warner cautioned Wexler that he would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
373 Glennan Birth of NASA, 7 Aug 1958. 
 203 
be disappointed with the ARPA-NACA decision on data reduction and informed him that 
a NACA representative would break the disappointing news to Wexler formally. When 
Warner informed Wexler that ARPA would remain willing to “cooperate with” Wexler in 
NASA-ARPA Committee work, Wexler, with evident pleasure, invoked his authority as 
an NAS Committee Chair, retorting, “as Chairman of the Space Board Meteorological 
Committee I have incorporated the ARPA Met Committee plus others and would as 
occasion demands take advantage of his, Warner’s, assistance as consultant.374” 
 That same day, USWB specialist in data analysis, Sig Fritz met with Edgar 
Cortright of NACA. Cortright, who became one of the USWB’s more reliable supporters, 
shared with Fritz “interesting papers” prepared by Air Force Cambridge Research 
Center’s William Widger, requesting money from ARPA to support (in Wexler’s words) 
“basic meteorological research based on satellite vehicles.”375 Sources do not indicate the 
distribution limits or classification level of the papers. Furthermore, it is hard to 
determine the degree to which the Weather Bureau officials were riled that fundamental 
research—facts of nature—were being withheld behind classification restrictions or the 
principal that the Air Force was directing basic research at all and hypothetically at the 
“expense” of USWB research capacity. 
 With papers in hand and Fritz in tow, Wexler later tracked down USWB Chief 
Reichelderfer insisting that the WB should “go into it whole hog,” and set up a hardware 
division as big as the instrument division in addition to reduction and analysis. Just a 
couple days later, 2 September 1958, ARPA briefed NACA-NASA representatives and 
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USWB researchers on their $5M plans for experimental satellites in 1959 and 1960. 
ARPA had reduced the run of satellites from nine to six, but Wexler did not receive a 
satisfactory explanation for the cut back. Of the $5M, $2.5M would be allocated to Army 
Ordnance Missile Command for an RCA contract on television instrumentation. Wexler 
also expressed distress that ARPA had asked NASA to perform data acquisition, 
processing, and a “reasonable” part of the analysis. 
 Wexler was greatly displeased. When the floor opened to discussion, he 
“reviewed the history of basic research in this country very briefly particularly the 
movement since the end of World War II for the military because of their greater 
financial capability to underwrite most of the basic meteorological research despite lack 
of Congressional mandate.”376 The USWB on the other hand had the federal mandate to 
perform basic meteorological research, but suffered perpetually insufficient funds. Two 
days later, Reichelderfer sent a priority memo to Wexler “Immediate Steps to Implement 
an Adequate Weather Bureau Program in Rocket and Satellite Meteorology.” Reflecting 
on the role of the new Office of Rocket and Satellite Meteorology, Reichelderfer 
predicted that there would be many additional  
steps to be taken in cooperation with NASA, ARPA, and other interested agencies 
to make sure that the Weather Bureau and the national meteorological service 
have full participation in planning and developments for rocket and satellite 
meteorology, and that the Bureau has full access to all the data…377 
 
Reichelderfer charged the office to be constantly alive to the fast-changing field and 
energetic in exploiting meteorological contacts. This and only this would “make sure that 
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the public interest in these meteorological developments is well represented and 
safeguarded.” The Weather Bureau doubtless communicated their early September 
reorganization to NACA-NASA officials because on 10 September, Wexler wrote 
twenty-two colleagues, “The Weather Bureau is about to enter the Space Age.” 
Following a visit to the Suitland data center, NACA-NASA representatives designated 
the USWB as their meteorological agent responsible for meteorological instrumentation, 
data reduction, and analysis for satellites after the IGY satellites series was finished.  
 Shortly thereafter, the House Select Committee on Astronautics and Space 
Exploration reported the clarifying statement, “Although weather and communications, 
manned platforms, and the like have obvious military uses, their primary purpose should 
be declared civilian.” The report continued with the strikingly ominous reflection, “If we 
do not do this, we automatically commit the world of the future to the same stalemated 
life in armor which is lived by the world of today.”378 NASA policy was crystalizing at 
once in both the formal legislative sense and by precedents of evolving practice among 
the R&D communities.  
NASA Opens For Business 
 NASA and ARPA began renegotiating terms for meteorological satellite R&D 
nearly as soon as Glennan was in office. Given the fact that NASA would not acquire the 
Minitrack tracking system, the Vanguard computation center, nor the 157 Vanguard 
personnel from the Naval Research Laboratory until February 1959, they would not be 
able to formally undertake actual satellite R&D for a several months. Thus, Glennan 
wrote ARPA Director Roy Johnson on 23 October of 1958. The earth satellite, he 
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observed, “represents a new observational tool which promises to be of great value to the 
science and practice of meteorology.” Glennan then acknowledged the multiplicity of it’s 
values listing a number of benefits: protection of life and property in weather disasters, 
safeguarding transport, crop planning and protection, industrial planning of weather 
dependent products, prediction of heating and cooling loads, “eventual limited weather 
control,” and “good will in return for providing these services to less fortunate people.” 
Recognizing that the DOD also needed weather forecasting for aircraft and missile use 
over “silent” (meaning no weather data was available) landmasses, aerial refueling, jet 
stream determination, ship and plane routing, the planning of military campaigns, and 
military equipment design, Glennan suggested a new mutual effort to develop 
meteorological satellites.379 
 Glennan proposed that in support of ARPA’s weather satellite due to launch in the 
summer of 1959, NASA provide Minitrack support, data acquisition, and data processing 
(having already made the USWB their meteorological agent). Thereafter, NASA assured 
the DOD that it would pursue meteorological satellite development to meet the stated 
needs of all users and that ARPA participation was welcome in these programs. 
Significantly, Glennan pointed out that R&D on these satellites would be performed with 
the ultimate aim of transitioning an operational system to the USWB. While NASA 
would provide proper attention to securing satellite coverage of “silent” areas (such as 
oceans and countries such as China that refused to contribute to the WMO) and even 
modification of satellite instruments to meet military needs, Glennan maintained that 
dissemination of all weather satellite data would be under the USWB as was already the 
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case with non-satellite weather observations.380 A Joint military-civilian Meteorological 
Satellite Unit was formed, this time housed under the USWB and welcoming 
representatives of the military services. 
USWB-NAS Efforts to Expand Civilian Meteorological Constituency 
 With experimental (but not operational) meteorological satellites settled under 
NASA-USWB jurisdiction, the USWB could turn attention back to a concern pre-dating 
the IGY: achieving a more logical balance of resources and manpower between the 
Department of Defense and the USWB in the basic sciences. Wexler was open to the 
notion of a joint meteorological advisory committee to advise NASA and ARPA on 
satellite development, but cautioned against another instance of a joint committee 
“heavily overloaded with military representatives.”381 RAND’s William Kellogg 
suggested that the USWB look to universities for participation, contrasting meteorology 
with ionospheric physics, he observed that the universities were not nearly as involved in 
meteorology.  
 The USWB had a variety of reasons to generate more university participation in 
their field, beyond stacking the joint satellite committee in their favor. Indeed, since 
1956, the National Academies of Sciences Meteorological Committee had been 
speculating on how to attract more researchers to basic scientific meteorology producing 
more “basic meteorological knowledge.”382 This perceived shortage of qualified 
personnel was aggravated by Wexler and Reichelderfer’s concern that too many 
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resources and too much latitude had been invested in the Air Force’s growing Geophysics 
Research Division.  
 Presumably because NASA had selected the USWB to be their meteorological 
agent in data analysis, the USWB had redoubled efforts to better coordinate research 
efforts of the Air Force Geophysics Research Division and USWB meteorological 
satellite groups. It was as yet to no avail. Wexler explained three motivations for 
increased communication, if not a degree of consolidation, between the two. First, there 
was a shortage of personnel qualified to reduce and interpret satellite data and 
nephanalyses (images of cloud cover). Second, there were clear benefits to having the 
analysis group as near as possible to the National Meteorological Center serving the 
“main bulk of” the Weather Bureau, Air Force, and Navy analysis and prognostic 
needs.383 Finally, improved coordination would avoid wasteful allocation on 
“unrealistically devised” contracting funds. Likely, Wexler was making a reference to his 
disapproval of the fact that the Air Force preferred to contract out a large share of its 
R&D operations with university and industry partners. At the bottom of his memo listing 
these concerns, Reichelderfer typed his encouragement to Wexler to keep him apprised of 
any “reluctance” on Warner’s part regarding ARPA and USWB cooperation. In red ink it 
read: “WE MUST NOT let the military invade our field of responsibilities in this 
matter.”384 Reichelderfer phoned Roger Warner and ARPA director, Roy Johnson about 
the matter, planning a conference for the coming week. 
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 During this time, the USWB had been working in concert with the NAS and NSF 
to better coordinate the field of fundamental upper atmospheric research. Doing so would 
not only increase the amount of basic scientific research taking place under the auspices 
of the federal government, it would expand the USWB’s constituency and expand the 
base of non-military stakeholders performing basic research on the upper atmosphere. To 
backtrack a bit, since 1956, Reichelderfer had been participating in NAS meetings to 
discuss the state of the scientific community. With the launch of Sputnik and subsequent 
state of crisis and re-assessment, like so many other scientific disciplines, the 
meteorologists engaged in a study of “manpower,” research, and education. This report 
was shared with a group of meteorology department heads and after their endorsement, 
sent to the president of the NAS, the Director of the NSF, the Commerce Department 
(under which the USWB operated), factions of the DOD, and other relevant government 
bodies. The report concluded that “the total effort in basic atmospheric research was quite 
inadequate” and recommended first, that basic research in universities and kindred 
institutions be increased and second, that a National Institute for Atmospheric Research 
be established.385  
 The NAS committee called for the American Meteorological Society and for US 
universities to take more active parts in invigorating the discipline. The universities 
responded immediately with the formation of UCAR—the University Committee on 
Atmospheric Research in February 1958. UCAR’s first report echoed the NAS’s call for 
the establishment of a National Institute for Atmospheric Research. Their reasons 
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included the necessity of tackling fundamental atmospheric problems “on a scale 
commensurate with their global nature and importance,” the fact that the extent of this 
research problem exceeded the facilities and technologies available to any one university, 
that these global problems necessitated the best talent from a variety of disciplines to be 
applied “in a coordinated fashion” on a scale beyond that of any single university, and 
finally, that it would preserve the “natural alliance” of research and education in a 
balanced fashion.386 Parallel to the logic of the Weather Bureau, the Institute for 
Atmospheric Research planned to invest heavily in “ground” facilities but leave the 
rockets and satellites to agencies that already carried that mandate (NASA).  
 Instead, the Institute would have a spectroscopic lab, instrumented aircraft for 
radiation measurement and vertical profiles of ozone distribution, a “large-scale” 
computer for theoretical calculations. In addition to this, the Institute would design 
instrument payloads for launch on sounding rockets and satellites.387 In July of 1958 the 
universities set up a nonprofit corporation and an agreement for cooperation, however the 
planning for (what became NCAR) stretched on into 1960.  
The Vanguard Division Tools Up for TIROS 
 As demonstrated by the IGY Vanguard proposal—the NRL Vanguard Division 
embodied essentially all the skills to design, launch, and operate a satellite system, but 
not the meteorological specialists to interpret the observations. As of January 1959, NRL 
code directories indicate that the Vanguard Division “moved” from being a Division level 
organization within NRL, to being listed as an “Outside Activity,” still on Navy property. 
Roughly 157 persons were included in this first main transfer of NRL manpower to 
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NASA, including phyicists, clerks, mathematicians, engineer aids, stenographers, 
electrical technichians, research engineers, and secretaries, from a wide range of 
operational units within the Vanguard Division including the Theory and Analysis 
Branch, Radio Tracking, XIB AM transmitter group, vehicles branch, and the program 
office.388 The transfer to NASA came weeks before the launch of the world’s first 
weather satellite, Vanguard II.  
 During the first week of February 1959, there were a series of “intense” meetings 
among the Vanguard Division, NASA Headquarters representatives, the USWB, the 
Army Signal Corps Research Lab, and ARPA.389 Behind the scenes, NASA officials 
deliberated over their course of action regarding meteorological satellite R&D. John 
Hagen, still lead of the Vanguard group, was offered four choices regarding weather 
satellites: NASA might withdraw from the “foundering” ARPA meteorological enterprise 
to devote their entire effort to their own follow-on program that was “just picking up 
steam;” NASA might continue collaborating with ARPA, offering minimal time and 
money; NASA might renew request for responsibility for all phases of project after 
launch; or NASA might request responsibility for the entire project.  
 At this point, NASA had already begun work on its own “follow-on” R&D 
meteorological satellite system, distinct of and more advanced than the Signal Corps’ 
experimental satellite.390 In spite of this and the headaches of taking on an underfunded 
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R&D project, Hagen selected the final option, requesting transfer of the entire project. 
Edgard Cortright was inclined to go with his choice since the Vanguardians were “the 
group which must do the work.”391 It is important to note that, similar to NASA’s initial 
support of the ARPA meteorological satellite, this decision was made at such a relatively 
low managerial level, given the fact that TIROS satellites would soon carry great 
diplomatic significance. The final decision to actually request transfer of the 
experimental meteorological satellite from ARPA to NASA was left to those who would 
“do the work.” In spite of the fact that the USWB wanted charge of the meteorological 
satellite data and in spite of the fact that Eisenhower’s Bureau of Budget had ordained as 
much, it is evident that if the Vanguard Division had opted not to take on the partially-
complete program, their managers would have supported them in the decision.  
 Sources indicate that design work on NASA’s follow-on R&D meteorological 
satellite took place almost entirely independent of operational support to what became 
known as TIROS (see Table 6.1 for details). This means that had the Vanguard team 
demurred on acquiring the simpler former Army meteorological satellite (TIROS), the 
civil space program would not have launched a meteorological satellite launch until at 
least 1963-64. On one hand, the Vanguard team may have benefitted by investing 100% 
of their efforts in development and launch of their own in-house meteorological satellite 
(rather than taking on the hassles and shared credit of launching, operating, and using a 
satellite designed by others). On the other hand, transfer of the partially-complete TIROS 
system did abbreviate the lead-time to NASA’s next successful satellite launch, important 
from an operations standpoint and a public relations standpoint. 
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 In weighing whether or not to take on ARPA’s TIROS meteorological satellite 
project, NASA management also debated whether or not to put in another request for the 
transfer of the Signal Corps’ William Stroud and his team of approximately six.392 Stroud 
had contacted NASA requesting transfer and NASA had sent a request to the Signal 
Corps that was denied based on the fact that Stroud was working on projects other than 
TIROS for the Signal Corps. 
 On 18 February 1959, the day after NASA’s launch of Vanguard II IGY satellite, 
Administrator Glennan wrote to ARPA’s Roy Johnson formally requesting the 
meteorological satellite project. The two had already met with Assistant Secretary of 
Defense Quarles about the matter and reached the conclusion of transfer, so the letter was 
a mere formality. There were at least three reasons that the transfer to NASA was logical: 
NASA had been active on the ARPA ad hoc committee since its inception (as NACA 
before that), they had a firm relationship with the Weather Bureau and had sponsored a 
Meteorological Satellite Section there that was progressing nicely. Last, the NASA 
administrator cited the Vanguard Division itself as justification for moving 
meteorological satellites from ARPA to the NASA. Due to this group’s “considerable 
experience in satellite systems” and the fact that they had specifically organized a “strong 
group to conduct long range” meteorological satellite R&D, Glennan could assure the 
best possible management of the research program.393  
 Two days later ARPA’s Roy Johnson responded amenably to the transfer, but 
cautioning that certain experimental results expected from TIROS were intended to 
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establish the “base for a specific meteorological satellite development program” meeting 
“urgent military requirements.”394 Sources do not reveal precisely what the urgent 
military requirements were, however it is certain is that the Strategic Air Command took 
an interest in the quality of TIROS images after it had been launched (discussed later). 
Sources do not indicate how long Strategic Air Command had been following the 
progress of the meteorological satellite instruments, nor whether ARPA’s TV or IR 
instruments were explicitly intended to function as proof of concept for Air Force 
weather reconnaissance (or even strategic reconnaissance) operations. Johnson’s letter to 
Glennan offered a candid notification: that in spite of NASA’s work on the centralized 
“national” operational satellite system, ARPA may initiate another program to focus 
military requirements. While it is unclear what SAC was doing or expecting in the spring 
of 1959, by 1960, SAC was biding its time, waiting to see how long it would take for the 
NASA-WB team to launch an operational—meaning 12-month a year—weather satellite 
system (to be discussed later in this chapter). Ultimately, Strategic Air Command would 
have two interests in operating its own meteorological satellite program. One interest was 
the retrieval of weather reconnaissance for SAC bombers conducting dangerous in-flight 
refueling. The second was that a weather satellite with lower resolution cameras could 
orbit “in front of” higher-resolution reconnaissance satellites performing cloud cover 
reconnaissance and determining whether or not the higher resolution satellite ought to use 
precious film imaging the earth, or whether cloud cover would obscure such a shot. 
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 The funding and intended application of Stroud’s infrared experiment were 
likewise, complicated elements. As of the winter of 1959, ARPA had notified NASA that 
they would not have the money to pursue the IR instrument nor to include Werner 
Suomi’s earth radiation budget experiment in their first meteorological satellite. Instead, 
they would focus their energies on two RCA television cameras with wide and narrow 
angle resolution. When in the first week of February the Vanguard Division considered 
transfer of the weather satellite program to NASA, part of their motivation had been the 
desire to reinstate Stroud’s instrument and hopefully even transfer the Army Signal Corps 
team to NASA (Suomi’s instrument was not mentioned specifically by NASA, though 
the USWB was deeply concerned about supporting his team).395 That spring, NASA’s 
Vanguard Division assembled a new joint meteorological satellite committee. As 
coordinator of military and civilian interest groups they sought representation more 
balanced in favor of universities and the USWB. Kellogg, who had crafted himself as a 
meteorological satellite expert for nearly a decade, was invited to sit in. Soon he would 
transfer from RAND to the National Center for Atmospheric Research. 
 In spite of having been transferred on paper to NASA, the meteorological satellite 
system remained in many ways the armed services’ baby. Plans were for TIROS to be 
launched by the Army Ballistic Missile Division (BMD). The USWB would have the 
“meteorological data interpretation and use responsibility,” but Navy Photo Interpretation 
Center would carry out the work of photo rectification. (This is the point at which the 
military would determine whether photos bore strategically compromising details for the 
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US or other countries and in turn, whether or not it could be released.)396 BMD and 
Lockheed would operate the data acquisition site in Hawaii. Army Signal Corps 
Laboratory was responsible for data acquisition from the satellite and monitoring the 
RCA payload effort. RCA Astro Electronic Products Division, was responsible for 
installation of the payload and ground equipment at data acquisition sites, answering to 
the Army Signal Corps.397 NASA would manage the overall project, provide orbital 
computation and orbital control (using Vanguard hardware), and develop the infrared 
equipment on the payload (under William Stroud who would transfer with all but one 
man on his team from the Signal Corps to NASA). As intended when under ARPA 
management, the satellite would function as a proof of concept for weather support. 
NASA took on the remaining balance of funds in the weather satellite’s budget ($11M) 
and responsibility for program management.  
 It’s important to note that even if the NASA-WB partners could have had 
unlimited access to the TIROS I and II data and images, a tremendous amount of work 
needed to be done in the field of weather forecasting, mapping the images, and computer 
processing to make operational use of the nephanalyses, let alone data. The fields of 
telemetering bandwidth, data processing, and sheer experience interpreting weather data 
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also had to be improved before the NASA-USWB partners could make operational use 
of a meteorological satellite system. 
Vanguard and TIROS: Circulation of Observations 
 
Particular attention should be paid to preserving and extending the patterns of 
cooperation which were formed during the IGY…the special committee 
commends the NASA for establishing an Office of International Cooperation...398 
 
 Aside from using the same Vanguard and Signal Corps manpower and much of 
the same support system hardware, another important link between Vanguard and TIROS 
were the precedents of data circulation and limitation. Four months before the close of 
the IGY, Weather Bureau Researcher Harry Wexler explained to WB Chief Francis 
Reichelderfer that twelve months of “International Geophysical Cooperation” would 
follow the IGY, extending collaborative activities to the end of 1959. This was, “to 
satisfy both Soviet desire to keep intact their IGY machinery and several nations’ need to 
keep their budget and legislative people happy.”399 In part, this bureaucratic extension of 
the IGY might be viewed as necessary because the US was the only country that had 
instituted space research in a civilian space program. International partners in a sense, 
needed an extended “expiration date” to make use of IGY data still being processed and 
recorded. In addition to the rich return of ground and lower atmospheric observations 
returned from the IGY, many satellite launch schedules had slipped beyond the formal 
close of the IGY cooperation, giving added reason to extend the IGY. 
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 These latecomers included three US satellites carrying meteorological 
instruments. Vanguard II, was launched on 17 February 1959, but due to improper orbital 
insertion, William Stroud’s scanning infrared experiment could not collect useful 
observations. Explorer VI, launched by the Army Ballisitic Missile Agency, on 13 
October 1959, produced the first photograph of earth from orbit. The small TV camera on 
board spent 40 minutes scanning the earth, producing one pixel per satellite rotation, 
compressed the data, and telemetered it to ground stations. Only one image was reduced 
from the data. The image was so poor that “any correlation with known weather from the 
BMD maps was fanciful at best” and at one Washington, D.C. press conference a 
Goddard Spaceflight Center engineer (perhaps in jest) accused “This is all a fake!”400 The 
Army produced no more images for public circulation. Explorer VII carried Suomi’s 
radiation budget experiment. Sources have not yet revealed how the data from the 
radiation budget experiment might have been distributed, but there was wide 
dissemination of the narrative and maps that he drew up from the data.401  
 Both of the imaging satellites were, to varying degrees, failures. Although they 
returned no useful observations of the earth, their originators had set important 
precedents of plans for data circulation and public awareness of it. Awaiting the launch 
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of Vanguard II, one newspaper reported to readers that although the satellite had missed 
its IGY deadline, it was still being treated as an “international scientific experiment in 
space” with the National Academies of Sciences (not NASA) planning to relay data to all 
nations participating in the IGY (sixty-six countries at the time).402 Another newspaper 
article explained that it would take two weeks before the Army Signal Corps scientists 
would be able to process data and “reconstruct first space pictures of earth’s cloud 
cover.”403 Given the fact that these were the first images of their kind, it can be hard to 
speculate how much time the Army factored in for “stitching” images together into 
mosaics and how much time was necessary to confirm that no strategic assets were too 
visible. The two-week wait for images rendered them useless for weather forecasting 
purposes, though meteorologists could contrast images with the known weather 
conditions at the time of imaging and begin refining image interpretation skills.  
 Due to the fact that the TIROS I and II satellites had never been intended as 
contributions to the IGY (they had, in fact, emerged from ARPA’s plans for military 
weather reconnaissance) and that the system transferred to NASA so late in development, 
the armed services exercised considerable latitude determining the processing and 
circulation of TIROS I and II data. Although NASA and the USWB were project 
managers and listed as the responsible agencies, in practice, NASA exercised little 
coordinating power over the space system users.  
 Thus, as of 29 September 1959, both 35 millimeter film negatives or positives of 
the television pictures and duplications of the magnetic tape from the infrared instrument 
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were to be available to “various organizations” willing to write and request copies as of 
September 1959. By 29 October, NASA and USWB representatives were surprised to 
learn of important changes to TIROS data dissemination. An officer representing ARPA 
had recently: 
informed us of an ARPA memo quoting the US intelligence board to the effect 
that all TIROS photos be reviewed by Intelligence personnel prior to public 
release. It was further indicated that this applied not only to the output of the 
narrow angle view camera, but also to that of the wide angle view. Since this was 
contrary to the planning to date on the utilization of these pictures, a meeting with 
the DOD Intel personnel was deemed desirable…404 
 
Soon after, Wexler wrote a memo invoking his authority as National Academies of 
Sciences Space Science Board Chair of the Committee on Meteorological Aspects of 
Satellites. Sending the memo to NASA (presumably to be sent on to ARPA), he 
recommended that TIROS data be made available “to any scientific group” wishing to 
study them. Morris Tepper, Chief of NASA’s Meteorological Satellite Program 
commented that “from a pure scientific research point of view, there is no objection to the 
kind of arrangement proposed by Dr. Wexler and it has our endorsement at the working 
level.”405 
 TIROS I was launched by an Air Force Atlas I on 1 April 1960. On board were 
three meteorological sensors: two TV cameras and one infrared experiment. Television 
images of clouds were transmitted on each orbit to receiving stations in Hawaii and near 
the Army Signal Corps Lab. They were then displayed on a TV screen, photographed 
with a 35 mm camera, and recorded on magnetic tape. TIROS carried two television 
cameras on board, one wide angle (imaging a wider swath of the Earth) and one narrow 
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angle (imaging a more narrow, but higher resolution portion.) Approximately 500 wide 
angle camera pictures were going to be selected for photogrammetric analysis by the 
Navy Photographic Interpretation Center. With their help, NASA would be able to 
improve estimates regarding camera orientation for each image. The US Weather Bureau 
was tasked with constructing grids showing geographic coordinates on these pictures and 
the remaining wide angle images. Gridding the images would make it possible to 
accurately locate the centers of the cameras, making it possible to identify the swath of 
higher resolution data within the image of the wide angle/lower resolution camera.406 
Narrow angle images, due undoubtedly to their higher resolution, were classified whereas 
the wide angle/lower resolution camera produced unclassified images. Nevertheless, 
members of the intelligence community reviewed all images before release to the 
meteorologists.407 
 The infrared radiation measurements taken by TIROS were reduced to a digital 
magnetic tape for input in a computer. The USWB received this data from NASA after it 
had been calibrated. To make sense of the infrared readings, NASA provided orbital 
information along with vehicle attitude so that all this information could be processed by 
an IBM 704 computer.  
 In the months that followed TIROS’ launch, the USWB worried that NASA could 
not keep enough satellites in orbit long enough for sustainable weather coverage. NASA 
representatives, in turn, invoked their authority as coordinating agency, openly 
questioning the USWB’s ability to process and use such data. One week after NASA’s 
launch, NASA’s Hugh Dryden reflected on the USWB’s inability to process, store, and 




disseminate satellite telemetry. He opined that the current volume of data was so great 
that the USWB simply could not deal with it by current processing methods and 
suggested that the USWB turn to the private sector seeking, “contracts with non-
governmental agencies with special competence and experience.” 408 Harry Wexler, on 
the other hand, proposed an international division of labor. Rather than contract with the 
private sector, he suggested that the USWB contract with other national weather services 
for the storage and processing of meteorological data, expanding their base of 
collaborators.409 On 18 April 1960, NASA Administrator Keith Glennan worried that the 
six thousand photos returned from TIROS were “almost impossible to cope with.”410  
 Might the USWB have been angling for cooperation with the Soviets when they 
suggested contracting with international partners for data processing and storage? 
Already, NASA administration and the White House were considering the possibility of 
inviting the Soviets to trade weather satellite data in “Project Comet.” NASA – White 
House correspondence regarding this was classified as Secret, likely due to fears of 
premature speculation in the press before the US could decide whether or not it would 
formally invite cooperation.411 On 26 April 1960, Administrator Glennan wrote President 
Eisenhower, updating him on a variety of international cooperation projects taking place 
at NASA. Glennan noted that due to the fact the USSR cooperated fully with the World 
Meteorological Organization, “the proposed cooperative US-USSR space project would 
fall naturally in this pattern.” Significantly, he observed that if the Soviets demurred on 
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collaboration, “it could be the result of their inability to move rapidly in this field.” While 
national pride might make them wish to contribute, their refusal to collaborate might 
either indicate that their technologies were inferior, or, at the very least lead other parties 
to presume their satellites were inferior.412  
 Unfortunately for the USWB, Gary Powers’ U-2 high altitude reconnaissance 
aircraft was shot down by the Soviet Union on 1 May 1960. Worse, before learning that 
the pilot had survived, the White House claimed that the U-2 was a NASA experimental 
vehicle researching the upper atmosphere and that it had gone off course. It took until 9 
May 1960 for Glennan to convince his head of International Relations Arnold Frutkin 
that the Project Comet invitation to trade satellite data would have to wait.413 Given the 
intelligence and the armed services communities’ concerns about the circulation of 
television images that may reveal too much information, might they have permitted 
sharing TIROS images with their potential adversary? It is probable. On 21 May 1960, 
Air Force General Thomas Power wrote Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas White, 
observing that the TIROS satellite had certainly demonstrated the feasibility of image 
intelligence from space, but that they were “not entirely suitable for intelligence 
purposes”414 The armed services to varying degrees each benefitted from the international 
circulation of meteorological data. 
TIROS Follow-On: Desires for an Operational System 
 Atmospheric sciences stood at the crux of several interagency matters including 
strategies to secure the maximum amount of funding from the Bureau of Budget, efforts 
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to streamline redundant research programs, and military demands for weather prediction. 
This political and financial climate influenced relations among weather researchers, 
satellite developers, and assorted users of meteorological data and necessitated a close 
partnership between NASA and the WB. Indeed, both Reichelderfer and Wexler were 
eager to enlist the technical guidance of NASA. Neither agency posed an overt threat to 
the other’s scientific jurisdiction. As NASA Administrator Hugh Dryden communicated 
to WB Chief Reichelderfer in May of 1960, “NASA has recognized from the beginning 
that research in meteorology as such, and the exploitation of meteorological data…are 
not within the functions assigned to NASA,” rather, “NASA does have the function of 
‘development, construction, testing and operation of research purposes of aeronautical 
and space vehicles.” He continued explaining, “this includes the research on and the 
preparation and launching of satellite meteorological instrument packages, including data 
retrieval.”  
 TIROS I’s performance received rave reviews from both the military and civilian 
meteorological communities. However the meteorologists always made it clear that they 
wanted more. TIROS, launched on a Thor-Abel rocket only had enough thrust to orbit 
around the equator. Meteorologists were eager to have a satellite in polar orbit which 
would provide global coverage of the poles (important for forecasting and science) but 
also coverage of the Soviet Union (of interest to the armed services). The Navy requested 
that the next TIROS have courier style magnetic Earth orientation so that it had fewer 
gaps in coverage when the camera was pointing out to space, but NASA said that they 
could not make those changes to the system in time for the projected 1962 launch of 
operational weather satellites. The Navy and USWB requested that the operational 
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meteorological satellite be less sophisticated than NASA was planning due to funding 
constraints. At this time NASA was eager to move on with development of next 
generation of meteorological satellites (that the Vanguard team had already begun 
development for in 1959). That fall, they informed the Weather Bureau that they would 
stop funding the USWB’s Meteorological Satellite Section as well as the “experimental 
operational use of satellite data.”  
 It was at this time that the NAS and UCAR began coming together forming a 
more substantial contingency to support basic atmospheric research. On 25 September 
1960, under the heading “Satellite Effort Could Be Wasted” (a reference to the TIROS 
weather satellite launched in 1960) the NAS announced the opening of NCAR. Quoting 
an NAS report: 
there exists at the moment no organization or group in the world that is prepared 
to exploit fully the new wealth of information that meteorological satellites will 
certainly provide. Thus, the huge expenditure of scientific effort, engineering, and 
finances in meteorological satellites may be largely wasted unless a proper 
organization is ready to exploit the informational output of the meteorological 
satellites for the increase of our knowledge and the construction of a sound, 
theoretical foundation upon which a new order of practical forecasting can be 
based.415 
 
While the division of labor between the Weather Bureau and NCAR would evolve over 
time, as of 1959-1960, NCAR was expected to provide computing facilities to develop 
techniques in measurement, data reduction, and data interpretation.416 
 NASA and the USWB were still trying to negotiate an amicable division of labor 
concerning the exchange of data with international partners. In August of 1960, NASA 
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and the USWB invited twenty-one countries (likely NATO partners judging by the 
Project Comet summary of international collaboration) to participate in analyzing TIROS 
II data. This was billed by the US as a training opportunity for international partners and 
after TIROS II (which was the second formerly ARPA satellite) NASA and the Weather 
Bureau extended the circulation of images to WMO partners.417 On 6 October 1960, 
Francis Reichelderfer and Hugh Dryden (NASA’s Associate Administrator) spoke by 
phone. Recently, the USWB Chief had written NASA contesting the fact that NASA was 
imposing on the USWB’s mission by transmitting data to international partners. Over the 
course of the conversation, “the Chief reiterated the Weather Bureau’s basic 
meteorological responsibility and apparently had Dr. Dryden’s concurrence that they did 
not wish to alter this.”418 During the conversation, Reichelderfer came to allow that it was 
appropriate for NASA to transmit orbital data concerning the satellite, however he stood 
by the principal that the USWB ought to be the entity forwarding satellite imagery (i.e. 
meteorological data) to international partners.  
 Later that week, at an 11 Oct 1960 meeting among Dryden, Wexler, 
Reichelderfer, and other NASA and WB officials, Wexler again raised the possibility of 
transitioning to a fully operational satellite system, making every effort to keep at least 
one satellite in orbit at all times. Dryden responded with sympathy to Wexler’s research 
interests, but an eye on the budget. He allowed that several users demanded such a 
“beefing up” of the satellite system (presumably the Air Force was the most vocal), but 
that bottlenecks in the production of Agena boosters had increased the cost of an Atlas-
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Agena combination to $7-8 million a set. As a result, one more advantage to extending 
the development phase on TIROS was to cover for the fact that the USWB lacked the 
money and NASA lacked the boosters to launch or maintain an operational satellite 
system—much easier to dub it “experimental” and not have to justify occasional gaps in 
coverage. Already the Bureau faced the risk of cutting other programs to cover expenses 
of the weather satellite program.  
 Furthermore, several parties remained skeptical that the USWB was sufficiently 
funded or staffed to manage a centralized weather service providing for all branches of 
the military in addition to civilian applications. Reichelderfer cautioned that their annual 
appropriation of $500M for satellites and $50M for traditional Weather Bureau functions 
demonstrated an undeniable shift in priorities.419 These numbers represented an 
intimidating expansion of WB operations.  
 Significantly, Air Force General Yates (functioning as Assistant to the Secretary 
of Research and Engineering) was displeased with the designation of TIROS as 
experimental and anxious to speed development to the operational phase. Reichelderfer 
noted Yates’ enthusiasm for enlisting “the Systems Approach” and observed that Yates 
believed “plans might be moving too fast in the utilization of an R & D satellite for 
operational purposes, and too slow in the planning for an operational satellite as such.” 
Assuming that the rate of development had been hampered by limited resources, Yates 
asked whether the Bureau might “get money to finance the whole meteorological satellite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
419 Emphasis in original F. W. Reichelderfer to multiple addressees, “Resume of 
Conferences on Meteorological Satellites,” 11 October, 1960, Box 11, File General 
Correspondence 1960, Wexler Papers.  
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program,” and make it fully operational.420 As mentioned above, this would undoubtedly 
have adverse effects on other USWB research obligations.  
 Yates feared that the longer NASA and the USWB for all appearances stalled on 
setting up an operational system, the greater likelihood that the Air Force (Strategic Air 
Command in particular) would risk gaps in weather coverage. TIROS satellites suffered 
two sorts of gaps. First, NASA and the WB could not afford to keep weather satellites in 
orbit year round. Second, the early experimental TIROS satellites were not spin-
stabilized, meaning that the machine itself rotated while orbiting the earth. The TIROS 
satellites I, II, and III cameras spent only a fraction of their useful life directed at earth, 
meaning that even while a satellite was in orbit, considerable swaths of the globe were 
missed with each pass.  
  At a meeting held 17 October 1960, NASA officials indicated that weather 
satellites were nearly operational and that it was time for another institution to “take over 
operation and control.” Air Force officers interpreted this to mean that the system was up 
for grabs for either the armed services or the USWB.421 Similarly, Harry Wexler and his 
associates at the Bureau found themselves debating their next move. Wexler noted that by 
ostensibly extending the experimental phase of TIROS weather satellites, the USWB 
gambled on the possibility of securing more funding from the Bureau of Budget. In an 
October 1960 memo to his colleagues at the WB, Wexler observed that they stood at a 
“crossroads” of two options. First, the WB might deem the TIROS satellite system fully 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
420 Emphasis added. F. W. Reichelderfer to multiple addressees, “Resume of Conferences 
on Meteorological Satellites – Dr. Dryden, NASA, General D.N. Yates, DoD,” 11 
October, 1960, Box 11, Folder General Correspondence 1960, Wexler Papers.  
421 This was General Thomas Power’s interpretation of the meeting, in Power to White, 1 
December 1960, Box 34, Folder SAC, Thomas White Papers. 
 229 
functional and operational. This, however, would eliminate NASA from the equation and 
result in a considerable increase in expenditures for the WB—“at possible risk to its other 
R & D requests.” Alternately, the WB could continue to “split the package” with NASA, 
allowing NASA to request funding for research on the hardware, while the WB would 
request funding to operate the system. After several cautious correspondences with 
NASA’s Hugh Dryden (and a bit of awkwardness surrounding accusations of duplicate 
requests for funding of satellite R & D), the Bureau and the Agency determined that they 
would for the time being continue to classify the TIROS system as experimental and 
leave all associated matters of funding to NASA.  
 What matters here are not the blurry boundaries between delineations of 
“development” and “operations.” Rather, I encourage the reader to focus on the fact that 
the NASA and the WB together consciously negotiated the status of the TIROS satellite 
system in such a manner that sustained the viability of their financial and scientific 
relations. Determining whether TIROS was experimental or operational was less a factor 
of TIROS I’s technical performance and more a function of institutional dynamics: how 
to secure funding, who best to request funds, and which state (development or operations) 
they were best equipped to manage. After having framed the issue within these pragmatic 
demands, NASA and the WB opted to characterize TIROS as an experimental system, 
still in need of R & D funds, as funneled through NASA.  
Concluding Thoughts 
 Why does the organizational tool of “basic research” seem to stop working in this 
chapter? In part because, as all the actors are well aware, it is impossible to draw clear 
distinctions among basic and applied work, military and civilian and this chapter truly is 
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where the rubber is hitting the road on the meteorological satellite policy. The 
relationship between the USWB, the armed services, and NASA cannot be described as 
collaboration, nor outright competition. Specifically because the armed services were 
already equipped to participate in the science services side: collecting data and 
contributing it to the WBAN, designing meteorological satellites, operating satellites 
systems, and providing satellite data, military and civilian parties continued collaborating 
in field research programs into the 1970s (GARP is just one example) and beyond. Thus, 
the USWB was already very much reliant on the armed services for data from the US and 
spanning the globe, the civilian meteorological community’s best hope was to ratchet up 
the federal support of and bureaucratic clout of non-military meteorological communities 
in universities and USWB.  
 The Air Force becoming dissatisfied with NASA’s way of managing the 
meteorological system is important to note because the Air Force was preparing to “press 
for control” of the US meteorological satellite system to assure that it would be in orbit as 
soon as possible. NASA was not entirely at fault for how long it took. TIROS had already 
been redesigned once so that it could be launched on the Thor-Abel, but Thor rockets had 
gone up in price substantially, making it harder for NASA to budget for constant satellite 
coverage. (Launch is by far the most expensive element to space science). Given NASA’s 
desire to move on to more complicated systems and the resistance of the USWB and the 
armed forces, it makes sense that by 28 November 1960 the DOD and USWB come to 
the agreement that they prefer to meet under a Joint Meteorological Committee 
Reichelderfer is already chairing. In this way they side-step NASA influence. At this 
point, all correspondence with NASA was at higher levels of management.  
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 As potential users of NASA’s Nimbus satellite system, the USWB and armed 
services had common interests: cheap systems, polar orbiting satellites, and operational 
coverage as soon as possible.422 In Chapter Six, their mutual interests will result in the 
Air Force pursuing its own highly classified DMSP, but then persuading the USWB to 
strong-arm NASA into more light, cheap, non-Nimbus satellites closely resembling the 
































	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
422 See Richard LeRoy Chapman, “A Case Study of the US Weather Satellite Program: 
The Interaction of Science and Politics,” (Syracuse Univeristy, 1967). 
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CHAPTER SIX 




space science, like nuclear science…has no conscience of its own. 
Whether it will become a force for good or ill depends on man, and only if 
the United States occupies a position of pre-eminence can we help decide 
whether this new ocean will be a sea of peace or a new terrifying theater 
of war. I do not say the we should or will go unprotected against the 
hostile misuse of space…but I do say that space can be explored and 
mastered without feeding the fires of war,423 




 Chapters Three through Five document the transition of meteorological satellites 
from Vanguard and Explorer proof of concept satellites to TIROS experimental satellites. 
With this chapter we shift emphasis to meteorology as a science service, employing 
operational meteorological satellite systems. Here, the same actors from space science 
and meteorological communities retained hope for the utility of nephanalyses for 
forecasting purposes as well as data concerning the earth’s albedo, heat budget, and other 
properties. From the outset, Weather Bureau officials anticipated the input of World 
Meteorological Organization partners who would benefit from US satellite data and 
images and in return provide local weather observations for establishing ground truth. 
Science services would progress hand in hand with fundamental research as the data was 
archived and used in climatological studies or to study phenomena such as typhoons, 
monsoons, and tornados. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
423 http://er.jsc.nasa.gov/seh/ricetalk.htm, last accessed 5 November 2013. 
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 On 25 May 1961, President Kennedy called for the USWB to be provided funding 
to develop “at the earliest possible time” a satellite capable of worldwide weather 
observation (in implicit contrast to the circulation restrictions on TIROS I and II data).424  
Presidential mandate was less an instruction to NASA and the USWB to share satellite 
observations with international partners and more a signal to other nations of American 
readiness to invest resources in global weather services. President Kennedy and Vice 
President Lyndon Johnson viewed this, and the Apollo mission announcement made the 
same day, as a solution to new crisis to US legitimacy. In the weeks following the 
successful orbit of cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin, human spaceflight and space applications 
such as communications and weather satellites were intended to buttress the US’s 
faltering reputation as a peaceful and potent space power.425 It is debatable the degree to 
which Cold War statesmen sincerely hoped that the Soviet Union would collaborate in a 
global weather service. Indeed, from the outset, the Kennedy administration engaged in 
what are generally accepted as half-hearted offers to collaborate on projects ranging from 
a joint lunar base to trading data and research in joint working groups.426 
 The space science community in NASA and the meteorological community 
translated these Executive level priorities into science practice. To experts such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
424 Urgent National Needs Speech, here the President also announced the US intention to 
place a man on the moon. http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-
034-030.aspx, accessed 8 November 2013. 
425 One excellent example of this mindset is a 12 April 19 1961 (the day of Gagarin’s 
launch) press conference in which Kennedy emphasized the US’s strong suits as being 
“more long-range benefits to mankind,” these were “not as spectacular as the man-in-
space or the first sputnik, but they are important.” Logsdon, John F. Kennedy, 71. 
426 Edward Clinton Ezell and Linda Neuman Ezell, The Partnership: A History of US-
Soviet Cooperation in Space (University of Miami: Center for Advanced International 
Studies, 1974); Krige, NASA in the World; Matthew von Bencke, The Politics of Space: 
A History of US-Soviet/Russian Competition and Cooperation in Space (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1997). 
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Reichelderfer and Wexler, international leadership meant setting an example of 
reciprocity with international partners. Relationships were characterized as reciprocal 
because the utility of satellite observations relied on routine global data from 
international partners. In making this offer for exchange, they provided a justification for 
national weather services abroad to expand and improve upon their own operations. 
International Collaboration: Geographic and Intellectual Reach 
 On the three-year anniversary of the successful Vanguard I launch, the former 
lead of the Program John Hagen delivered a speech to the National Rocket Club.  
At the time, Hagen was serving as NASA’s Assistant Director for Spaceflight 
Development. This one man’s career in many ways functioned as an analog to the 
evolving US space program. Beginning as an astronomer at Wesleyan University, Hagen 
transferred to the NRL in 1935 and worked as a radar physicist in the Second World War. 
Postwar, he worked alongside UARRP collaborators and the Project Paperclip engineers 
and scientists, sharing data and observations with UK space scientists in the early 1950s, 
and weighing in on the deliberations to form a civil space program in 1957-58. Hagen 
was one of many researchers-turned-administrator who had contributed continuously to 
the US’s fitful emergence as a space power. In his speech, he observed that the US was 
already benefiting from a rise in the number of experts worldwide contributing to space 
research and exploration. The next step, he predicted, would be the simultaneous and 
ordered observation of upper atmospheric phenomena from a variety of geographic 
locations, followed by the free interchange of such data. Was he hearkening to the IGY 
past or foreshadowing WWW coordination? 
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 To Hagen, the IGY Minitrack network engendered “perhaps the simplest type of 
international cooperation… sharing in the worldwide tracking of space objects.” 427 
Minitrack was only the beginning. Hagen spoke that day of both intellectual access and 
geographic access accomplished through international cooperation. In addressing the 
limitations of US spaceflight capability, Hagen— born in Nova Scotia— evoked the 
notion of a worldwide pool of human and material resources available to the US. He 
argued that it would be “morally wrong” to “carry on the work of science” without 
making the most of the talent of foreign scientists desiring to participate in space 
research. Both the space science community and the meteorological community had 
practical needs to be filled through coordination with international partners. 
“Data Sparse Regions” 
 As mentioned in previous chapters, the USWB faced a number of interrelated 
challenges and objectives in operating meteorological satellites: improving world 
meteorological service, improving the fundamental understanding of the Earth’s 
atmosphere, and gathering more data from a finer grid of locations. Representatives of 
the military-civilian Interdepartmental Committee on Atmospheric Sciences (ICAS) 
explained: “Without these basic measurements of the atmosphere, scientific research, as 
well as operational weather forecasts and warnings, will suffer severely.” In October 
1960, members of the ICAS learned that the Air Force Weather Reconnaissance Program 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
427 “Space and Cooperation,” Hagen, Director of Office for the UN Conference,  
Speech to national Rocket Club March 1961, RN 902 LEK 1/8/3 Hagen bio, NHRC. 
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would phase out by the close of 1963, depriving the USWB of weather data from across 
the globe.428 
 This situation sent ICAS members scrambling to find a new plan for procuring 
conventional weather observations from oceans and “sparse data regions.” In response, 
the ICAS composed “A Plan for Meeting Meteorological Observation Requirements over 
Sparse Data Regions.” In it, the they expressed concern over the USWB’s ability to 
procure adequate meteorological data from oceans and other “remote regions of the 
earth.” The report continued, noting that, “[t]his problem has become increasingly urgent 
as a result of an announced plan by the Department of Defense to phase out the Air Force 
Weather Reconnaissance Program.” Noting that the AFRP had already been cut by 40%, 
the report recommended that an alternative be set up by December of 1963—the date by 
which the Air Force would complete the phase out of its ground weather services.429 
Realizing that this lack of data would adversely affect research as well as weather 
forecasts and warnings, the WB began looking into upper air sounding equipment that 
could be used on merchant ships as well as automated meteorological observing stations 
for ground and sea. 
 Although the bland terminology of being “data sparse” emotes images of open 
international waters or desert wastelands, forecasters and researchers alike desired more 
and more standardized reports on weather phenomena. While the Soviet Union was a 
reliable contributor to the World Meteorological Organization, there were several 
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countries incapable or unwilling to contribute. China, occupying a very large landmass, 
and not contributing to current international weather exchanges was just one source of 
concern.  
 Such data would also benefitted the armed services—in particular Strategic Air 
Command and other departments of the Air Force and Navy responsible for in-air 
refueling over uninhabited regions and open stretches of water. Presuming the likelihood 
that their Cold War adversary would deny the US weather observations in the event that 
they discovered the US conducting satellite reconnaissance, Air Force leadership 
reasoned that they ought to orbit meteorological satellites to compensate for the potential 
loss of Soviet weather reports. On 1 December 1960, SAC Commander in Chief General 
Thomas Power wrote USAF Chief of Staff, General Thomas White. Reflecting on SAC’s 
dependence on Soviet weather observations and the likelihood that the USSR would deny 
weather observations of the US upon discovering the use of image intelligence satellites, 
Power requested that the USAF undertake the operation of its own meteorological 
satellite system or “press for control” of the national meteorological satellite system “if 
we are to insure that the output from the system will satisfy our requirements.” The 
outlook of General Power warrants quoting at length: 
With the success the Russians had in exploiting the U-2 incident, it appears 
logical to assume that with our launch of reconnaissance satellites, Russia will 
again exploit any means to degrade the effectiveness of the system and at the 
same time reap the harvest of propaganda. Since [the photographic 
reconnaissance satellite] SAMOS will be dependent on cloud conditions…it 
appears only reasonable for Russia to deny the free world weather data from the 
Sino-Soviet bloc. This action would not only have an immediate and serious 
effect on our ability to provide weather forecasts for the operation of SAMOS, but 
would provide Russia with a tremendous propaganda drum, for all nations are 
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interdependent upon one another in their endeavor to understand and predict the 
actions of the atmosphere.430 
 
Indicating it was common knowledge that the USWB was underfunded, he stated that it 
was “in a very poor position to obtain funds to support the [satellite] system, and was 
sure they would not have the same interest in the program as we will have.” A few days 
later, General Power wrote White, suggesting that the Strategic Air Command change its 
name to Strategic Aerospace Command. SAC was intended to be the operating agency 
for the Air Force reconnaissance satellite and Power already was considering the 
adoption of the TIROS meteorological satellite system from NASA (presuming it would 
even be allowed). In light of this, Power suggested that the name change would benefit 
the Air Force, buttressing its reputation “as the progressive and farseeing arm of the 
military services,” this, in turn, would “firmly identify SAC as the air/space agency for 
the accomplishment of the strategic war mission [sic].”431  
1961 Plans: National and International 
 Users in the defense and civilian meteorological communities were eager for 
follow-on satellites after TIROS I and II. After resisting the notion of having two satellite 
systems—Nimbus and TIROS—in design and production at once, NASA representatives 
finally relented to plans for follow-on TIROS satellites. Reichelderfer and Wexler 
remained eager to continue coordinating efforts with NASA. In the eyes of the USWB, 
NASA’s cache of technical skill and design experience coupled nicely with its rapport 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
430 Power to White, 1 December 1960, Box 34, Folder SAC, White Papers. 
431 Confidential letter from Power to White, 5 December 1960. Box 34, Folder SAC, 
White Papers. 
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with Congress; NASA assured a higher degree of financial security and political 
credibility. Observed Reichelderfer:  
As for…whether NASA or Weather Bureau should budget for TIROS V, VI, and 
possibly VII, I would be inclined to say that NASA should go head solely because 
they have Congress’ ear on satellites and are more likely to get the money in crash 
estimates; moreover; this will give us more time to get Congress and Budget 
acquainted with the importance of meteorological satellites and the fact that 
NASA and everybody else agree that operational satellites are not the function of 
NASA.432 
 
With the Nimbus National Operational Meteorological Satellite System running behind 
schedule, these follow-on TIROS satellites would fill in gaps in coverage. Later, that 
month a confidential NASA memo observed the importance of sustaining the TIROS 
program.433 The memo observed that, “Not only does it stand on its own feet in this sense 
but it would also act as an example and, therefore, as a ‘prop’ to our other programs,” 
buttressing morale and setting an example of project management. Thus, an additional 
$24M was requested “at once” so that NASA could begin placing orders for payloads and 
launch vehicles. If no additional funds could be obtained from Congress, the memo 
advised reprogramming other existing projects to free up the money.  
 In spite of the fact that NASA retained the franchise to establish requirements for 
a joint weather satellite system, in the summer of 1961 meteorological satellite planning 
again diverged into military and civilian programs. The Air Force, unsatisfied with the 
fact that TIROS satellites would not be equipped with spin stabilization (which would 
eliminate the gaps in photo coverage addressed in Chapter Five), and that it would not 
circle the earth in a polar orbit, had begun pursuing its own classified weather satellite 
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Record Number 11167 NHRC. 
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system. 434 With no redundant systems on board, the Air Force weather satellite was 
lighter and could be launched on a smaller, cheaper rocket. Also, a polar orbit guaranteed 
full coverage of the Soviet Union, Arctic, and Antarctic. This development is significant 
because parallel development of military and NASA satellite would provide an off-the-






















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
434 The National Reconnaissance Office history of the DMSP program indicates that 
NASA management remained skeptical that spin stabilization could be developed soon 
and inexpensively. Cargill Hall, A History of the Military Polar Orbiting Meteorological 
Satellite Program (National Reconnaissance Office, 2001), 2. 
435 Thus, the USWB would insist that TIROS 9 and the TIROS Operational System be 
based on Air Force models, cheaper than Nimbus but spin-stabilized and polar-orbiting. 
On 28 September 1965, the DOD and DOC would sign an agreement to eliminate the 
necessity for coordination between “Aeronomy” and “Meteorological Reconnaissance 
Programs,” formally permitting independent programs. Hall, History of the Military 
Polar Orbiting, 15. Other names include: Weather Reconnaissance Satellite—Program II 
(as of summer 1961), Program 35 (as of September 1961), Program 694 BH (as of July 
1962), Program 417 (as of August 1962). In 1965 the military meteorological satellite 
program was transferred to SAC and its classification level was reduced. First Defense 
Meteorological Satellite Program satellite launches 1/19/1965.  
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Hardware Notes Policy Notes 
TIROS 1 4/1/60   
TIROS 2 11/23/60   
TIROS 3 7/12/61 New Suomi ERB, switched to 
two wide-angle cameras, 
coverage more important than 
resolution 
Launched with 
MIDAS 3 “Spy in 
the Sky” 
accusations 
TIROS 4 2/8/62  4/15 begin daily fax 
of images overseas; 
suspicion Soviets 
hacked into system 
TIROS 5 6/19/62   
TIROS 6 9/18/62   
TIROS 7 6/19/63  For 
hurricane/typhoon 
season coverage 
TIROS 8 12/21/63 First APT First APT 
NIMBUS 1436 8/28/64 NASA R&D satellite: Advanced 
Vidicon Sys, APT, high-res IR 
for night images 
1963 cancelled 




cheaper and less 
complex 




storm bulletins to 50 
countries 
TIROS 10 7/2/65   
ESSA 
1/TOS437 
2/3/66 Satellite was based on TIROS 9  
ESSA 2/TOS 2/28/66 Satellite was based on TIROS 9, 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
436 Formerly the NOMSS system, by fall 1962 delays were serious.  
437 TOS: TIROS Operational System.  
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Talking about the Weather: US-Soviet Relations 
 On 12 April 1961, the Soviets successfully placed cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin in 
orbit around the earth. President Kennedy initially responded in a fashion parallel to 
Eisenhower’s response to Sputnik, offering lukewarm congratulations to the Soviet 
Union, but not suggesting change to the US course or policy in of space exploration. At 
one press conference, he even suggested that US progress in seawater desalinization 
could “really dwarf any other scientific accomplishments.” Facing criticism for inaction 
from Congress and the press, by the evening of 14 April Kennedy’s outlook had begun to 
change. 438 On 25 May 1961 Kennedy made his “Urgent National Needs” speech to 
Congress in which he called for four things: the commitment to land a man on the moon 
(no estimate of cost), an additional $23M funds for the Rover nuclear rocket (to be used 
for interplanetary spaceflight), an additional $50M for “leadership by accelerating the use 
of space satellites for world-wide communications,” and an additional $75M ($53M for 
the USWB) for the “earliest possible” worldwide weather satellite system.439  
 On 20 December 1961 the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 1721. Based 
on a 1960 US State Department Report, Resolution 1721 was in many regards a nod 
toward US interests in the international use of space.440 “Believing that the exploration 
and use of outer space should be only for the betterment of mankind and to the benefit of 
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States irrespective of the stage of their economic or scientific development,” the UN 
resolution suggested that the WMO study methods for advancing weather forecasting 
capabilities and to “help Member States make effective use of such capabilities.”441 US 
representatives had seen to it that weather and communications satellites were central to 
the resolution—two technologies US policymakers were confidant they had a lead in.  
 With the responsibility to help member nations produce and use weather 
information came the implicit mandate to suggest amendments to the WMO’s existing 
budgetary and organizational structures. These responsibilities were delegated to Harry 
Wexler and Professor V. A. Bugaev of the Soviet State Committee on 
Hydrometeorology. At the USWB, the Resolution set in motion a dizzying chain of 
events. Aware of Soviet Premier Khrushchev’s fickle nature in cooperative agreements, 
the Kennedy Administration pressured the Weather Bureau to act quickly: draft a plan for 
the sharing of meteorological satellite data and negotiate it as quickly as possible. Noting 
the sense of urgency, Wexler observed that the WMO’s tasks and timetable were “rather 
severe.” In January of 1962, Wexler met with Secretary General of the WMO to advise 
on the first draft of the agreement regarding the Greenbelt to Moscow “Cold Line” 
facsimile line. Yet, rather than simply discuss how best to send satellite data between the 
two countries, Wexler identified an additional objective: to “fill in gaps” of coverage. He 
observed that the next steps were “obvious.” After coordinating satellite activities, the 
they would address “more serious gaps in the world network of rawinsonde and oceanic 
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surface stations, improved telecommunications, etc—all comprising a global observing 
and prediction system called the World Weather Watch.442 
 When Harry Wexler and his colleague V. A. Bugaev met in 1962 to draw up their 
technical plans for the Cold Line - World Weather Watch, they based their planning on 
two deficiencies in the existing international meteorological system. First, they voiced 
displeasure with the number of stations contributing ground observations to the WMO. 
Second, they wished to improve the techniques and instruments for the systematic 
measurement of the atmosphere above 30 km. Researchers hoped to make better sense of 
high altitude data (between 30 and 100 km) by combining information gleaned from 
sounding rockets with satellite observations. 
 “The First Report of the WMO on the Advancement of Atmospheric Science and 
Applications in Light of Developments in Outer Space” made it clear that such 
observations were necessary for NASA and USWB techniques in data analysis and 
forecasting.  
full exploitation of the new meteorological [satellite] data…necessitates an 
expansion and rearrangement of the present system whereby conventional 
meteorological observations are made and exchanged under procedures 
laid down by WMO…this proposed system which combines satellite and 
conventional observations, would be called the World Weather Watch443 
 
Far from an act of aid to the developing world, enactment of the WWW was quite 
explicitly intended to advance meteorological satellite practice by “filling in the main 
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gaps in the world network of conventional data.”444 In exchange, the Superpowers 
ensured availability to all partner nations of processed information, observations, and 
“satellite data best suited to meet [their] ends.”  
 Part of the impetus for the Cold Line-WWW data exchanges was the cancellation 
of the Air Force Weather Reconnaissance Program discussed at the opening of this 
chapter. Thus later, when representatives of the Soviet Hydromet expressed concerns 
over the January 1964 deadline for Cold Line exchanges, NASA’s Hugh Dryden 
demurred on an explanation, indicating that pressure to impose this deadline came from 
elsewhere (outside NASA or the USWB). He offered only the ambiguous response that, 
“one of my problems in my country will be to show exchange of data before 1964.”445 
Even if the Soviets did not have a satellite in orbit by January 1964, they did agree to 
begin sending conventional weather data immediately, as soon as the line was in 
operation. The two nations began exchanging non-satellite weather observations in 
October of 1964. 
 In terms of multilateralism, whereas the meteorological community emphasized 
the contributions other nations could make to the WWW and the improvement of WWW 
service, statesmen emphasized the service being provided to fellow WMO members. In a 
7 March letter to Khrushchev, Kennedy speculated that they could render “no greater 
service to mankind” than with such a weather satellite system. Khrushchev responded, 
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agreeing that precise and timely worldwide weather prediction “would be still another 
important step on the path to man’s subjugation of the forces of nature.” 446 
Cold Line Planning | World Weather Watch Planning 
 
 Representatives of both countries recognized the rhetorical value of cooperating 
on “practical” space applications such as communications satellites, navigation, search 
and rescue, and the weather. Such applications promised to improve the quality of life at 
home or to demonstrate developmental altruism abroad. Thus, weather satellite 
collaboration was situated among a variety of proposals President Kennedy made before 
the UN on 20 September 1963.447 Among his considerations were a World Health 
Organization center for health communications, regional research centers to train new 
scientists and doctors for “new nations,” a global communications satellite system, a 
global weather satellite system, a worldwide program for pollution studies and resource 
management, and finally, a worldwide program of farm productivity. 
 Academician in the Soviet Academy of Sciences Anatoly Blagonravov shared this 
rationale, insisting that space experts focus “initial cooperation in practical fields, such as 
weather satellites and communication systems,” particularly because they would be 
“meaningful to the main in the street.”448 In this, the Superpowers communicated a sense 
of accountability to populations worldwide. Numerous trade articles promised lifesaving 
weather predictions regarding tornadoes and hurricanes, improved understanding of 
worldwide rainfall and monsoons, and the ability to trace radioactive fallout in the event 
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of atomic explosions. Information and predictions derived from the WWW promised to 
aid in search and rescue, facilitate ground transportation, predict spring thaws, to make 
the fields of commercial aviation and maritime industries more safe, and to aid farmers 
the world over in the timing of planting and harvest. WWW representatives even 
promised to advance the budding fields of climate and weather modification, to destroy 
hurricanes, dissipate fog, and bring rain on command. 
 
 The US meteorologists emphasized time and again that satellite networks would 
not immediately render conventional ground observations obsolete. Instead, the 
development of these space systems relied upon expanding observation and reporting 
systems on the ground or on suborbital sounding rockets. In the interest of filling in the 
data sparse regions, the WMO Economic and Social Council adopted Resolution 829 
unanimously. At minimum, the WMO called for 100 automated surface stations, 30 in the 
northern hemisphere and 70 in the southern hemisphere. It recommended the construction 
of 53 new upper air observing stations, 33 on land and 20 on ships stationed at fixed 
locations.449  
 In order for such tremendous amounts of information to be useful, local weather 
conditions had to be quantified: rendered stable, standardized, mobile, and combinable. 
Stability was attained through durable media and internationally recognized archival 
repositories; mobility derived through standardized forms, international telephone lines, 
facsimile, computer lines, and eventually communications satellites. Compatibility of 
data was achieved by virtue of its standardization in metrology and reporting formats.  
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 This was the power that Reichelderfer and the USWB wielded. Returning to 
notions of a systemicity among US R&D institutions: Reichelderfer did not command the 
same the influence nationally that he experienced abroad. At home, the USWB had long 
suffered accusations of not being progressive enough in methods or politics. The FAA, 
NASA, and the armed services all competed with the Bureau in the field of basic 
meteorological research, pressing for the decentralization of US R&D management.450 In 
March of 1963, Reichelderfer observed that the USWB had been largely “’dealt out of 
the picture’ as being ‘negative and unimaginative’” with US research policy.451 In the 
US, the Weather Bureau’s relative influence was viewed as negligible. On the world 
stage of the WMO, it was historically and geographically unrivaled.  
Public Diplomacy 
 In October 1966, President Lyndon Johnson’s Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
circulated a paper to the Members of the Space Council. One of the first considerations in 
the report fell under the heading “Changing International Attitudes.” The report 
speculated that following lunar landings by the US and Soviet Union and the eventual 
entry of other nations into space, enthusiasm for space spectaculars would undoubtedly 
diminish. The industrialized “haves” and less developed “have nots” alike would begin to 
question, “what’s in it for us?” Meantime, attention would shift from space spectaculars 
to “practical applications of space programs.”452 Questioning whether the US should 
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move away from an extension of the space race and toward a more orderly and 
internationally responsible way of doing business, the report suggested that the US 
“might instead…use satellites to help bridge the ‘have’ versus the ‘have not’ gap.”  
 To a limited degree, one might interpret the reciprocal arrangements of the WWW 
as a manifestation of power by developed nations over developing nations. WMO 
member states approached the WWW with disproportionate budgets and technical assets, 
at times conscribed, at times mobilized by Cold War and post-colonial sensibilities. The 
US and Soviet Union staged space exploration as a transnational activity rooted in global 
science “for the benefit of all mankind” (a frequent refrain in national and UN law, 
treaties, and proclamations). This was to their geopolitical benefit. In particular, the 
rhetoric of space science conducted for the benefit of all mankind shaped international 
opinion and in turn, space law. Arnold Frutkin, NASA’s Director of International 
Programs, explained in bald candor that the US’s image as a progressive and inclusive 
leader in scientific affairs “without question lent credibility to our posture and contrasted 
sharply with our competitor’s performance.” He says this because the US benefitted from 
positive international opinion throughout the Cold Line-WWW planning and throughout 
the process of establishing international space law.  
 Peaceful cooperation—almost as important as the appearance of wanting to 
cooperate—ultimately buttressed the US’s image “as an open society ready to join with 
all of good will, and in particular demonstrates the openness of this country with one of 
its greatest national assets—advanced technology.” These circumstances combined again, 
in Frutkin’s own words, to function as a “catalyst for sentiment in support of US 
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objectives on the subject of outer space in UN forums.”453 Hence, the 1966 settlement of 
space law as being free for all nations, open for private business, and only mildly 
regulated by the UN. 
In the early years, the US and USSR used the forum of the United Nation’s WMO 
to set the tone for agreements in worldwide standards of data recording and exchange 
among dozens, and later hundreds, of participants.454 Through agreements made with the 
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WMO, the USSR and US agreed to use their meteorological facilities, “as places of ‘on-
the-job’ training” and training seminars.455  
Getting to the Global 
 
 Following its rocky developmental phase, World Weather Watch qualified as an 
unquestionable scientific and public service success. One of its most striking features 
remains the sheer number of weather stations linked to one another through 
meteorological satellites, communication satellites, high-speed data processors, and 
telecommunication facilities throughout the course of the entire cold war. WMO member 
nations participated in a remarkably smooth-operating system. As of 1975, only five of 
approximately 135 countries failed to supply weather data in compliance with WWW 
procedures, and only an estimated 5% of required information remained unreported 
overall.456 In the 1970s, WWW precipitated several specialized observational 
experiments in which nations conducted synchronized observations of extraordinary 
weather phenomena such as monsoons and polar air-mass transformations. Throughout 
this time, Soviet and American satellites remained vital tools to the WWW, not only for 
gathering meteorological information, but later as data relays, transmitting signals from 
ships, buoys, aircraft, and weather balloons.457 
 The WWW was also a diplomatic achievement. The US and Soviet Union were 
each dependent upon the developing world for local reports—not only for daily 
conventional weather predictions, but for the very development of satellite meteorology 
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technique and computer numerical forecasting. Here, the desires of the “haves” and “have 
nots” converged in the interest of a thoroughly standardized global network distributing 
satellite and conventional weather data. Together national and international institutions 
sought to expose budding weather services to higher standards of practice, meantime 
agglomerating national services into a semi-automated international network geared for 
the collection and dissemination of world weather data. Infused with a humanitarian 
rhetoric of development, they offered the legitimacy of WMO training, bargain-priced 
Automatic Picture Transmission (APT) equipment, and access to satellite data. In the end 
all parties received standardized weather data, training, and forecasts in a politically 

























CHAPTER 7  
Conclusions and Looking Ahead: 




 Cold War historians have produced a rich literature concerning the state’s 
mobilization of technologies in military activities, in international relations, and in 
politics. Problematizing the notion that space exploration represents solely nationalistic 
aspirations, I look to the careers of experts within the space science and meteorological 
communities to document the emergence (not the deployment) of a series of sounding 
rocket and satellite systems during the Cold War. Charged with maintaining a strategic 
edge over potential adversaries, researchers in DOD labs pursued programs in materials 
science, rocket science, environmental science, and space science as just a few examples 
throughout this study. Thus, the TIROS Genealogy in Table 1.2 and the coalitions listed 
in Table 1.1 illustrate that the TIROS satellite system traces its origins to a broad network 
of R&D communities funded almost entirely by defense funding.  
 Operating at the epistemic edge of their fields—in many regards beyond the 
budgets of their traditional sponsor-patron relationships—UARRP members mitigated the 
cost of expensive sounding rocket systems by coordinating research activities with 
partners in universities, industries, and colleagues overseas. For more than a decade 
before the Sputnik shock and alleged birth of the Space Age, these researchers in many 
regards bided their time, waiting for the resources to perform satellite R&D. During this 
understudied lead-time to satellites, they awaited sponsorship, continuing proof of 
concept work with sounding rockets (Chapters Two and Three) and weighing the 
institutional and administrative liabilities presented by satellites (Chapter Three). One 
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month into the IGY and one month before the launch of Sputnik, NRL’s Homer Newell 
published his report, “The Challenge to the United States Leadership in Rocket Sounding 
of the Upper Atmosphere,” cautioning that US ought not lose its lead in upper 
atmospheric research to other nations.458  
 Funding for a scientific IGY satellite and the Executive mandate for the formation 
of NASA were two critical moments in which resources otherwise inaccessible to these 
communities became available. Both tipping points hinged on sobering threats to US 
national security and the perception that the US may have lost its strategic edge over the 
Soviet Union. Whereas the IGY satellites were intended to establish the legal precedent 
of satellite overflight (making way for reconnaissance satellites to better assess the 
nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union), NASA was formed in response to Sputnik as an 
alleged demonstration of Soviet ICBM capability and the threat of a Soviet conquest of 
space for militaristic purposes. In Chapter Six, cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin’s successful orbit 
around the earth provides a third “threat,” a threat less to US national security and more 
to soft power prestige. In response, President Kennedy called for a race to the moon and 
funding for what USWB and WMO representatives would mold into the WWW. 
 Fundamental scientific research, the research communities proper, and 
manifestations of their R&D such as the Vanguard and TIROS satellites were each dual 
use in nature. As such, they could serve hard power national defense. But they could also 
and function as co-optive instruments of soft power among allies (such as the Gassiot 
Committee, IGY, NASA, and WWW), the non-aligned (through the IGY, NASA, and 
WWW), and even the USSR (IGY, NASA, and WWW). From roughly 1957 and through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
458	  Cited	  in	  Newell,	  Beyond,	  endnote	  23,	  459,	  	  
 255 
1962, US administrative and legislative branches began to retool for the more effective 
deployment of soft power in space. To do so they appropriated pre-existing initiatives 
(some may say the norms) of scientific and engineering communities. Representatives of 
the Weather Bureau, department of defense labs, universities, and private industry had 
each long-since identified stakes in the carefully managed circulation of knowledge 
among themselves and international colleagues. These communities relied upon 
transnational organizations such as the UN’s meteorological, astronomical, radio, and 
other Scientific Unions to remain abreast of—and to assert their authority in—these 
fields.  
 When history is told from the perspective of Stroud, Wexler, Newell, and 
Reichelderfer’s R&D, field science, and science service communities we learn the ways 
in which NASA was not simply a demonstration of American prowess vis a vis Sputnik. 
Neither can it be described as a clear-cut compartmentalization of civilian resources from 
military resources. It was at once a compliment to hard power and an instrument for 
scientifically substantive international collaboration.  
 At the heart of NASA’s formation and each the coalitions listed above were 
efforts to draw distinctions between what were to be military activities, what would be 
preserved as non-military, or what must be cleaved out as explicitly civilian. Engaging in 
a Cold War competition with Soviet statism, experts and policymakers of the Eisenhower 
era expanded federal powers, institutionalizing technological change for state purposes. 
But many did so self-consciously, fearing the buildup of what was often described in 
actor terms as a monolithic technocratic state. They deliberated over delicate boundary-
work to characterize this expansion of state power as embodying select elements in a 
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series of binaries including: military/civilian, applied/ basic, national/international 
interest, R&D/operational, crash project/sustainable program, and 
competitive/collaborative. Thus, rather than characterize their public policy as a 
wholesale centralization of power in the state, it was viewed as a subsidy to civil life and 
a counterpoise to the US’s much-feared progression toward a garrison state. 
 
 I will close this dissertation outlining areas I intend to improve upon in the future. 
Foremost, I must develop a firmer grasp of the USWB and its relative stance with UCAR, 
NCAR, and university researchers. I must better elucidate the function of the USWB as a 
potential and established user of weather satellites and I must also better determine its 
alleged mandate over basic research to which Reichelderfer and Wexler so frequently 
referred.  
 In the months to come I will work to identify numbers reflecting the relative 
funding of the communities at hand. That will provide a clearer sense of the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of the institutions as well as their relative rise and decline in 
influence among one another.  
  In addition to this, I hope to develop a more refined understanding of the 
relationship of Eisenhower to the PSAC and how they operated as a conduit of the 
broader scientific community’s interests. I also need to develop a more clear narrative 
concerning space policy in the Kennedy-LBJ White House years. Doing so will help me 
begin to refine our understanding of the US and Soviet Union as Cold War powers within 
a distinctly global Cold War. 
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 Finally, this dissertation has explored how scientific communities with the 
Executive and Legislative branches are interdependent for political legitimacy, public 
diplomacy, funding, and the execution of public services. However, science and 
technology policy underpinning these coalition activities were neither inevitable 
outgrowths of this democratic capitalist system, neither were they guaranteed to be 
permanent. In later iterations of this work, my research will address threats to the WWW 
order, in particular, debates concerning the centralization of military and civilian weather 
satellite programs into one joint satellite system, the unpalatability of the armed services 
benefitting from the WWW, and how Cold War and post-colonial tensions otherwise 






















Meeting  Date  Place  Remarks  
 0  16 Jan. 46  NRL  Preliminary, exploratory discussion.  
1  27 Feb.46  PU  Organizing meeting.  
2  27 Mar. 46  NRL  -  
3  24 Apr. 46  NRL  Now called V-2 Upper Atmosphere Panel. Panel begins practice of 
hearing reports on firings and research results.  
4  3 June 46  APL  -  
5  9 July 46  GE  -  
6  5 Sept. 46  WL  Now called V-2 Upper Atmosphere Research Panel.  
7  4 Nov. 46  ESL  -  
8  28 Jan. 47  NRL  -  
9  25 Mar. 47  PF  JRDB requests long range plans from panel.  
10  7 May 47  APL  -  
11  3 July 47  WSPG  -  
12  1 Oct. 47  GE  Aerobee test firings have started. Panel promotes symposium on high-
altitude physical research by rockets, to be held at American Physical 
Society meetings in Chicago. 29-31 Dec. 1947.  
13  29 Dec.47  Chi.  Krause resigns; Van Allen elected chairman. Office of Chief of Ordnance 
proposes panel consider broadening its scope.  
14  28 Jan. 48  NRL  -  
15  18 Mar. 48  ERL  Name changed to Upper Atmosphere Rocket Research Panel.  
16  28 Apr. 48  ESL  -  
17  16 June 48  APL  -  
18  29 Sept. 48  WSPG  -  
19  5 Jan. 49  CIT  -  
20  21 Apr. 49  UM  Van Allen has been using Aerobees fired from shipboard to extend 
geographic coverage of his research.  
21  3 Aug. 49  HCO  Viking development is under way, and a first firing has been made.  
22  26 Oct. 49  NRL  -  
23  14 Feb. 50  APL  -  
24  20 Apr. 50  NRL  Panel plans a coordinated set of high-altitude temperature experiments.  
25  14 June 50  UC  Sydney Chapman, British scientist, attends.  
26  8 Sept. 50  GE  Future research requirements and need for higher altitude vehicles considered.  
27  31 Jan. 51  NRL  -  
28  25 Apr. 51  NRL  Panel begins discussions that lead to publication of panel paper on 
properties of upper atmosphere in Physical Review.  
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29  14,15 Aug. 
51  
URI  Panel conducts seminar on properties of atmosphere at high altitudes. 
Panel has been giving extensive consideration to sounding rocket 
firings at other locations than White Sands; Fort Churchill, Canada, is 
one of the possibilities being considered.  
30  24 Oct. 51  UCh  -  
31  8 Jan. 52  SUI  -  
32  30 Apr. 52  MN  Panel plans to accept invitation from Gassiot Committee to join 
symposium on upper atmosphere at Oxford in August 1953.  
33  7 Oct. 52  TN  Van Allen reports on use of balloon-launched rockets, called Rockoons. 
Panel is planning a symposium on rocket ionospheric studies.  
34  29, 30 Jan. 53  PAFB  -  
35  29 Apr. 53  TN  Panel is going in depth into plans for coordinated northern latitude firings.  
36  7 Oct. 53  AFCRC  Panel reviews results of international symposium on upper atmospheric 
research held at Oxford the preceding August. Panel discusses 
participation in IGY.  
37  4 Feb. 54  MN  Special Committee for the IGY (SCIGY) to work on Arctic firings is appointed.  
38  29 Apr. 54  MN  Plans progressing for IGY rocket program.  
39  8, 9 Sept. 54  NRL  Panel develops budget for IGY program.  
40  3 Feb. 55  JPL  Panel votes to offer SCIGY to Technical Panel on Rocketry of National Academy of Sciences.  
41  2 June 55  TN  Panel data on upper atmosphere has been used in preparing proposed 
extension to ICAO Standard Atmosphere used in aeronautical design 
work.  
42  27 Oct. 55  BRL  Van Allen reports on Rockoon firings in auroral zone. Panel is planning 
symposium on scientific uses of earth satellites.  
43  26, 27 Jan. 56  UM  Symposium on scientific uses of earth satellites.  
44  31 May 56  P  Panel hears reports on Japanese, Australian, British, and French 
rocket programs. IGY satellite plans are discussed.  
45  17 Dec. 56  NRC  Rocket firings are under way at Fort Churchill.  
46  29 Apr. 57  NRL  Panel changes its name to Rocket and Satellite Research Panel.  
47  19 Sept. 57  AFCRC  Committee on the Occupation of Outer Space formed.  
48  13, 14 Nov. 57  UM  Meeting devoted to report of COS, and to discussion of future of RSRP.  
49  6 Dec. 57  NAS  Meeting devoted to planning RSRP's promotion of a National Space 
Establishment. Panel has been enlarged-about double.  
50  19 Dec. 57  UCh  Meeting devoted to planning RSRP's activity in support of National Space Establishment.  
51  8 Jan. 58  NAS  Meeting devoted to the promotion of National Space Establishment.  
52  14 Feb. 58  MN  Meeting hears reports of progress on promoting National Space Establishment.  
53  2 Apr. 58  NAS  -  
54  29 Jan. 59 
(1959-1)  
NASA  Panel discusses its future role; decides on series of colloquia.  
55  10 Apr. 59 NASA  Colloquium on Van Allen Radiation Belt.  
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(1959-2)  
56  15 June 59 
(1959-3)  
NAS  Symposium on IGY rocket and Satellite results.  
57  6 Nov. 59 
(1959-4)  
NAS  Colloquiurn on ionosphere.  
58  17 Feb. 60 
(1960-1)  
UM  Colloquium on magnetic storms and their relation to rocket and satellite 
research. Panel adopts formal constitution.  
59  18,19 May 
60 (1960-2)  
SH  Review of panel firings and results.  
 PANEL SUSPENDS OPERATIONS 
 60  2 Feb. 68 
(1968-1)  
JPL  Primarily to renew acquaintances. Secretary proposes to turn over panel 
files, when he finishes with them, to National Air and Space Museum, 




































NATIONAL SPACE ESTABLISHMENT 




 27 December 1957 
Summary of Proposal  
  
It is proposed that there be created a unified National Space Establishment for the 
purpose of carrying out the scientific exploration and eventual habitation of outer space.  
  
It is imperative that the United States establish and maintain scientific and technological 
leadership in outer space research in the interests of long-term human progress and 
national survival.  
  
1. Role  
  
The role of the National Space Establishment shall be to unify and to greatly expand the 
national effort in outer space research, specifically excluding areas of immediate military 
urgency (e.g., the development, production and fielding of intercontinental and 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles).  
  
2. Mission  
  
The broad mission of the National Space Establishment shall be to establish United States 
leadership in space research by 1960 and to maintain it thereafter.  
  
Accomplishment of this mission requires the following specific achievements:  
  
(a) An intensified program of scientific soundings with high altitude rockets, 
immediately.  
  
(b) An intensified program of scientific and technical developments with small 
instrumented satellites of the earth, immediately.  
  
(c) Impact on the moon with non-survival of apparatus, by 1959.  
  
(d) Placing an instrumented satellite in an orbit about the moon, by 1960.  
  
(e) Impact on the moon with survival of scientific instruments, by 1960.  
  
(f) Returnable, manned satellites in flight around the earth, by 1962.  
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(g) Manned circumnavigation of the moon with return to the earth, by 1965.  
  
(h) Manned permanent satellite, by 1965.  
  
(i) Manned expedition to the moon by one or two men, by 1968.  
  
(j) Manned expedition to the moon by a sizeable party of men, by 1971.  
  
A thorough analysis of existing capabilities shows that all of these objectives are within 
reach of a unified, vigorous national effort.  
  
3. Funds Required  
  
A detailed analysis shows that the accomplishment of the basic mission will require a 
national expenditure of ten billion dollars over the next decade.  
  
4. Administrative Status of National Space Establishment  
  
(a) It is strongly desirable that the N.S.E. be given statutory status as an independent 
agency in order that its work can be freely directed toward broad cultural, scientific and 
commercial objectives. Such objectives far transcend the short term, though vitally 
important, military rocket missions of the Department of Defense.  
  
(b) If the proper creation of an independent agency is judged to require an intolerable 
delay, then it is believed that statutory existence under the Secretary of Defense (but not 
within the jurisdiction of any one of the military services) will be a workable arrangement 
for the immediate future. But in this event, it is urged that the "charter" of the agency 
explicitly provide for its independence as soon as its stature and achievements make this 
advisable.  
  
(c) It is explicitly advised that the National Space Establishment not be placed within the 
jurisdiction of any one of the three military services. There are many reasons, growing 
out of extensive professional experience, for this view. The military services are basically 
operating agencies, not research ones. The research talent of any branch of the military 
services is almost inevitably turned toward helping meet short term, limited objectives. 
Such a point-of-view would assure the failure of a National Space Establishment in its 
broad mission-which is truly a national one, far beyond the mission of any one of the 
services or of the Department of Defense taken as a whole. During the early phases of 
space research, it is evident that existing facilities and missile technology of the 
Department of Defense can make enormous contributions. The National Space 
Establishment must be set up in such a way that it enjoys the unqualified support of all 
three services, and not merely one of them. Such a situation is believed to be possible 
only if the N.S.E. is an independent agency from the outset or if it is directly responsible 
only to the Secretary of Defense during its early years-with the clear prospect of 
independence at the earliest possible date.  
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(d) There must be clear channels for mutual cooperation between the proposed N.S.E. 
and all levels of the Department of Defense, in order to assure no jeopardy of short term, 
vital military need on the one hand and in order to assure maximum rate of advance of 
space research on the other.  
  
5. Remarks on the Long Range Importance of Space Research  
  
It is already clear that international leadership hinges, to a very great extent, on 
preeminence in scientific and technological matters.  
  
Space research will contribute enormously to the educational, cultural, and intellectual 
character of the people of the United States and of the world. Indeed, the exploration and 
eventual habitation of outer space are the finest examples of the "Endless Frontier". It is 
for such bold endeavors that the highest motives of men should be invoked.  
  
There will be a rich and continuing harvest of important practical applications as the 
work proceeds. Some of these can already be foreseen-reliable short term and long term 
meteorological forecasts, with all the agricultural and commercial advantages that these 
imply; rapid, long range radio communications of great capacity and reliability; aids to 
navigation and to long range surveying; television relay; new medical and biological 
knowledge, etc. And these will be only the beginning. Many of these applications will be 
of military value; but their greater value will be to the civilian community at large. (To 
use a homely example, the telephone is certainly a valuable military device, but its 
importance to the civilian population is vastly greater.)  
  
6. Availability of the Rocket and Satellite Research Panel for Consultation and 
Participation  
  
The Rocket and Satellite Research Panel comprises a broad membership of persons of 
extensive experience in all aspects of the proposed program of outer space research. Its 
members are professionally dedicated to national leadership in this field. They offer their 
services, individually and collectively, in the conduct of the broad mission of the 
National Space Establishment.  
  
  
[431-432] The Rocket and Satellite Research Panel 
 Berning, W. W.  Army Ballistics Research Lab.  
Delsasso, L. A.  Army Ballistics Research Lab.  
Dow, W. G.  University of Michigan  
Ehricke, K.  Convair Corp.  
Ference, M.  Ford Research Laboratory  
Green, C. F.  General Electric Co.  
Greenberg, M.  AF Cambridge Research Center  
Jones, L. M.  University of Michigan  
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Kaplan, J.  University of California  
Kellogg, W. W.  Rand Corp.  
Newell, H. E.  Naval Research Laboratory  
Nichols, M. H.  University of Michigan  
O'Day, M. D.  AF Cambridge Research Center  
Pickering, W. H.  Jet Propulsion Laboratory  
Spencer, N. W.  University of Michigan  
Stehlink, K.  Naval Research Laboratory  
Stewart, H. J.  Jet Propulsion Laboratory  
Stroud, W. G.  Army Signal Engineering Lab.  
Strughold, H.  Randolph AFB  
Stuhlinger, E.  Army Ballistic Missile Agency  
Townsend, J. W.  Naval Research Laboratory  
Van Allen, J. A., Chairman  University of Iowa  
Von Braun, W.  Army Ballistic Missile Agency  
Whipple, F. L.  Smithsonian Astrophysical Obs.  
Wyckoff, P. H.  AF Cambridge Research Center  
Zelikoff, M.  AF Cambridge Research Center  
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